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THE WORK OF THE MISSOURI SUPREME
COURT FOR THE YEAR 1940
STATISTICAL SURVEY
FRED L. I-OWARD*

The total number of opinions handed down by the Missouri Supreme
Court in 1940 was 282.1 Table I presents the state of the docket on
December 31, 1940 and what activity there has been in the docket for the
last two years. The number of cases shown by the docket and the number
of opinions handed down by the court are not the same because often one
opinion disposed of several docketed cases.
TABLE 12
SUPREME COURT DOCKET
January1, 1939 to December 31, 1940
Number of cases filed in 1939 and 1940
Civil
1939 ......... 320
1940 ......... 310

Writs
181
178

Criminal
89
93

Total
590
581

Number of cases disposed of by opinions
Civil
1939 ......... 254
1940 ......... 267

Criminal
51
43

Total
305
310

*Chairman, Board of Student Editors.
1. There are seven cases listed by the supreme court as decided in 1940, the

opinions of which have not been published at this writing.
2.

Table I was prepared by the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
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Number of cases disposed of by motion
Civw7
1939 ......... 176
1940 ......... 228

Writs
131
140

Criminal
52
38

Total
350
406

Number of cases disposed of 1939-1940 ...................... 1380
Number of cases filed 1939-1940

.......................... 1171

Table II presents the various ways in which the 282 cases decided by
opinion in *1940 were disposed of. It is of note that as many cases were
affirmed as were reversed or otherwise disposed of. However, it may be
that the appellant considered that his appeal was successful even though
the judgment of the lower court was affirmed in some manner.
TABLE II
DIsPosIIoN

OF LITIGATION

Judgments affirmed .....................................
119
Judgments affirmed and remanded ........................
2
Judgments affirmed on condition of remittitur ..........
3
Judgment affirmed as to one respondent, reversed and remanded as to the other parties ......................
1
Judgment on merits affirmed, judgment assessing costs
reversed ........................................... 1
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed with directions in part .. 1
Judgment affirmed in part, amended in part and set aside in
part ...............................................
1
Judgment on counterclaim affirmed and cause remanded with
directions ..........................................
1
Judgments reversed ....................................
18
Judgments reversed and remanded ........................
26
Judgments reversed and remanded with directions ........ 27
Judgments reversed with directions ......................
2
Judgment reversed and appellant discharged ..............
1
Judgments reversed as to one respondent, affirmed as to others 2
Judgments remanded with directions ....................
2
Judgment reversed and new judgment granted on condition
of remittitur .......................................
1
Decrees affirmed ........................................
11
Decree affirmed and remanded with directions ............
1
Decree reversed and remanded with directions ..............
1
Orders granting new trial reversed and remanded with directions ............................................
2
Orders granting new trial affirmed ......................
2
Order granting new trial affirmed and cause remanded ....
1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1
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Pleas to jurisdiction sustained as to some respondents, overruled as to other respondents ........................
Opinion and judgment quashed ..........................
Opinion quashed in part, writ as to remainder of opinion
quashed ...........................................
Opinion and record quashed in part ......................
Opinion quashed in part ................................
Records quashed ........................................
W rits quashed ..........................................
W rits granted ..........................................
Writ dismissed .........................................
Alternative writ made peremptory ......................
Writ granted, relator discharged .........................
Rules absolute .........................................
Preliminary rule discharged .............................
Appeals dismissed ......................................
Transferred to court of appeals ..........................
Petitioner remanded to custody ..........................
Defendant disbarred ....................................
Ouster denied, proceedings dismissed ....................
Respondent ousted from office ..........................

1
1
1
1
1
4
11
4
1
1
1
7
1
2
13
1
2
1
2

SUMMARY
Cases affirmed in some manner ........................
Cases reversed in some manner ..........................
Cases otherwise disposed of ..............................
Total opinions considered .............................

142
78
62
... 282

Table III shows roughly the relative activity in the different fields of
law within the cases that were decided by the supreme court. It should
be borne in mind that each case was placed in only one classification. In
many instances this amounted to an arbitrary classification since most of
the opinions involved several points. Also, this table gives no indication
of the relative volume of cases in the different categories in the trial or
appellate courts; only in the supreme court. This result is inevitable since
the jurisdiction of the supreme court allows easy appeal to it in some
classes of cases and almost prohibits such appeal in other classes of cases.
It should be remembered that, by reason of the form of court organization
in Missouri, many decisions of the courts of appeal represent decisions of
last resort, but they are not represented in these tables nor considered in
this survey.
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TABLE III
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
Administrative Law ....................................
A gency ................................................
Appeal and Error ......................................
Attorney and Client ....................................
Bills and Notes .........................................
Banks and Banking .....................................
Constitutional Law .....................................
Certiorari ..............................................
Conflicts ...............................................
Contracts ..............................................
Corporations ...........................................
C ourts .................................................
Criminal Law ..........................................
Creditors Rights ........................................
Domestic Relations ......................................
E quity ................................................
E vidence ..............................................
G ifts ..................................................
H abeas Corpus .........................................
Insane Persons .........................................
Insurance ..............................................
M andam us .............................................
Master and Servant .....................................
Mortgages .............................................
Municipal Corporations ..................................
Negligence (Automobile) ................................
Other Negligence .......................................
Partnership .................
..........................
Pleading ...............................................
Practice and Procedure ..................................
Quo W arranto ..........................................
Real Property ..........................................
Sheriff ................................................
Statutes ...............................................
Sales ..................................................
Taxation ...............................................
Torts (other than negligence) ............................
Trusts .................................................
Wills ..................................................
Workmen's Compensation .................................

4
2
10
5
1
2
12
4
1
5
2
15
44
2
3
14
11
1
1
1
8
4
4
9
13
7
9
1
4
13
2
13
3
8
1
11
6
5
14
7

It may well be noted that no case was reversed on rehearing and only
two were modified, although 110 motions for rehearing were either denied
or overruled. Dissents were registered by one or more judges in four cases.
In one of these dissents a commissioner joined. In five other cases there was
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1
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concurrence in result only. In three of these eases a judge or judges concurred; in one case a judge and a commissioner concurred and in one ease
a commissioner alone concurred. In three cases there were separate concurring opinions by judges. No commissioners joined in these concurring
opinions. In one case a commissioner expressed himself as "dubitante"
(doubting) but did not dissent.
There were three per curiam opinions; 154 opinions were written by
commissioners and 128 opinions were written by judges. Of the 282 cases
decided with opinion by the supreme court, 48 were decided en bane, 124
were decided by division one, and 110 by division two.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ROBERT

L.

HOWARD*

The absence of important decisions by the State Supreme Court in
the field of administrative law in any particular year, as has frequently
been true in the recent past, does not necessarily indicate that important
developments in that field of the law may not have taken place within
the jurisdiction. The expedient of counting the cases or measuring the
space occupied in the digest, if, conceivably, a criterion in any field of
the law, as some appear to believe, clearly has no application to public
law development. Not infrequently its greatest growth proceeds at the
hands of agencies other than the judiciary.
Within the year 1940, however, a few cases in the Supreme Court of
Missouri dealing with aspects of administrative law appear sufficiently
important to be brought to the attention of the bar as a brief part of this
general survey.
There is a well established doctrine in the field of administrative law,
sometimes euphemistically characterized as that of administrative impregnability by estoppel, which denies to a party a judicial remedy until
he has exhausted his available administrative remedies. Just as the
courts will not listen to such a party, so they will not intervene to restrain
an administrative tribunal from acting within its jurisdiction. The cases
herein referred to, with one exception, furnish varying illustrations of
the application of these general doctrines.
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B. University of Missouri,
1917; A.M., 1918; LL.B., 1925; S.J.D., Harvard, 1933.
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The case of Hughes v. State Board of Health' involved an attempt to enjoin the board from hearing a complaint directed to the revocation of the
plaintiff physician's license to practice medicine. In denying the injunction
the supreme court gave full recognition to the fact that administrative
agencies such as the board of health "are, by legislative enactment, invested with a part of the state's police power," 2 and that they are to be
permitted to exercise some discretion in the performance of their official
functions involved in the exercise of such power; and reasserted the familiar
doctrine that "Courts of equity do not interfere by injunction for purposes
of controlling acts of public officers constituting inferior tribunals
on matters properly pertaining to their jurisdiction.' ""
Four cases decided by the supreme court during the period under review
involved actions in prohibition to prevent circuit courts from proceeding
with matters alleged to be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of administrative tribunals, three of which had to do with the
functioning of the state public service commission. State ex reZ. Cirese v.
Ridge4 presented such an attempt to prevent a circuit court in Kansas City
from taking jurisdiction in an equity suit by one electrical company to
restrain another, operating without a certificate from the public service
commission, from competing with it. Since the defendants, by demurrer,
admitted that they were operating as a public utility, the court thought
it clear that the public service commission had jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the controversy. The court emphasized that matters relating
to public utilities had been placed by statute under the regulation, supervision, and control of the state public service commission; that all such
matters within the jurisdiction of the commission must first be determined
by it before the courts will intervene; that during the more than a quarter
of a century since the Public Service Commission Law was enacted this
exclusive jurisdiction of the 'commission in first instance had not been
questioned; and that orderly procedure in this field of the law requires
that this practice be continued.
The second case involving attempted court interference with the
functioning of the state public service commission, State ex rel. Public
Service Commission v. Padberg,5 dealt with an attempt to prevent enforcement of the Bus and Truck Law of 1931. That Act fully vests in the
1. 345 Mo. 995, 137 S. W. (2d) 523 (1940).
2. Id. at 526.
3. Ibid.
4. 345 Mo. 1096, 138 S. W. (2d) 1012 (1940).
5. 346 Mo. 1133, 145 S. W. (2d) 150 (1940).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1
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commission the power of regulation, supervision, and licensing of commercial hauling by motor vehicle on the public highways of the state.
License fees, graduated by carrying capacity which the commission is
authorized to determine, begin with capacity in excess of one and one-half
tons. The commission is specifically authorized to determine this capacity
either by the manufacturer's rated capacity or by actual weight carrying
capacity. In accordance with its uniform practice of using the latter
method, the commission subjected to license fees certain trucks, which, as
rated by the manufacturer, were claimed to be exempt. Against an effort
to restrain the commission the supreme court emphasized that, except for
judicial review of decisions of the commission, the courts are prohibited
from interfering with it in the performance of any of its functions. The
court recognized as thoroughly established in this state the rule that
"matters within the jurisdiction of the commission must first be determined
by it in every instance before the courts will adjudge any phase of the
controversy because otherwise different phases might be pending before
the commission and the courts at one time, thereby leading to endless
confusion." 6 The question of capacity here giving rise to the controversy
was one of fact, the determination of which is expressly delegated to the
commission, and the court made it clear that no court could "enjoin the
commission from determining in first instance a matter of fact in support
7
of its jurisdiction."
The third case involving the public service commission, State ex rel.
Public Service Commission v. Blair s had to do with an attempt to prevent
the Circuit Court of Cole County from giving a declaratory judgment
construing the Bus and Truck Law of 1931, and enjoining the enforcement activities of the commission. The matter here at issue involved the
controversial provisions of the statute exempting from its application
and thus from the jurisdiction of the commission commercial motor
vehicles operating wholly within a municipal corporation in this state,
or such municipality and its adjacent suburban territory, where the major
part of such transportation system is within the limits of such municipal
corporation. The court took the position that some of the operations involved were clearly exempt, and as to others the statute was ambiguous,
and that therefore the carriers were entitled to the judgment of the
court as to whether the commission had any jurisdiction over their business.
6. Id. at 151.
7. Ibid.
8. 146 S. W. (2d) 865 (Mo. 1940).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
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On that basis the supreme court itself proceeded to construe the act and
determined that the provisions referred to above applied to a situation
where the adjacent suburban trade territory lay outside, as well as where
it lay within, the state, and thus involved interstate commerce. Such
determination covered the matter at issue wholly in favor of the carriers,
exempting them from the application of the statute and from the jurisdiction of the commission. Thus the circuit court injunction, we are told,
had not restrained the commission from doing anything they were authorized to do under the act, so the writ of prohibition against the court
could properly be quashed.
This case, the court emphasizes, does not deny the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the commission as determined to exist in other cases," but
merely holds that the court may properly be called upon to construe the
statute and determine whether the operations described in a petition come
within its terms and thus within the jurisdiction of the commission. Having
performed this function of construction and having established the exemption of the operations in question from the application of the statute and
from the jurisdiction of the commission, there is and can be no interference
by the court with acts of the commission in a proceeding within its jurisdiction. This does not deny that it may be necessary, in a case actually
pending before it, for the commission to determine in first instance the
existence of its own jurisdiction. In such a case the function of a court
would be one of judicial review. Here, however, the commission had
held no hearing and -made no record subject to court review.
The final case of prohibition to prevent a circuit court from interfering
with a matter properly reserved for the administrative process is State
ex rel. Lambert v. Padberg.0 Here was involved an attempt by a police
officer in the city of St. Louis to go over the heads of the Board of Trustees
of the Police Retirement System, the administrative body set up to administer the police retirement plan, in a court action for the recovery of
pension allowances without first exhausting his administrative remedies.
The statute setting up the retirement plan expressly provided that
for an officer to receive the benefits of the plan he must have his case
presented to the Board of Trustees by a member of the Board of Police
Commissioners, must show that he had become incapacitated by accident
while in the performance of duty, and must be provided with the proper

9. Such as State v. Padberg, supra, n. 5.
10. 346 Mo. 1082, 145 S. W. (2d) 123 (1940).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1
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certificate by the medical board. The officer here in question ignored the
procedural provisions of the statute and sought recovery in court for the
allowance he alleged to be due him. Being faced with a demurrer which
the court sustained, he did secure the presentation of his claim to the
Board of Trustees in the regular way, but thereafter refused to submit
proof, and requested and secured an injunction (temporary) preventing
the board from proceeding with his claim. In prohibiting the lower court
from proceeding with the demand for a permanent injunction, the supreme
court made it clear that the rule by which such a claimant is required to
exhaust his administrative remedies, as provided by statute, before a court
will consider his claim is fully recognized in this state.
None of the foregoing cases represent any development of novel
doctrine in the field of administrative law, but they do make clear the
adherence of our highest court to established principles elsewhere recognized, which, judged by the attitude of the lower courts involved, had not
previously been sufficiently clarified in this state.
A single remaining case, De Pass v. B. Harris Wool Co,11 sustaining
the validity of a contract in Missouri by which a lay practitioner before
the Interstate Commerce Commission was employed to represent the defendant's interests, merits brief mention. Without, in any way, weakening
the doctrine of such cases as Clark v. Austin. 2 and Curry v. Dahlberg,"
restricting practice before administrative agencies in Missouri to licensed
attorneys, 14 the Missouri Supreme Court held that this doctrine had no
application to the case of a person duly licensed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, under authorization of an act of Congress, to practice
before it.
While the ruling is obviously sound,. the case is an interesting one
for purposes of comparison of the position of lay practitioners in this
state before state administrative tribunals and before similar agencies
of the national government.
Whether or not the policy of the state against lay practitioners before
administrative tribunals might be applied to practice within the state
before any federal agency with respect to which Congress has not provided
for the special licensing of practitioners other than attorneys, is, of course,

11. 346 Mo. 1038,. 144 S. W. (2d) 146 (1940).
12. 340 Mo. 467, 101 S. W. (2d) 977 (1937).
13.

341 Mo. 897, 110 S. W. (2d) 742, 112 S. W. (2d) 345 (19'37).

14. This matter is discussed by the present writer under the title, Control
of Unauthorized Practice Before Administrative Tribunals in'Missouri (1937)

2 Mo. L. REv. 313.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
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not dealt with in this opinion. However, it would seem that the affirmative
of this proposition could well be maintained on the theory that until
Congress acts to control the matter or clearly occupy the field the policy
of the state may be applied.

APPELLATE PRACTICE
CHARLES V, GARNZTT'
I.

THE JuRismCTioN OF THE SUPREME COURT

Following the recommendation of the Missouri Bar Association at its
annual meeting in the fall of 1939, the court amended its rules relating
to the contents of briefs, by adding the requirement that appellant's brief
must contain "a concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction
of this court is invoked."' The rule itself is one which has long been in
force in other jurisdictions, notably in the Supreme Court of the United
States. Its primary purpose, as pointed out by the court in Hicks v. LaPlant,' is to direct the attention of appellant to the question of proper
appellate jurisdiction and thus avoid the delay of having cases come to the
supreme court where the proper appellate jurisdiction is elsewhere. The
rule is new, but the decisions for the period now under review indicate
that it is being carefully observed by the majority of the bar and that questions relating to appellate jurisdiction are less frequent.
Litigants are still experiencing some difficulty in determining whether
or not their appeals involve constitutional questions sufficient to confer
appellate jurisdiction on the supreme court. Under the constitution, the
court is given jurisdiction of all cases "involving the construction of the
constitution of the United States or of this state.'" But, as is pointed out
in Bieser v. Woods, 4 a mere claim that the acts and conduct of a litigant
are violative of constitutional guaranties does not raise any constitutional
question "because it does not state or complain of any action of the court
or legislature which would be in violation of defendant's constitutional
rights." In that case the losing party had attempted to plead the due
*Attorney, Kansas City. LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. See Supreme Court Rules as amended, rule 15.
2. 145 S. W. (2d) 142 (Mo. 1940).
3.

4.

Mo. CONsT. art. VI,

§

12.

147 S. W. (2d) 656 (Mo. 1941).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1
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process and equal protection clause of the constitution without any statement of facts showing wherein such constitutional guaranties were in fact
denied, and the court, pointing to the rule that constitutional questions
must be specifically raised, transferred the case to the proper court of
appeals.
Constitutional questions, even when properly raised, may not be made
the basis of appellate jurisdiction if they are later abandoned. In Diekroeger v. Joness defendant challenged plaintiff's petition by demurrer upon
constitutional grounds, but, upon the overruling of that demurrer, -filed a
general denial answer and went to trial on the merits without repleading
the constitutional rights claimed under the demurrer. The court, although
holding that the demurrer presented a constitutional question, further held
that the defendant abandoned that question by participating iii the trial
under a general denial, and transferred the cause to the proper court of
appeals. Constitutional questions must be kept alive at every stage of the
proceedings and may even be abandoned by failure to rely upon them in
the appellate court. As shown by the opinion in Wright v. Tucker, even
where the appeal has properly been taken to the supreme court because of
constitutional questions preserved in the trial court, the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court is lost unless the appellant keeps the questions
alive by making them the subject of assignment of error and brief and
argument.
In Achtenberg v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W.,7 a suit on a beneficiary
certificate, the judgment of the trial court was based upon the theory
that a certain section of defendant's by-laws was inapplicable to the certificate in suit. It appeared from the record that the Nebraska Supreme
Court, in a class suit, had decided to the contrary. In retaining jurisdiction of the appeal, the supreme court based its jurisdiction upon the fact
that the question involved was whether or not the full faith and credit
clause of the federal constitution was observed by the trial court.
In City of University City v. Amos,8 the suit was one on a special tax
bill and the judgment was for defendant, the record not disclosing the
trial theory upon which that judgment was rendered. Defendant had
pleaded certain constitutional questions which are examined by the court
and the conclusion reached that the trial court's finding for defendant

5.

6.
7.
8.

145
137
346
346

S. W. (2d) 435 (Mo. 1940).
S. W. (2d) 557 (Mo. 1940)_
Mo. 927, 144 S. W. (2d) 73 <1940),
Mo. 319, 141 S. W. (2d) 777 (1940).
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could not have been based thereon. Accordingly, the court transferred
the cause to the proper court of appeals. While the lack of appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court is not entirely clear from the statement of
facts contained in the opinion, the transfer is apparently based upon the
view that the failure of the trial court to designate the constitutional point
as the controlling point in its decision, coupled with the fact that there were
questions not involving construction of the constitution upon which the
trial court's decision could have been reached, left the constitutional
question as one without substance. Had the record affirmatively shown
that the constitutional point was made the basis of the trial court's decision, a different result would probably have been reached; and likewise, if
the judgment below had been for the plaintiff, the constitutional question
would probably have been properly preserved by defendant so as to vest
the appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court. However, in Bridges
Asphalt Co. v. Jacobsmeyer, where the principal question in a suit on a
special tax bill was whether or not the tax district had been laid out in
such manner as to be an abuse of legislative power, the supreme court had
no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that a constitutional question was
involved so as to vest it with jurisdiction.
In White v. State Social Security Commission,10 the court very fully
considered the jurisdictional questions involved in appeals relating to the
right of claimants to old age assistance. It is there decided that the commission is not a state officer and that it is a quasi-public corporation similar,
so far as the jurisdictional question is concerned, to the Workmen's
Compensation Commission, the Highway Commission and the Public Service
Commission. On the question of whether or not the revenue laws were
involved, the court points out that the judgment could only legally
establish the eligibility of the applicant to be granted benefits in an amount
to be later determined by the commission and that the judgment did not
require and could not compel the payment of any amount out of the state
treasury. "We cannot hold", says Judge Hyde, "that construction of
the revenue laws of this state is involved in the determination of a party's
status or claim, merely because this may entitle him to be paid some amount
out of public funds." In transferring the cause to the proper court of
appeals, the court expressly overruled an earlier decision by the Springfield
Court of Appeals in Hughes v. State Social Security Commission."'
9. 346 Mo. 609, 142 S. W. (2d) 641 (1940).
10. 345 Mo. 1046, 137 S. W. (2d) 569 (1940).
11. 133 S. W. (2d) 430 (Mo. 1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1
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Whether the amendment to Rule 15 be responsible for it or not, it is
noteworthy that, in only three cases questions of jurisdiction because title
to real estate is involved, have been discussed. In at least one of these,
State ex rel. Brown v. Hughes,12 it is evident that the appeal first reached
the supreme court prior to the adoption of the rule requiring a jurisdictional statement. In that case, although the pleadings did not raise the
point, the judgment actually rendered determined title. The parties
stipulated that the cause might be transferred to the court of appeals and
the court, pursuant to that stipulation, ordered the transfer. After the
case had been decided by the St. Louis Court of Appeals, the supreme
court issued certiorariand held that the court of appeals had exceeded its
jurisdiction in deciding the case because the title to real estate was actually involved in the constitutional sense, quashed the opinion of the court
of appeals, and retained the case for argument and decision on the merits.
Thus the litigants, who first came to the supreme court, and then were sent
to the court of appeals on their own stipulation, were finally brought back
to the supreme court for a decision of their controversy. Had the rule
requiring jurisdictional statement been in effect at the time the appeal
was first perfected, it is quite probable either that the parties would not
have stipulated for the transfer, or the court would not have permitted the
transfer. The case illustrates the value of the rule.
In State ex rel. Luechtefetd v. Arnold"s the court, pointing to the
fact that if a constitutional question had originally been involved it had
later been abandoned, held that it was without jurisdiction because the
case was a proceeding in mandamus to compel the issuance of a building
permit which had been refused under zoning laws. The court stated that
"It is clear that seeking to compel the issuance of building permits did
not require the court to actually adjudicate a title controversy" and
transferred the cause to the proper court of appeals.
A more difficult jurisdictional question is presented by the case of
Ashauer v. Peer,'4 where the action was one to determine the true boundary
lines between two tracts of lands. Two deeds, emanating from the same
source, conveyed adjoining tracts, one described as containing 8 acres and
the other as containing 15 acres; whereas, the two tracts together contained
only slightly more than 21 acres. There was no dispute between the par-

12.
13.

345 Mo. 958, 137 S. W. (2d) 544 (1940).
144 S. W. (2d) 60 (Mo. 1940).

14. 346 Mo. 218, 139 S. W. (2d) 991 (1940).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
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ties as to the actual acreage each was entitled to under the deeds, but the
contention between them was one involving the true direction of the dividing line. The court holds that the judgment did not take title from plaintiff and give it to defendant because there never was any title in plaintiff
except to the lands described in her deed and that the only thing accomplished by the judgment was to remove an ambiguity in description and
to settle the controversy between the parties as to the location of the two
boundary lines. In the course of the opinion it is stated that-'If plaintiff had brought suit to determine title, and had described the land in
the petition as it would be described if the dividing line runs as she claims,
and had asked that title be determined to that description, then title would
be involved, but no such case as suggested is here." It would seem, therefore, that the court might well have sustained its jurisdiction upon the
theory that the substantive effect of the trial court's decree was to quiet
the title in accordance with the clarified description; but the court did not
take that view of the matter and transferred the cause to the proper court
of appeals.
In only three cases decided during the year did the court refuse to
entertain jurisdiction upon the ground that the amount involved was less
than $7500.00. All were cases where the existence of the jurisdictional
amount did not affirmatively appear from the record. In one of them,
Franke Schmidt Planing Mill Co. v. Mueller,15 the suit was one to enjoin a
boycott and the court pointed out that the right to pursue a lawful business is an intangible thing, the value of which, for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the supreme court, must affirmatively appear
from the record. In another, Higgins v. Smith,"6 the action was one to
contest a will where the value in money of the release to the plaintiff or
of the loss to the defendant was not affirmatively shown. The court en
bane held that the rule that the value of the estate fixes appellate jurisdiction is an inaccurate rule, and that there must be an affirmative showing
not only of the gross value of the estate, but also of the amount of the allowed demands, reasonable expenses and other items which would reduce
the gross value of the estate in order that the court may properly determine
whether or not the jurisdictional amount is present. After full consideration of the authorities, the court holds that the broad rule announced in
7
Fowler v. Fowler,1
and Meyers v. Drake,1s that the value of the estate
15. 147 S. W. (2d) 670 (Mo. 1941).
16. 346 Mo. 1044, 144 S. W. (2d) 149 (1940).
17. 318 Mo. 1078, 2 S. W. (2d) 707 (1928).
18. 324 Mo. 612, 24 S. W. (2d) 116 (1930).
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determines appellate jurisdiction are in conflict with and in effect overruled by the holding of the court en bamn in City of Doniphan v. Cantley,"'
and that the true rule to be followed is to determine the amount in dispute by an affirmative showing of the net value, after deducting claims
and expenses, of the interest which will be either established or set aside
in the will contest. Thus the Higgins case has finally put at rest questions
surrounding the showing which must affirmatively be made in order to
establish appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court in will contest cases
not involving the title to real estate; and that such affirmative showing
must include not only the value of the estate but also the amount of the
claims and expenses to be deducted therefrom which will, in turn, constitute
an affirmative showing as to the actual amount in dispute.
The third decision in which the court declined jurisdiction on the
ground that there was no affirmative showing of jurisdictional amount in
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Bowler.10 That was a suit to construe a
will where defendant claimed title absolutely to a $10,000.00 fund and
plaintiff conceded that defendant had a life estate in the fund. The record
did not furnish a basis for ascertaining defendant's life expectancy and
the will allowed, to defendant in case of sickness such additional sums as
might be needed. Consequently, there was an entire absence of an affirmative showing of the actual amount in dispute and the cause was transferred
to the proper court of appeals.
As has already been shown, the adoption of the rule requiring a
jurisdictional statement is of material benefit to the litigants in that its.
operation has undoubtedly resulted in the reduction of the number of
cases which have been delayed by transfer to the courts of appeal. It is to.
be hoped that, when the bar has become thoroughly familiar with the.
requirement and its primary purpose, the court will find it unnecessaryto transfer cases except in the rarest of instances.
II.

FORM OF BRms AND ABSTRACTS

The penalty for violation of the rule requiring a jurisdictional statement is, as stated by the court in Stephens v. Anth2 ' and in Hicks v.
LaPlant,22 a dismissal of the appeal; but because the rule was recently
adopted the court, in both of the cases mentioned, declined to enforce the
19.
20.
21.
22.

330
346
142
145

Mo. 639, 50 S. W. (2d) 658 (1932).
Mo. 800, 143 S. W. (2d) 59 (1940).
S. W. (2d) 1008 (Mo. 1940).
S. W. (2d) 142 (Mo. 1940).
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penalty, expressing its reluctance to dispose of cases otherwise than on
the merits, and transferred each of them to the proper court of appeals.
And in Lee v. Ullery,23 the court points out that the penalty for violation
of the rule is a very harsh one, but nevertheless calls attention to the fact
that its purpose is to facilitate the disposition of appeals and that its adoption has already resulted in many cases not properly in the supreme court
being transferred to the proper tribunal without argument and submission
and without further loss of time. The court comments that--'-It is an
important rule to be observed", but overrules the motion to dismiss upon
24
the ground of failure to comply with it. In Maxwell v. Andrew County,
the court refused to dismiss the appeal for violation of the rule requiring
jurisdictional statement not only because the rule itself was recently
adopted but also because the case involved matters of large public interest.
In no case decided during the period under review was an appeal dismissed for failure to furnish the jurisdictional statement, but, as has
been shown, the refusal to dismiss, in each case where the rule was violated,
is largely based upon the fact that the rule is new and may have been
overlooked.
In only one decision during the period under review did the court
find it necessary to dismiss an appeal for violation of the rule requiring
a brief by appellant distinctly alleging the errors complained of. In that
case, MetropolitanPropertiesCo. v. Rideout,5 both the assignments of error
and the points and authorities, which are set out in the opinion, were
mere abstract statements of law or facts and not shown to have any direct
bearing upon or connection with the errors alleged. The court points out
that it is not its duty to search the entire record to discover errors and
that the rule is promulgated not only to aid the court in dispatching its
work "but also to guard against the disturbance of nisi prius judgments
except upon a full and fair presentation of the whole record necessary to
a determination of errors properly presented."
In Poague v. Kurn,26 the court, while not approving of the practice,
held that an appeal should not be dismissed because of omission from the
abstract of exhibits and testimony of defendant's witnesses where the original bill of exceptions filed by agreement and with the permission of the

23.

346 Mo. 236, 140 S. W. (2d) 5 (1940).

25.

346 Mo. 787, 142 S. W. (2d) 1055 (1940).

26.

346 Mo. 153, 140 S. W. (2d) 13 (1940).

24. 146 S. W. (2d) 621 (Mo. 1940).
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court contained all of the exhibits and the testimony. Again, in Hein v.
Payne,27 and in Maness v. Graham,8 the court declined to dismiss appeals
because of defects in appellant's abstract where the defects were corrected
by additional abstract filed by respondents. So, also, in Bullock v. E. B.
Gee Land Co.,29 an equity case, where appellant's abstract sets forth portions of the oral testimony in narrative form and portions of exhibits with
a statement of what appellants claim such exhibits show, but respondent
filed an additional abstract which aided in clarifying the issues, the court
declined to dismiss the appeal because of its belief that "appellants have
been unconsciously influenced by their own theory of the case and have not
intentionally attempted to mislead the court."
In State ex rel. Alton R. R. v. Shain,30 the court declined to agree with
the suggestion that, in a certioraricase, there is no need for a statement
of facts as required by the rules of the supreme court, and, although
conceding that such statement should be more concise than in any ordinary
appeal because the governing facts are to be found within the appellate
opinion under review, comments "that is very different from dumping in
our laps by reference four sources from which the facts may be learned,
as relator has done." In that case the court also severely criticized the
inclusion in relator's abstract of pleadings, evidence, instructions and
motions as contained in the original record before the court of appeals,
announcing that the court would not look at the extraneous matter in the
record or allow the bill for the same to be taxed as costs. Commenting
upon the fact that the writ brings up the abstracts and briefs as filed
in the court of appeals which, for certain purposes, may be examined
by the court, the conclusion is reached that "all this does not authorize
relator in a conflict case to print in the record evidence and proceedings
outside the opinion." The court, however, declines to dismiss the proceeding for these violations of its rules, basing its refusal in part upon the
fact that the harmony in the case law of the state is involved, a matter of
public interest, making the case more than a mere adversary proceeding
between litigants; but the opinion adds a last word of admonition that, notwithstanding that public interest, it will not waive any and all violations
of its rules when the case is on a writ of certiorarifor conflict in opinions.

27.
28.
29.
30.

346
346
148
346

Mo. 967, 144 S. W. (2d) 122 (1940).
Mo. 738, 142 S. W. (2d) 1009 (1940).
S. W. (2d) 565 (Mo. 1940).
Mo. 681, 143 S. W. (2d) 233 (1940).
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The court then proceeds to consider the case on its merits and decides it
in favor of the relator.
These decisions again illustrate the reluctance of the court to dismiss
proceedings for technical violations of its rules. In certain cases, the
court may, by refusing to enforce them, be weakening the rules themselves;
but the trend of modern judicial thought is that the technical application
of the rules of court should not be permitted to result in the impairment
of the substantial rights of litigants.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
WILLIAm

R.

COLLINSON*

In 1940 our supreme court decided thirty-one cases in which a constitutional law point is found. In many of these cases, however, the constitutional law point was simply mentioned by the court and not discussed in
any way. All thirty-one cases are annotated herewith, but only those in
which the constitutional law question was decisive are discussed.
I.

CONSTRUCTION, OPERATION, AND ENFORCEMENT

The cases of State ex rel. Volker v. Kirby1 and State ex rel. Volker v.
Carey2 present two interesting constitutional questions. The first question
presented in both cases is whether or not a ministerial officer can question
the constitutionality of the statute fixing his ministerial duties. These
cases were mandamus actions against the county treasurer of Jackson
County and the city treasurer of Kansas City, respectively, to compel them
to pay warrants issued by the Kansas City election commissioners. The
general rule is that a ministerial officer cannot question the constitutionality
of a statute fixing his ministerial duties. But it affirmatively appeared
from the record in each of these cases that these officers had been directed
by the fiscal agencies of their respective political divisions to refuse payment on presentation of the warrants, and the court held that for this
reason he could question the constitutionality of the act creating the Kansas
City election commissioners and fixing their powers. The second constitu*Prosecuting Attorney, Springfield. A.B., Drury College, 1933; LL.B., University of Missouri, 1935.
1. 345 Mo. 801, 136 S. W. (2d) 319 (1940).
2.

345 Mo. 811, 136 S. W. (2d) 324 (1940).
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tional question which was raised was whether or not the election board conducted county business and therefore its creation was a violation of Article
VI, Section 36, of the constitution, which provides that the county court
shall have jurisdiction to transact all county business. The court iuled on
this point that the maintenance of an election board was a state function
and not a county function, and that this act did not violate this provision
of our constitution.
A third constitutional question was attempted to be raised by the
respondent in each of these cases, by a plea that if the act creating a board
of election commissioners were given a construction that the board had full
authority to draw warrants on Jackson County and the City of Kansas City
free from any restraint, that then the act was unconstitutional. The
majority opinion held that such a plea did not raise a constitutional question, because a constitutional question could only be raised by an allegation
that the law is unconstitutional under any construction which might be
given it. This principle seems to be well established in this state by recent
decisions of the court,' but a well written and well reasoned dissent was
filed in the cases on this point. The dissent will probably appeal to -the
practicing lawyer as the better law.
In the case of State ex rel. Steed v. Nolte,4 the court held that a constitutional question which had not been raised by the parties in a prohibition
action, would not be decided by the court.
In the case of Sheehan v. First National Bank in St. Louis,5 the court
had before it one of those vexing situations which can arise in the administration of the estate of a non-resident. The public administrator in this
case sued to have Section 273, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, declared
unconstitutional. This is the section allowing an administrator from
another state to secure intangible assets without the necessity of an
ancillary administration in this state. The court held that the public
administrator never had any vested rights which were affected by this
statute, and that his sole authority came from the legislature and therefore could be changed by the legislature. As this statute was enacted
before this particular estate came into existence the court held that the,
public administrator was not adversely affected and had no rights for which

3.
Langan
4.
5.

Moyer et ux v. Orek Coal Co., 78 S. W. (2d) 107 (Mo. App. 1934);
v. United States Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 989, 114 S. W. (2d) 984 (1938).
345 Mo. 1103, 138 S.W. (2d) 1016 (1940).
346 Mo. 227, 140 S. W. (2d) 1 (1940).
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he could claim protection by an attack upon the constitutionality of the
statute, and that, therefore, he was in no position to challenge the constitutionality of the act.
In City of Cape Girardeauv. Groves Motor Co.,o the court had before
it a city license ordinance. This ordinance attempted to fix the amount
of license tax upon automobile dealers in proportion to the gross business
done by the licensee. The ordinance established a sliding scale for an
annual license fee, based on gross sales for the preceding calendar year.
It further provided that a licensee who had not engaged in business the
preceding year should pay a license based on an estimate of the gross business which would be done, which license fee would be adjusted at the end
of the year upon the basis of actual gross receipts.
There was no question but that the statutory provisions pertaining to
this city authorized a licensee tax upon automobile dealers as a class, and
the court held that this was a constitutional classification. The court
pointed out, however, that under this ordinance two automobile dealers
doing an identical business from the view point of gross sales, might pay
an entirely different license fee for the same period. If one dealer's fee
was determined by his gross receipts for the preceding year, and the other
dealer had only commenced business and his license fee was adjusted to
the amount payable for his gross receipts for the current year, you would
have two entirely different rates. The court held this feature discriminating
and void. The court held that the defendant in this case, an established
dealer, could question the constitutionality of the ordinance of the act,
because the suit was to collect a tax due under the ordinance, and, even
without evidence that the ordinance had actually operated in the manner
discussed above, the court as a matter of law, from an interpretation of the
ordinance and its practical operation, would hold it unconstitutional.
In the case of State ex Inf. McKittrick v. Williams,7 the court again had
before it the question of the removal from office of a county officer (in this
case a sheriff) by quo warranto,for misconduct in office. The court entered
the judgment of ouster, affirming the applicability of this form of action.
The questions raised were almost identical to those raised in State ex Inf.
McKittrick v. Wymore, 8 which has been discussed in previous years.
In the case of Williams Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Ginsburg, the court
recognized the well established principles that a statute must be given a
6. 346 Mo. 762, 142 S. W. (2d) 1040 (1940).
7. 346 Mo. 1003, 144 S. W. (2d) 98 (1940).

8. 345 Mo. 169, 132 S. W. (2d) 979 (1939).
9. 146 S. W. (2d) 604 (Mo. 1940).
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construction that will avoid conflict with the constitution, if possible, and
that a statute should not be held invalid unless its unconstitutionality appears beyond a reasonable doubt, but held this statute unconstitutional on
the ground that the subject matter of the statute was not clearly expressed
in its title.
Members of the bar should familiarize themselves with this decision
because the statute held unconstitutional, Section 3225, Missouri Revised
Statutes 1929, authorizes the assignment of mechanic lien claims before
they are filed, which has been a fairly common practice. As a result of this
decision such liens can only be assigned after they have been filed for record.
II.

DISTRIBUTION

oF

GOVERNMENTAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

The most interesting case decided in 1940, which falls under this sub0 involving the revocation of a will by
division is Robertson v. Jones,"
implication. The constitutional point in the case, however, is simply that the
supreme court cannot change the statutes of the state, but that is for the
legislature to do. This same principle is repeated in the cases of Hankins
v. Smarr," Demattei v. M. K. T. R. B.,12 and Maxwell v. Andrew County. 3
The question of delegation of legislative power came up in the case
of State ex rel. Rothrum v. Darby. 4 The court held that the legislature
could grant to municipal authorities the right to exercise legislative power
but that a further delegation of said power by the city council to a city
manager was void as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
The cases of State ex rel. Cirese v. Ridge 5 and Ex parte Williams, 6
both discuss the power of the legislature to delegate to administrative
agencies the power to promulgate and enforce the public policy of the state.
The first case involved the public service commission and the second case
involved the power of the City of St. Louis to regulate solicitation of funds
for charitable purposes. In both cases the delegation was held to be valid.
In the case of Sheehan v. First National Bank in St. Louis, discussed
supra, the court stated that all subjects governed by statutes relating to the
administration of estates and the authority of the public administrator come
within the limits of the matters placed in the jurisdiction of the probate
10. 345 Mo. 828, 136 S. W. (2d) 278 (1940).
11. 345 Mo. 973, 137 S. W. (2d) 499 (1940).
12.

345 Mo. 1136, 139 S. W. (2d) 504 (1940).

13. 146 S. W. (2d) 621 (Mo. 1940).
14. 345 Mo. 1002, 137 S. W. (2d) 532 (1940).
15. 345 Mo. 1096, 138 S. W. (2d) 1012 (1940).
16. 345 Mo. 1121, 139 S. W. (2d) 485 (1940).
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court by the constitution. An interesting question relating to probate
courts arose in the case of Van Loo v. Osage County. 7 This was a suit by a
guardian and curator of an insane person to recover from the court certain
costs incurred in the probate court's sanity inquisition. The defense was
that the county court had exclusive jurisdiction over sanity hearings of
poor persons and to commit insane poor persons to the state hospital as
county patients. Without going into detail, the court held that the statutory
provisions relating to the powers of county courts to commit insane poor
could not change the constitutional power of the probate court to conduct
the sanity hearings, but that the county court was the only court which
could commit a person to the state hospital as a county patient. In view
of this decision, the county was held liable for the costs in the probate court
hearing, since the insane person had no estate from which the costs could
be paid.
In the case of Jensen v. Wilson Township,"8 the plaintiff sued on certain
warrants issued by the defendant but which were issued on claims which
had not been verified by affidavit. The court held that it was the duty of
the supreme court to enforce all laws for the protection of public funds,
and the court could not permit an evasion of the plain intent and purpose
of such laws. For this reason, recovery was denied on the warrants, but
the court indicated that the plaintiff could amend his petition and recover
on the principle of subrogation on the debts for which the warrants were
issued.
The case of State ex Inf. Williamson v. Black 9 is the case in which the
supreme court held the statutes 0 providing for the incorporation of burial
societies by pro prima decree unconstitutional and void. This act, allowing
the formation of burial societies, which actually do an insurance business,
was held to be in conflict with Section 21, Article X of the Missouri Constitution which forbids the organization of corporations, except those
formed for benevolent, religious, scientific, or educational purposes, without
the payment of certain fees into the state treasury. The court held that
the question of whether or not a corporation is a benevolent corporation is a
judicial question, and a mere declaration by the legislature that the purpose is benevolent, when it actually is not, cannot evade the constitutional
prohibition.

17. 346 Mo. 358, 141 S. W. (2d) 805 (1940).
18. 346 Mo. 1199, 145 S. W. (2d) 372 (1940).
19. 145 S. W. (2d) 406 (Mo. 1940).
20. Mo. R~v. STAT. (1929) § 5014 et seq.
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III. Ponice POWER IN GENERAL
In the case of Ex parte Williams, discussed supra, the court held that
under the police power the state could regulate solicitation of funds for
charitable, patriotic, and philanthropic purposes. The court indicated in
its discussion of cases from other jurisdictions that the regulation must be
reasonable and not arbitrary.
In Reed v. Jackson County,21 the court stated the well-established principle that the "public policy" of the state is determined by its statutes, and
if the legislature has not spoken, then by court decisions. The court held
in this case that the statute prohibiting any candidate for office from
promising to receive less than the salary fixed by law, and the decision in
State ex reZ. Rothrum,v. Darby,22 established the public policy of this state
as against permitting public officers, either elected or appointed, to receive,
by agreement or otherwise, less compensation for their services than that
fixed by law.
In De Pass v. B. Harris Wool Company,23 the court had before it a
contract for services to be performed by a layman before the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Although not admitted to practice law in this
state, the plaintiff was licensed to practice before the commission. The
defendant attempted to defeat the claim on the contract, on the ground
that under the public policy of this state the services to be rendered could
not be rendered by other than duly licensed attorneys. The court pointed
out that the plaintiff would violate no law by practicing before the commission, and held that since the laws and rules of the Interstate Commerce
Commission permitting the plaintiff to practice before it were binding in
Missouri, the laws of the State of Missouri would not declare a public policy
contrary to this, and allowed the suit to be maintained on this contract of
employment.
In the case of State ex rel. P. S. C. v. Blair,24 the court in deciding the
case pointed out that the authority of the public service commission is
referable to the police power of the state, which power can never be
abridged.

21.
22.
23.
24.

346
345
346
146

Mo. 720, 142 S. W. (2d) 862 (1940).
Mo. 1002, 137 S. W. (2d) 532 (1940).
Mo. 1038, 144 S. W. (2d) 146 (1940).
S. W. (2d) 865 (Mo. 1940).
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VESTIM RIGHTS

In Mangiaracinov. Laclede Steel Company,25 the court had before it a
defense, in a personal injury suit, that the cause of action was barred by
the Illinois Compensation Act, which appears to be similar to our Workmen's Compensation Act. In determining this question the court held
that the Illinois Compensation Act did not take away a vested right covered
by the common law, without substituting another adequate right, and
therefore did not unconstitutionally deprive plaintiff of vested rights. This
is the uniform rule in all states in which workmen's compensation acts have
been attacked on this basis.
V.

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS

In Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Town of Carrollton,2 it was
contended that the action of the defendant in constructing a competing
light plant violated the constitutional provisions against impairment of
contract. The court overruled this contention by interpreting the contract
contained in plaintiff's franchise to have expired by its terms.
In State ex rel. Lucas v. Blair, the court had before it another phase
of the fire insurance rate litigation. In this case the question of law was
whether or not an attorney who had been employed by the superintendent
of insurance to represent the state in this litigation, had any lien on the
fund impounded to compensate him for his services. It seemed to be
conceded in the case that the contract of employment of this attorney,
which was approved by the governor, was beyond the statutory power of
the superintendent of insurance to make, in so far as the contract provided
that the compensation should be taken out of the fund, because the fund
actually belonged to the policyholders. In this suit the contention was made
that a court of equity could enforce a lien upon general equitable principles,
to compensate the attorneys for their lengthy efforts in collecting the fund
for the policyholders. The court denied that a court of equity could ignore
the statutory limitations upon the power of the superintendent of insurance
to make contracts, and held that these statutes did not in any way impair
the superintendent's freedom of contract, nor freedom of those who contracted with the superintendent.

25.
26.

145 S. W. (2d) 388 (Mo. 1940).
346 Mo. 802, 142 S. W. (2d) 849 (1940).
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VI.

EQUAL PROTECTION
27

An interesting question came up in the case of Carson v. Baldwin.
This was a damage suit against a railroad in which the principle instruction
for the plaintiff contained an abstract statement of law, that if the defendant's car blocked the street for more than five minutes such an act was
unlawful. This statement was based upon Section 4830, Missouri Revised
Statutes 1929, which make it a misdemeanor for railroads to block any
public crossing for more than five minutes anywhere in the state, except in
cities and towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants. The court held this
statute unconstitutional under the principle, well established in this state,
that a law may not make an act a crime if committed in one locality and
not a crime if committed in another.
VII. PRIVIIEGES AND ImMUNITmS AND CLASS LEGISLATION
The only case found which is properly classified under this heading is
that of the City of Cape Girardeauv. Fred A. Groves Motor Co., supra,
which was discussed under Point I.
VIII.

RETROSPECTIVE AND EX POST FACTO LAWS

The Unemployment Compensation Act of this state, which was enacted
in 1937, provided that any employer who had eight or more employees employed in each of twenty different weeks in any year, subsequent to January 1, 1936, should come within the provisions of the act. The defendant
in the case of Murphy v. Limpp,2 1 did have over eight employees in 1936,
but after January 1, 1937, never had over eight employees. The court held
that this defendant did not come within the act and that, in-so-far as the
act attempted to impose a tax based on a condition which existed in a year
prior to the addition of the act, it was unconstitutional as retrospective
legislation. The court set out with approval Justice Story's definition of a
retrospective law as follows: "Every statute which takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions
or considerations already passed, must be deemed retrospective."

27. 346 Mo. 984, 144 S. W. (2d) 134 (1940).
28. 147 S. W. (2d) 420 (Mo. 1940).
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DuE PROCESS

In Ploch v. City of St. Louis,2 9 the court had before it the constitutionality of the cigarette tax of the City of St. Louis. This tax is one dollar
per thousand on cigarettes sold at retail, and is collected by the sale of
stamps to be placed on the packages of cigarettes. It was contended that
the part of the ordinance providing that any cigarettes offered for sale on
which the stamps were not fixed could be seized and sold and the proceeds
used to pay the tax and cost, was unconstitutional, as violating the due
process clause of our constitution. This contention was overruled by the
court, by a holding that this provision simply imposed a lien for the
amount of the tax.
In Ex parte Williams, supra, the court held that the St. Louis ordinance regulating solicitation of funds for charitable purposes did not violate
due process simply because no right of appeal was provided, because the
administration of the ordinance was conducted by a ministerial board. The
court pointed out that due process does not necessarily mean judicial
process.
In Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,30 the court had an interesting case involving survival of actions. During the pendency of a
will contest brought by the only heir of the deceased, the heir died. The
heir of the deceased contestant attempted to revive the action by being
substituted as contestant, which right was denied by the court. The court
held that, as the heir of the deceased contestant had no interest in the
probate of the will and had no property rights which were involved,
the denial of the right of substitution did not deprive him of due process.
In Bridges Asphalt Co. v. Jacobsmeyer,31 the court overruled a contention that the manner in which the cost of a street improvement had
been apportioned violated due process.
In Roberts v. Benson,32 the court again upheld the constitutionality
of the statute enacted in 1939 which amended the Jones-Munger Act so
as to make it inapplicable to the City and County of St. Louis. The constitutionality of this act had previously been upheld in Hull v. Baumann,8
by division two, and the instant decision was by the court en bano. In
Clutter v. Blankenship,3 4 the court affirmed a permanent injunction against
29.

345 Mo. 1069, 138 S. W. (2d) 1020 (1940).

31.
32.

346 Mo. 609, 142 S. W. (2d) 641 (1940).
346 Mo. 676, 142 S. W. (2d) 1058 (1940).

30. 346 Mo. 200, 139 S. W. (2d) 935 (1940).

33. 345 Mo. 159, 131 S. W. (2d) 721 (1939).
34. 346 Mo. 961, 144 S. W. (2d) 119 (1940).
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the operation of a funeral home in a residential district, as a valid exercise
of the police power, and not in violation of the due process clause of our
constitution.
In Cockrell v. Taylor,3 5 the plaintiff contended that the appointment
of a substitute trustee in a deed of trust in an ex parte proceeding denied
the plaintiff due process of law. The court overruled this contention,
on the ground that the notice and opportunity for hearing required by
the due process clause need not be given at the beginning of the proceedings
in all cases, but the requirement of due process is met if the interested party
is afforded notice and opportunity to have his day in court before a final
determination of his substantial rights.

EQUITY
ROBERT S. EASTIN'

As in the past, progress in the field of equity during 1940 was not
evidenced by any startling changes, but rather by a slow advance. The
court applied familiar principles to facts which generally fall within the
familiar categories. As the minutiae of the factual situations varied, so
the decisions during 1940 varied from the previous decisions of the court.
It is always difficult to review equity cases because the court, not being
bound by the findings of fact below, reviews the evidence at length and
reaches its own conclusions as to the facts. Many unique cases are disposed of by the court with opinions which are almost entirely factual
discussions. It is hard to tell whether such a case will later be regarded
as an advance to a new position or merely an unimportant application of
well settled principles to a particular set of facts.
The following cases, however, seem to deserve comment.
I.

EQUITABIM JURISICTION

As a result of the decision in Buckley v. Maupin' decided in 1939,
holding that a creditor's bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance can

35. 145 S. W. (2d) 416 (Mo. 1940).
*Attorney, Kansas City.

LL.B., University of Missouri, 1931.

1. 344 Mo. 193, 125 S. W. (2d) 820 (1939). And see Note (1939) 4 Mo. L.
REv. 324.
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only be maintained by a judgment creditor, a contention was made in a
certiorari case, State ex rel. Brigance v. Smith,2 that a bill could not be
maintained by the holder of a fourth mortgage on real estate to have the
mortgage reinstated as a valid lien in spite of the foreclosure of a prior
mortgage, until the plaintiff had obtained a judgment at law. The court
properly held that a judgment at law was unnecessary and that the rule
of Buckley v. Maupin had no application. It is unfortunate, however, that
the court arrived at this conclusion upon the theory that the plaintiff's
remedy was one exclusively equitable. This is perfectly true but it seems
also to be true that the remedy of a plaintiff who seeks to bring a creditor's
bill is exclusively in equity. There is no concurrent or equivalent legal
remedy. It rather seems that the true rule is that equitable jurisdiction
in each case is based upon the adequacy of the legal remedy. A general
creditor having no lien upon his debtor's property cannot say that his
legal remedy is inadequate under ordinary circumstances. A judgment
at law and execution will normally give him money, which is all he is
entitled to receive. Only when execution fails and he cannot obtain his
money from that source can he say that his legal remedy is inadequate.
On the other hand, the plaintiff in the Brigance case had a lien upon real
estate, and it is obvious that the legal remedy is inadequate where a
plaintiff is seeking to enforce rights in specific real estate. Specific relief
is the only thing which will give him what he contracted for. In the
particular case, this variance in theory is not material, but in the light of
the misunderstanding arising from the decision in the Buckley case, it
would seem that the court might clarify the situation by pointing to the
inadequacy of the legal remedy as the basic and only test of equitable
jurisdiction in every case.
In the field of jurisdiction, the court also held that: (a) where an
administrative proceeding was pending in the inceptive stage, prior to the
hearing of any evidence, the court would not enjoin the administrative
body from proceeding where the sole charge was the inadequacy of the
complaint to state facts sufficient to justify action by it ;3 (b) the legal
remedy is inadequate in a case where an oral contract was entered into
to devise real estate and personal property in return for personal services, 4
the court basing its decision, however, upon the fact that a money judg2.

345 Mo. 793, 135 S. W. (2d) 355 (1940).

3. Hughes v. State Board of Health, 345 Mo. 995, 137 S. W. (2d) 523
(1940), discussed more fully by Professor Howard in the section on Administrative
Law, supra at p. 386 n. 1.
4. Maness v. Graham, 346 Mo. 738, 142 S. W. (2d) 1009 (1940).
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ment could not properly compensate for the personal services rendered,
ignoring the fact that the contract was inter alia for the transfer of real
estate which alone would furnish a basis for specific performance; (c) an
action may not be maintained to set aside a deed where the grantor is
not a party even though the plaintiff owned the beneficial title and the
grantor was in fact a straw;5 (d) where an action for specific performance
was brought against the vendor together with his vendees (in alleged violation of the contract sued upon) and, on appeal by the plaintiff, the
assignments of error relating to the judgment in favor of the vendees are
abandoned, the appellate court will nevertheless retain jurisdiction to
consider whether the plaintiff made a case for damages ;6 (e) where specific performance of an oral contract was denied because of the Statute
of Frauds, the court should take jurisdiction to the extent that it might
require the defendant to return to the plaintiff the money consideration
received by the defendant from the plaintiff on account of the invalid
sale ;7 (f) the court will not do a useless thing, and where, after a suit
is brought to set aside an execution sale which was subject to a prior
mortgage this mortgage is foreclosed and the defendant is the purchaser
at such foreclosure, the plaintiff's action to set aside the execution will be
dismissed as moot."
II.

EQUITABLE REMEDIES

A.

Specific Performance

In the field of equitable remedies, naturally the subject of specific
performance looms rather large. This is particularly true in considering
the decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court, due to the fact that our
courts have been extremely liberal in permitting actions for the specific
performance of oral contracts to make wills, etc. It is debatable whether
it is not a clear violation of the basic principles involved in the Statute of
Frauds to permit recovery in many such cases. Nevertheless the Missouri
courts have permitted such recovery, upon a proper showing, for so many

5. Kidd v. Schmidt, 345 Mo. 645, 136 S. W. (2d) 72 (1940). But cf.
Hoffman v. Hogan, 345 Mo. 903, 137 S. W. (2d) 441 (1940) where as an incident

to other relief the court set aside a deed from a grantor, not a party, to the defendant. However, this action did not prejudice the defendant as it was admitted that the grantor had no interest in the property and the deed conveyed
no title.
6.

Gorman v. Mercantile Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mo. 1059, 137

S.W. (2d) 571 (1940).
7. Davis v. Falor, 346 Mo. 514, 142 S. W. (2d) 76 (1940).
8. Lortz v. Rose, 346 Mo. 1212, 145 S. W. (2d) 385 (1940).
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years that it would be very difficult if not impossible to overthrow the
doctrine at the present time. Irrespective of the desirability of the rule
permitting a recovery, such cases are always extremely vexing, based as
they are upon transactions which occurred many years prior to litigation
and usually involving transactions with deceased persons. The net
result is that appeals are frequent and these cases form a substantial part
of the equity cases decided by the court.
Quite a number of such cases came before the supreme court during
1940, the most significant of which were Plemmons v. Pemberton,0 Shaw
0
v. Hamilton"
(both involving contracts to make mutual wills), Findley
v. Johnson," Maness v. Graham,'2 and Bick v. Mueller."3 All of these
cases reiterate the insistence of the court that before plaintiff may recover
he must (1) prove the existence of the contract by clear and convincing
evidence, and (2) prove part performance by the plaintiff, which part
performance must be referable solely to the contract sought to be proved.
The application of these rules to varying states of fact is beyond the
scope of this comment. However, it should be said that the court does
scrutinize the record in each case in the light of these and other pertinent
principles and reaches its conclusion based upon the actual fact situation.
Thus, in Plemmons v. Pemberton, a contract to make mutual wills was
specifically enforced. In Shaw v. Hamilton, such relief was denied, the
court finding the evidence of the existence of the contract to be insufficient.
The subject of part performance of an oral contract was also considered
in Davis v. Falor.'4 The plaintiff there had been the owner of the property
in question and the defendant owned a note secured by a deed of trust
thereon. The deed of trust was foreclosed but prior to the delivery of
the trustee's deed plaintiff filed a redemption bond and was permitted to
continue in possession of the premises for one year under the terms of the
statute. 5 During the year in question the alleged oral contract was entered
into. At the end of the year the defendant refused to perform the
oral contract and in this suit the plaintiff contended that his possession
of the property after the date of the oral contract was sufficient part
performance to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. However, the
court quite properly held that the plaintiff's possession could be identified
9.

10.
11.
12.

346 Mo. 45, 139 S. W. (2d) 910 (1940).

346 Mo. 366, 141 S. W. (2d) 817 (1940).
142 S. W. (2d) 61 (Mo. 1940).
346 Mo. 738, 142 S. W. (2d) 1009 (1940).

13. 346 Mo. 746, 142 S. W. (2d) 1021 (1940).
14. 346 Mo. 514, 142 S. W. (2d) 76 (1940).
15. Mo. Rsv. STAT. (1939) § 3450 et seq.
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not alone with the oral contract but also with his position as a redemptioner. As a result there was no part performance referable solely to the
contract in question and relief was denied.
In the general field of specific performance the court had no particularly difficult or interesting situations before it. Note may be made of Braxton
Realty & Inv. Co. v. Schellenberg0 where specific performance of a contract to exchange real estate was refused. In this case the contract called
for conveyance by the plaintiff of its tract subject only to a first mortgage. The plaintiff had a contract with the holder of a second mortgage
upon the tract that he would release that instrument of record but he
did not do so. Defendant was not a party to the contract with the second
mortgagee. The court properly held that the plaintiff took the risk of
the non-performance of the second mortgagee's contract and could not
say that it had performed or was able to perform its side of the contract.
Specific performance was, therefore, denied.
B.

Relief from Judicial and Tax Sales

A number of interesting cases came before the court wherein the
plaintiff sought various sorts of relief from judicial and tax sales. Thus,
in Hoffman v. Hogan 7 the plaintiff contended a sale for drainage taxes
was invalid because the bidding was chilled. In that ease the sale occurred
in 1933, at which time there was an organization of farmers in the county
where the land was located who were pledged to keep bids down on sales
for drainage taxes. At the particular sale in question a representative
of the holders of the drainage bonds was present to bid but was assaulted
and not permitted to attend the sale. The court held that inasmuch as the
bid was not only chilled "but a prospective bidder was knocked cold" the
sale was entirely invalid. The court thus refused to sanction sales where
combinations of bidders or others conspire to prevent full and free
bidding by all persons. Such sales were characterized as mere shams.
The court held that the bidding was chilled sufficiently to justify
setting aside a sale in Stone v. Hammons'8 where the trustee, in crying
a foreclosure sale, announced that there was a lease on the premises.
There was in fact a lease but it was dated subsequent to the deed of trust
and would be cut out by the foreclosure. It was held that the announcement of a lease implied that the lease was prior to the deed of trust and
16. 142 S. W. (2d) 1006 (Mo. 1940).
17. 345 Mo. 903, 137 S. W. (2d) 441 (1940).
18. 146 S. W. (2d) 606 (Mo. 1940).
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that any purchaser would take subject thereto. Thisqwas held to affect
the bidding sufficiently to justify setting the sale aside, particularly where
there was a showing of bidders who, had it not been for fear of the lease,
would have bid more than the property brought at the sale.
In Drannek Realty Co. v. Nathan Frank Inc.19 the suit was for a
deficiency judgment after foreclosure of deed of trust. The defendant
did not seek to have the sale set aside but did seek to have a credit made
upon the note in excess of the bid at foreclosure, alleging that the amount
of the bid was inadequate and less than the true value of the property.
The court refused this relief and held that it would not require the
plaintiff to credit any amount on the note in excess of the bid at foreclosure. If the bid price was so inadequate as to shock the conscience of
the court the sale could be set aside but as long as the sale stood the bid
price was controlling as to the amount of the credit. In this case the bid
was $47,500, subject to unpaid taxes for several years, while there was
evidence that the fair value of the property was as high as $141,000.
The court held, however, that the bid was not so inadequate as to justify
setting the sale aside.
On the subject of inadequacy of price, reference should be made to
Lindsay v. St. Louis, 20 where land worth four to five thousand dollars was
sold for $85.00 under a decree foreclosing a benefit judgment in the amount
of $7.50 and interest. It was held that this price was so grossly inadequate
as to shock the conscience of the chancellor, particularly where no notice
of sale had been given to the then owners of the property, although their
predecessors in title had been served with process. Where, however, a
successful bid at foreclosure is equal to as much as one-fifth of the estimated
value of the land, the inadequacy is not so great as to shock the conscience
of the court. Such a sale will not be set aside. 2
In Krahenbuhl v. Clay22 it was held that while the Charter of
Kansas City provided for a redemption from tax sales by tender of taxes,
penalty and interest, to the city treasurer, redemption could be made in
equity by tendering this amount to the holder of a certificate of purchase
prior to the delivery of a valid tax deed. This case emphasizes the traditional equitable view favoring redemption and not limiting the means
by which a redemption can be made so long as the redemptioner acts

19. 346 Mo. 187, 139 S. W. (2d) 926 (1940).
20. 345 Mo. 1141, 139 S. W. (2d) 906 (1940).
21. Cockrell v. Taylor, 145 S. W. (2d) 416 (Mo. 1940).
22. 346 Mo. 111, 139 S. W. (2d) 970 (1940).
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in timely fashion and so long as the substance of the redemptionee's
rights are protected.
C.

Resulting Trusts

While the subject of trusts is beyond the field of comment assigned
to the writer, a resulting trust is primarily an equitable remedy designed
by the courts to afford relief in a particular type of fact situation. I
do not think it amiss therefore to briefly consider certain decisions of the
court insofar as they affect resulting trusts in their aspect as remedial
devices.
In Clubine v. Frazer23 the court held that a plaintiff could not sue
in two counts to (a) recover as a debt money of the plaintiff which the
defendant had invested in land, together with the establishment of an
equitable lien upon the land, and (b) seek the establishment of a resulting
trust on account of the same payment of money and investment in land.
The basis for this is that the two counts are repugnant. With all due
respect to the court, it seems that this is a very narrow decision. As
pointed out above, a resulting trust is merely an equitable remedy, and
where the plaintiff states fact which may, (a) if the evidence is one way,
justify an equitable lien, or (b) if the evidence is another way, justify
a resulting trust, there would seem to be no objection to praying for the
two remedies in the alternative. It may be granted that both remedies
may not be granted on account of the same transaction. If a resulting
trust is declared, title to the real estate is vested in the plaintiff, and
plaintiff is not indebted to defendant. On the other hand if a debt be
established, it cannot be said that title to the property is vested in plaintiff.
However, too much weight should not be given to the idea of a "trust".
A resulting trust is merely a device to do justice. In a case of that kind
a plaintiff should be permitted to state his facts and obtain such relief ds
equity will grant in the premises, whether we call it establishing a trust
or an equitable lien.
In Woodard v. Cohron24 and Mays v. Jackson,25 the court considered the
admissibility of evidence of oral agreements between the parties in an action for the declaration of a resulting trust. An oral agreement can never
be the basis of a resulting trust. If the trust is based on the agreement,

23. 346 Mo. 1, 139 S. W. (2d) 529 (1940).
24. 345 Mo. 967, 137 S. W. (2d) 497 (1940).
25.

346 Mo. 1224, 145 S. W. (2d) 392 (1940).
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it is an express trust and, being oral, the Statute of Frauds renders it
unenforceable. A resulting trust arises solely from the acts of the parties.
However, evidence may be introduced showing the declarations of the
parties at the time of the transaction which would tend to explain the
meaning of their acts and thus establish or negative the existence of
the resulting trust. To this extent and thus far only, such oral testimony is
admissible and may be considered by the court.
D. Reformation
An interesting case on the subject of reformation on the ground of
mutual mistake is Steger v. Seabaugh26 where it was sought to reform a
deed on the ground of mutual mistake. The grantor was illiterate and
told a scrivener, who was called for the purpose, that he desired to convey
the portion of his farm on which the improvements were located, showing
the scrivener certain deeds which contained descriptions of parts of the
farm. Apparently the scrivener misunderstood the nature of the descriptions and wrote a deed which conveyed a portion of the farm other than
that on which the improvements were located. On this showing it was
held that the deed should be reformed, the scrivener's mistake being
treated as a mutual mistake of the parties.
E.

Injunction

Ordinarily the court will not enjoin the conduct of a business upon
the mere apprehension that it may become a nuisance. However, where the
business is one which will be a nuisance under any circumstances an
injunction is proper even though the business has not been established and
carried on. Thus, in Clutter v. Blankenship,27 the defendants had purchased property for the purpose of operating a funeral home in a residential district. Such a business in such a place is a nuisance, no matter
how it is conducted, and consequently it was proper to grant an injunction
even though -defendants had taken no steps toward conducting their business on the premises.
F.

Receivers

Straus v. Tribout 28 is interesting in that it very clearly points out the
difference between receivers appointed pursuant to a creditor's bill to
26.
27.
28.

346 Mo. 728, 142 S. W. (2d) 1001 (1940).
346 Mo. 961, 144 S. W. (2d) 119 (1940).
146 S. W. (2d) 617 (Mo. 1940).
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take charge of a corporation and all of its assets, and receivers appointed
in a foreclosure proceeding merely to take charge of property covered
by a deed of trust. The former receiver is a receiver of the corporation
while the latter is only a receiver of certain specific property, taking
steps toward foreclosure. In the latter case the receiver is not responsible
for corporation franchise taxes accruing after his appointment, as the
maintenance of the corporate entity is of no importance to such a receiver.
I.

EquITABLE DOCTRINES

A.

Lacheg

In two cases the court determined that the equitable doctrine of
laches was not applicable to the facts presented. In the first, Schwind
v. O'Halloran,29 the court refused to apply the doctrine to the inaction
of a wife during the lifetime of her husband where dealings between the
husband and wife were involved. In such instances the wife may properly rely upon the husband's attention to her interests without being
barred from equitable relief by the doctrine of laches. In the case of
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Busch,30 the court refused to apply the doctrine in a suit to establish ownership of certain stocks, although there
had been a delay of some eighteen years in asserting the right and in the
meantime all the parties to the transaction were deceased. Notwithstanding, the court held that the doctrine is only to be invoked when the delay is
such as to preclude the court from arriving at a sure determination of the
facts. Here there was sufficient evidence to convince the court that its
conclusion was proper and as a result the doctrine was disregarded.
B. Equity regards the substance of transactions
In Greenfield v. Pettys' a frst mortgage on real estate was given to
the county school fund and the second mortgage to the plaintiff's assignor.
Prior to the plaintiff's acquisition of the second mortgage but after it had
been executed and recorded, the school fund mortgage was released of
record and a new mortgage for the same amount to the school fund substituted. The reason for this substitution was that the statute of limitations was about to run on the old mortgage and it appeared from the
29.
30.
31.

346 Mo. 486, 142 S. W. (2d) 55 (1940).
346 Mo. 1237, 145 S. W. (2d) 426 (1940).
346 Mo. 1186, 145 S. W. (2d) 367 (1940).
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records that there was no real intent to subordinate the school fund mortgage to the second mortgage. Under these circumstances the court disregarded the record release of the first mortgage and established the
school fund mortgage as the prior lien.
IV.

IN GENEIAL

One general comment may be in order and that is with reference to
the court's zealousness to protect the interests of married women in
transactions with their husbands. The reluctance of the court to apply
2
the doctrine of laches to such a case has already been commented upon1'
Along the same line the court refused to set aside a deed of trust to the
grantor's wife as in fraud of creditors where there was any reasonable
showing that the transfer was made as security for a bona fide antecedent
debt.3 In much the same spirit the court in Lynn v. Coates3 4 refused to
find that a deed in favor of the wife of the grantor had been obtained
through undue influence, particularly where the suit was at the behest of
the grantor's heirs who were purely collateral. The court recognized
that a wife may, through her acts and conduct, influence her husband
but held that there was no intendment that such influence was undue. In
fact, if anything, the court apparently felt that in the usual case it would
take strong proof to show that the influence which any wife asserts is undue.
Thus in widely different situations the court felt that a wife in dealing
with her husband was entitled to a little more favored treatment than
persons otherwise situated.
CONCLUSION

It will be seen from the analysis of the cases that the court had
before it the usual broad variety of equity suits. The decisions in general
have accorded with the principles already laid down. Traditionally the
Supreme Court of Mffissouri has looked with favor upon claims for the
specific performance of oral contracts to make wills and the like, and in
1940 the court did nothing to change its position. In the light of its
own past decisions the court was consistent and, in general, correct,
however much the commentator may decry the lengths to which the court
has gone to give relief in some instances. It may be a matter of regret

32. Schwind v. O'Halloran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S. W. (2d) 55 (1940).
33. Graveman v. Huncker, 345 Mo. 1207, 139 S. W. (2d) 494 (1940).
34. 142 S. W. (2d) 1014 (Mo. 1940).
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that the importance of the proposition that in each case he adequacy of
the legal remedy is the test of equitable jurisdiction has not been more
clearly enunciated, but this criticism may be more theoretical than real.
On the whole, therefore, it appears that the court's work in 1940 in this
field was well up to its standard.

EVIDENCE
JAMES

A. FIcNc,

JR.*

During the year 1940 the cases on evidence decided by the Supreme
Court of Missouri by and large did not involve any particularly new or
unique questions, nor was there any outstanding departure from previously established precedents in this state. The court did deal for the
first time with the admissibility of motion pictures in evidence, as will
be noted herein. Limitations in space prevent a detailed recital of the
facts in the cases, and the writer has sought to refer briefly to all the
evidence questions decided, giving an analysis or summary of the facts only
when deemed necessary to a clear understanding of the point involved.
I.

JuDIciAL NOTICE

In the case of De Pass v. HarrisWool Co.,' the court judicially noticed
that the Interstate Commerce Commission has adopted rules whereby
under specified conditions persons other than attorneys may be admitted
to practice before it.
In several cases the court took judicial notice of matters of common
knowledge. In Ploch v. City of St. Louis, 2 in a suit dealing with the socalled St. Louis cigarette tax ordinance, it was recognized that the size
and mildness of the cigarette tempt the young to indulgence which produces tobacco addicts. In another case,3 in passing upon the propriety of
an instruction in a railroad-crossing case which required only warning by
whistle, the court said:
"It is common knowledge and common sense that an engine
whistle is a better warning than an engine bell, and plaintiff 4could
not be prejudiced by requiring the best possible warning."
*Attorney, Cape Girardeau. A.B., University of Missouri, 1930, LL.B., 1932.
1. 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S. W. (2d) 146 (1940).
2. 345 Mo. 1069, 138 S. W. (2d) 1020 (1940).
3. Poague v. Kurn, 346 Mo. 153, 140 S. W. (2d) 13 (1940).
4. Ibid.
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In another case, 5 the court held that it is common knowledge that a
change in elevation of approximately two and one-third feet in a distance
of approximately one hundred sixty feet would be noticeable to the driver
or occupants of an automobile traveling at twenty miles per hour. In
Look v. French6 it was recognized that many men of affairs frequently
change their -wills to meet changing conditions, and in another case the
court again recognized the fact that private persons seldom exercise their
statutory right to file criminal complaints, and in the same case the court
judicially recognized that at the election of 1936, state as well as federal
officers were elected.
In Bridges Asphalt Co. v. Jacobsmeyer,8 in a suit upon a special tax
bill, the court recognized that grass plots and parkways are now component
and necessary parts of streets and highways. In GilZ v. Bichanan County,9
in a suit by a former member of the county court to recover a balance of
salary claimed to be due, the supreme court took judicial notice from its
records that the Buchanan County Court was faced with a difficult financial
situation which could not be met out of current revenue, because a subsequent suit in the supreme court 0 involved a bond issue to pay warrants
reduced to judgments.
The court took judicial notice of its own records in Collins v. Leahy."
In that case, on a prior appeal a map showing the location of certain
streets and places in St. Louis had been introduced in evidence. On the
second trial the map was not introduced, but the court took judicial
notice of the map and what it disclosed. In that case the contention was
made that the court could take judicial notice of the location of the streets
concerned, their respective location to each other, the direction in which
they run and the location of Chaminade College irrespective of any consideration of the map, but the court held that it was unnecessary to pass
upon that contention.
2
the court took
In Aquamsi Land Co. v. City of Cape Girardeau,1
judicial notice of the population of the City of Cape Girardeau and that
the Southeast Missouri State Teachers' College is located there, from which

5.
6.
7.
(1940).
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Fitzpatrick v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 146 S. W. (2d) 560 (Mo. 1940).
346 Mo. 972, 144 S. W. (2d) 128 (1940).
State ex inf. of McKittrick v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 144 S. W. (2d) 91
346 Mo. 609, 142 S. W. (2d) 641 (1940).
346 Mo. 599, 142 S. W. (2d) 665 (1940).
State ex rel. Gilpin v. Smith, 339 Mo. 194, 96 S. W. (2d) 40 (1936).
146 S. W. (2d) 609 (Mo. 1940).
346 Mo. 524, 142 S. W. (2d) 332 (1940).
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it could be inferred that it is a cultural and athletic metropolis of that part
of the state. In another case' 8 the court judicially noticed the distance
traveled in making a round trip from Marshall to Glasgow and in another
case14 judicially noticed that Watson is in Atchison County, has more than
two hundred inhabitants and the consolidated school district comprised at
least two districts besides the village district of Watson.
Finally the court, in determining its jurisdiction in a will contest
case,' 5 held that the value of an estate is not the sole determining factor and
that it judicially knew that the amount of the estate was proper subject for
diminution in the course of administration.
On the other hand, in Cleaver v. Central States Life Insurance Co.,16
in a case wherein was raised the question of whether death by inhalation
of carbon monoxide gas from an automobile was death from poison within
the exception to the double indemnity clause, the court held that the nature
of carbon monoxide gas and how it operates to produce its effects were
proper subjects for expert testimony and were not matters of which the
court could take judicial notice.
II.

PRESUMPTIO,

INFERENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF

The question of whether an unfavorable inference is to be drawn from
failure to call a particular witness depends upon the availability of the
particular witness.' 7 The court holds that the term "availability" does
not mean mere accessibility for service of a subpoena, but instead it turns
upon such matters as superior means of knowledge of the existence and
identity of the witness, the relationship between the witness and the particular party and the nature of the testimony that the witness would be
expected to give in the light of his previous statements, if any, and such
factors as might make it natural to expect that the witness would testify
in favor of one party and against the other. In the event a witness is
available under this test, failure to call that witness raises the inference
that the testimony of such witness would be unfavorable. In this case the
court drew an unfavorable inference from the failure of the attorney to
call as a witness his client in the proceedings under scrutiny. The court

13.
14.

(1940).

State ex rel. Alton R. R. v. Shain, 346 Mo. 681, 143 S. W. (2d) 233
State ex inf. of McKittrick ex rel. Martin v. Stoner, 146 S. W. (2d) 891

(Mo. 1941).
15. Higgins v. Smith, 346 Mo. 1044, 144 S. W. (2d) 149 (1940).
16. 346 Mo. 548, 142 S. W. (2d) 474 (1940).
17. In re Warden, 146 S. W. (2d) 874 (Mo. 1940).
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distinguishes this situation from the Parkinson case,18 wherein sufficient
connection between Parkinson and the witness was not shown to meet this
test of availability. The rule is in accord with the rule laid down by the
St. Louis Court of Appeals"0 and with this court's rule as applied to certain
20
records not introduced.
In the article last year reference was made to a decision discussing
the rule against piling inference on inference. 21 In State ex rel. Mulcahy
v. Hostetter22 the same rule is reiterated, namely, that such rule is a rule
of reason governing only when the proven facts and the reasonable implications therefrom furnish no basis for the fact sought to be proved. The
court holds that the same fact may raise several inferences, the only requirement being that each instance must have factual foundation.
The court recognized the established rule that the holder of negotiable
paper in due course does not have the burden of proof to establish that he
had no knowledge of an infirmity in the note and acted in good faith in
acquiring it. 23 Under the statute the burden of evidence or the necessity
of meeting prima facie proof offered by an opponent may shift from time
to time, but the burden of proof remains throughout with the party asserting it.
In both Darby v. Henwood 4 and Jenkins v. Kurn2 the court recognized that there is a presumption that one did not commit suicide. In the
latter case the fireman of the train testified that he warned the engineer,
who failed to apply the air brakes immediately. The fireman then jumped
from the train. The court says that the evidence indicates that the engineer
did not hear the warning. Any other conclusion would eliminate any explanation except suicide, and the court applied the presumption against
suicide. In the former case the court also reiterates the established presumption that, absent evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that
at the time of the injury deceased was exercising ordinary care for his
own safety.
In Gray v. Kurn,26 recovery was sought for injuries received from the
18. In re Parkinson, 344 Mo. 715, 128 S. W. (2d) 1023 (1939).
19. Chavaries v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 110 S. W. (2d) 790
(Mo. App. 1937).
20. Tichenor v. Bowman, 133 S. W. (2d) 324 (Mo. 1939).
21.
(1939).
22.

23.

Wills v. Berberich's Delivery Co., 345 Mo. 616, 134 S. W. (2d) 125
346 Mo. 65, 139 S. W. (2d) 939 (1940).

Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co. v. Duing, 346 Mo. 896, 144 S. W. (2d)

69 (1940).
24. 346 Mo. 1204, 145 S. W. (2d) 376 (1940).
25. 346 Mo. 904, 144 S. W. (2d) 76 (1940).

26. 345 Mo. 1027, 137 S. W. (2d) 558 (1940).
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falling of a car door. The allegation of negligence was based on defects
in the door fastenings. There was evidence as to the condition of the
bolts, etc., after the accident. In response to a contention that proof of
condition after the injury did not establish existence of the condition for
any time before, the court held that the jury could so infer. In so holding,
the court said:
"An inference may be and often is retroactive, that is to say,
the trier may from present conditions infer a previous fact.""
In State v. Jackson28 it was held that while there is a presumption that
an infant between the ages of seven and fourteen has no criminal capacity,
there is no such presumption in favor of an adult of that alleged mental
age.
29
In State ex rel. Wilkerson, Prosecuting Attorney, v. Kelly, Judge,
the supreme court held that it would construe opinions of the court of
appeals as ruling only as such court was authorized to rule under the
law, and in Schulte v. Schulte0 it was held that there is a presumption that
the judgment entered of record is the judgment actually rendered by the
court.
III. AiDmSSIONS

AND DECLARATIONS

In an action for malicious prosecution, evidence of subsequent declarations is admissible to show defendant's previous animus against
plaintiff and to characterize the motive with which the act was done.31
In Look v. French3 2 it was sought to contest the validity of a will by
the terms of which one dollar each was bequeathed to brothers, sisters and
nephews and nieces, and the balance to testator's wife. The widow and
one nephew named as a defendant asserted the validity of the will. Evidence was offered to show that the widow had stated that in some way
she was going to get the testator to change his will to leave out a particular
brother. The court recognized the general rule in Missouri that an extrajudicial admission made by one of several legatees or devisees is not admissible in a will contest suit for the reason that only one judgment
admitting or rejecting the will is possible, and that it would be unfair to

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
(1940).
32.

Ibid.
346 Mo. 474, 142 S. W. (2d) 45 (1940).
346 Mo. 416, 142 S. W. (2d) 27 (1940).
140 S. W. (2d) 51 (Mo. 1940).
Polk v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry., 346 Mo. 793, 142 S. W. (2d) 1061
346 Mo. 972, 144 S. W. (2d) 128 (1940).
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permit one legatee or devisee by his or her extra-judicial admission to
affect prejudicially the rights of other legatees or devisees. However,
the court further announced the rule that where only the one legatee or
devisee making the statement would be adversely affected, then the evidence is admissible. Since in this case the nephew asserting the validity
of the will would be benefited by action of the court in setting aside the
will, it followed that the statement of the widow was held to be admissible.
In a railroad-crossing case 33 a letter from the president of the railroad
company acknowledging receipt of a copy of an ordinance of the village
which recited that the crossing had become extremely hazardous and that
five collisions had occurred there, was not any admission by the railroad
company that the crossing was hazardous or that the company knew of
hazardous conditions or that additional protection was required.
In the same case it was held that subsequent installation of electric
crossing signals was insufficient to make a submissible case on negligence
in failing to provide some warning, and in Bond v. Weiner"4 it was held
that subsequent repairs to a manhole cover following an accident in which
a person fell into the manhole were not admissible to show notice or
knowledge of conditions existing at the time of the accident.
IV. PAROL AND EXTRINSIC EvmENcE AFFECTING RIGHTS
In Paisley v. Lucas, Supt. of Ins. Dept.,3 the contract involved provided for the appointment of a general insurance agent and provided that
some territory should be "open" and some "exclusive". The contract
did not define either term, and it was held to be ambiguous so that extrinsic
evidence was admissible to aid the court in construing the contract.
38
the deceased husband of plaintiff had
In Schwind v. O'Ha~loran
purchased certain properties, title to which was taken in the names of
plaintiff and her husband. This suit involved certain notes and deeds of
trust alleged to represent the proceeds of the sale of the real estate owned
by the entirety. Defendant sought to establish that title was so taken
only as a matter of convenience and that in reality it was property of the
deceased. The court recognized that even if deceased furnished all the
consideration, the law would presume that the conveyances were intended

33. Dimond v. Terminal R. R. Association of St. Louis, 346 Mo. 333, 141
S. W. (2d) 789 (1940).
34. 346 Mo. 258, 140 S. W. (2d) 25 (1940).
35. 346 Mo. 827, 143 S. W. (2d) 262 (1940).
36. 346 Mo. 486, 142 S. W. (2d) 55 (1940).
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as provisions for his wife, and the court then held that parol evidence of
a mistake or fraud or other action affording legal escape from the covenants
of the deed would have to be clear, cogent and convincing, as well as so
definite and positive as to leave no room for doubt.
In Findley v. JohnsonS7 it was sought to offer parol evidence as to
the contents of certain letters and the postmarks thereon, but the letters
were not offered nor their absence explained. Of course, it was held that
the oral testimony was properly excluded as not being the best evidence.
Where an original will has been lost, it was held that if the jury found
that testatrix executed the will which was lost, a carbon copy thereof
introduced in evidence could be used to prove provisions of the will, the
same as if it were the original.3 8
V.

OPINION EVIDENCE

The opinion of a specialist in nervous and mental diseases based
upon competent evidence assembled in hypothetical question is competent,
as is such opinion based upon his observation of the patient, including
his speech and account of things. 9 However, such opinion may not be
based upon facts related by the patient as to past matters rather than
present complaints, for the reason that such portion of the history is
within the hearsay rule and not competent, and hence the specialist's
opinion could not be based thereon. To the extent that the history consists
of present complaints, which are competent and are evidence, it. is proper
for the specialist to base an opinion thereon. The court, in the above mentioned case, further held that objection to only one element of a hypothetical question propounded to a specialist in mental and nervous diseases
was properly overruled where none of the other elements constituting the
question was even questioned.
In Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. 41 plaintiff testified that while
standing on the platform of a railroad station he was struck by a door or
some attachment on the door of a passing refrigerator car. He had testified that he saw the door swinging open, but he did not testify that he
saw any lever or attachment, and the court held that his statement that he
was struck by some attachment, if not the door, was pure conclusion or

37. 142 S. W. (2d) 61 (Mo. 1940).
38. Thomson v. Butler, 147 S. W. (2d) 437 (Mo. 1940).
39. Oesterle v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 346 Mo. 321, 141 S. W. (2d)
780 (1940).
40. 346 Mo. 28, 142 S. W. (2d) 455 (1940).
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deduction. Hence, the court held, it was error to admit as expert testimony
the testimony of a former railroad switchman that the iron levers on
refrigerator car doors sometimes become rusty or jammed and extend outward. It is proper to receive evidence showing that it was possible or
impossible for an injury to have been caused in a certain manner, provided
there is any substantial evidence to show that it was inflicted in that manner, but such evidence is not admissible where there is no basis for such
hypothesis and all the factual testimony is wholly negative or to the contrary on that point.
In the same case the court stated that an estimate of distance given as
one's best judgment must yield to the facts as he and other witnesses
saw them. Likewise, in Luettecke v. City of St. Louis,4' it was held that
the city engineer's measurements control over mere estimates of the
height of a curb above the sidewalk.
In Dimond v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 42 wherein plaintiff sought to recover for injuries received in a crossing collision with one of defendant's
trains, plaintiff offered the testimony of a lighting expert who testified
based on the hypothetical facts existing at the crossing. He testified that
an automobile would be within fifty feet of the crossing before the driver
could see a coal car on the track. Defendant, on the other hand, offered
pictures taken at from one hundred seventy-five to two hundred feet from
the crossing, and several witnesses testified as to tests made under the
same conditions, which disclosed that the train could be seen several
hundred feet away. Under those circumstances, it was held that the opinion of the lighting expert had no probative value in view of the actual tests,
was not controlling and would not sustain a verdict for the plaintiff.
The court again held 43 that a lay witness may testify that a person
is sane, without being required to give the facts upon which such opinion
is based, but that such witness may not express an opinion that a person is
insane or of unsound mind without first detailing the facts upon which
the opinion is based. It is further necessary that such facts be inconsistent with sanity, the court having held that such matters as sickness, old
age, peculiarities, eccentricities in dress or oddities of habit, forgetfulness,
inability to recognize friends, feebleness resulting from illness, and other
such facts are not inconsistent with sanity or ability to comprehend the
nature and extent of one's property and the natural objects of his bounty.
41. 346 Mo. 168, 140 S. W. (2d) 45 (1940).
42. 346 Mo. 333, 141 S. W. (2d) '789 (1940).
43. Lee v. Ullery, 346 Mo. 236, 140 S. W. (2d) 5 (1940).
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The court further held that the opportunity to cross-examine did not
cure the error of not requiring that proper facts be detailed as a foundation.
In criminal prosecutions some greater latitude is permitted. No
hard and fast rule is prescribed, but the admissibility is left largely to
the discretion of the trial court. In State v. Jackson44 the defendant, to
establish insanity as a defense in a homicide prosecution, offered the
testimony of a physician who had treated defendant for an illness about
seventeen years before and had simply seen and passed the time with
defendant since that time. It was held that the evidence was properly
excluded because the opportunity to examine was too remote and casual
and because the proffered evidence did not tend to establish lack of knowledge between right and wrong, but rather mere feeble and undeveloped
intellect.
VI. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Evidence that stolen clothing was found in an apartment which defendant had rented under an assumed name, there being no explanation
of the possession of the clothing offered, was sufficient to sustain a conviction of grand larceny. 45
In the case of In re McNeese 4" it was held that there was sufficient
evidence to show guilt of a condition involving moral turpitude justifying
disbarment where there was evidence that the attorney was guilty of
selling opium to another.
Where an injury may have resulted from two causes, the evidence
must not leave to conjecture the question as to which was the cause of
47
the injury.
In Federal Cold Storage Co. v. Pupillo48 plaintiff sought to show
negligence in maintaining proper temperature in the storage of grapes.
The court held that evidence of temperature readings twenty-eight feet
away from the grapes in question was not very substantial and that to
support recovery, the evidence must remove the case from the. field of
speculation.
In considering whether there was substantial evidence to show lack of

44. 346 Mo. 474, 142 S. W. (2d) 45 (1940).
State v. Curley, 142 S.W. (2d) 34 (Mo. 1940).
46. 142 S.W. (2d) 33 (Mo. 1940).
47. Luettecke v. City of St. Louis, 346 Mo. 168, 140 S.W. (2d)"45 (1940).
48. 346 Mo. 224, 139 S.W. (2d) 996 (1940).

45.
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ordinary care in providing sufficient light for customers using a stairway,
the court would ignore as mere conclusions testimony that it was dark and
dim.

49

VII.
A.

WITNESSES

Depositions and transcripts

In Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. 50 plaintiff used a witness in
the first trial of the case. That was in 1931. In 1938 the case was retried
and the witness, who was a non-resident, did not attend. Plaintiff obtained
a properly authenticated transcript of the testimony of the witness at the
first trial. Meanwhile, defendant took the deposition of the witness. At
the trial of the case plaintiff first offered the deposition of the witness
which defendant had recently taken. In the deposition the witness at times
was very forgetful and would say that his testimony offered on the first
trial on that point was correct. On these matters plaintiff then sought to
offer parts of the transcript to fill in those gaps and also with reference to
certain matters not inquired about on the deposition. Admission of parts
of the transcript to fill in gaps because of the witness' faulty memory was
held to be erroneous, the rule being the same whether the witness was
present to testify in person or whether it was by deposition. However,
on matters not sought to be covered by the deposition the transcript was
held to be admissible under the statute authorizing use of such transcripts.
The plaintiff, in using the deposition, was bound by it so far as it went, but
not on matters which it did not cover.
In another case51 the court held, without analysis or discussion, that
where a witness was not present it was proper to permit the reading of
his evidence from a deposition taken prior to the first trial and also from
the transcript of his testimony in the bill of exceptions for the first trial,
citing sections 1714 and 1780, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929. Apparently the same question was not raised in this latter case as was raised
in the Turner case with respect to the right to use both the transcript and
the deposition, or the one covered matters not covered in the other.

49.
50.
51.

Lindquist v. S. S. Kresge Co., 345 Mo. 849, 136 S. W. (2d) 303 (1940).
346 Mo. 28, 142 S. W. (2d) 455 (1940).
Collins v. Leahy, 146 S. W. (2d) 609 (Mo. 1940).
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B.

Examination

In cross-examining a witness offered as an expert on land values, it
was held that it was proper to ask him, "You don't know of a single sale
in the neighborhood at $50.00 a foot made within a few miles of this property within the last two years?" Such question was proper to test the
52
qualifications of the witness.
Where questions asked on cross-examination were argumentative and
were simply attempts to get the witness to contradict what he had already
said, it was entirely within the discretion of the trial court to restrict such
53
cross-examination.
C.

Credibility, impeachment and corroboration

In an investigation by an assistant attorney-general, leading subsequently to disbarment proceedings, a former recorder of deeds, Beckner,
made a statement to the assistant attorney-general in which he said that the
attorney had arranged for him, Beckner, to alter certain records, and in the
statement to the assistant attorney-general Beckner repudiated earlier
testimony given in a damage suit based on the records alleged to have
been falsified. Subsequently, at a hearing relative to proposed disbarment
of the attorney, Beckner repudiated his statement to the assistant attorney-general and reaffirmed what he had originally testified. In that proceeding the statement given the assistant attorney-general was offered, and.
it was held that while the statement had no substantive value and was not
direct evidence, it was admissible for impeachment and also was a circumstance to be considered in connection with the conduct of the defendant
attorney in that he made no effort to corroborate Beckner's original story
after knowledge of the charges made against him in Beckner's statement.5 '
The court also reaffirmed the doctrine that the jury has the right to
believe or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness, even
though uncontradicted or unimpeached.-5

52. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Deutschman, 142 S. W. (2d)
1025 (1940).
53. Roach v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 141 S. W. (2d) 800 (Mo. 1940).
54. In re Warden, 146 S. W. (2d) 874 (Mo. 1940).
55. Thomson v. Butler, 147 S. W. (2d) 437 (Mo. 1940); Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co., 144 S. W. (2d) 62 (Mo. 1940).
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GESTAE

In State v. Benson,"' a prosecution for murder, the defense was a plea
of self-defense. The defendant had been shot in the back of the neck a
few hours earlier, and the theory of the state was that defendant Benson
shot de~eased while he was asleep, saying that deceased did not shoot
him, defendant, accidentally, and that he, defendant, was not shooting deceased accidentally. Defendant testified that deceased said, "I did not
kill you the other time, but I will now," and that defendant shot in selfdefense. The state offered testimony of a woman about a conversation with
deceased in which he said that he and defendant were prowling around
a garage and defendant got shot. The court held that the statement was
not part of the res gestae and not within any exception to the hearsay rule,
but was simply a narration of a past event, self-serving on the part of the
deceased and made to exculpate himself from any blame. It was further
held that such error was not cured by an instruction to the jury to disregard such evidence.
In a death action the court admitted as part of the res gestae a statement of the deceased made immediately afterwards that he was going to
catch the bus and slipped and fell.5 7 The statement was spontaneously
made, did not relate to past events, but rather dealt with the main event.
It did not appear to be an opinion or a conclusion, but was a proper
statement admissible as part of the res gestae.
The res gestae rule was applied to a somewhat unusual situation in
State v. Ring.5 8 Four men were charged with murder arising out of a
night club fight. There was a fist fight, after which deceased fled, pursued
by four men, including defendant. One of the men inflicted several blows
with a club, and there was evidence that defendant, to whom a severance
was granted, shouted words of encouragement and had a bottle in his
hand with which he may have struck a blow. The four men came back into
the night club, and the man with the club stated he had hit deceased three
times and knocked him over a fence. Objection was made that this statement was hearsay as to this defendant. The evidence further disclosed
that after the four men returned to the night club one of them suggested
that they go and find deceased and finish him up, and they then got into a
car and left. The court held that the statement of the principal aggressor

56. 346 Mo. 497, 142 S. W. (2d) 52 (1940).
57. Roach v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 141 S. W. (2d) 800 (Mo. 1940).
58.

346 Mo. 290, 141 S. W. (2d) 57- (1940).
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as to hitting deceased was admissible, even though made perhaps as much
as three or four minutes after the men returned to the building. They
had already made their attack but did not know that their purpose had
been accomplished, and they sought to leave the building and complete it.
The court held that the statement in question was so interwoven with the
entire transaction, it was admissible to show defendant's purpose and
conduct and, under the peculiar facts, could be considered part of the res
gestae.
In the same case a statement by one of the four men other than the
defendant, made prior to the assault, to "get him, boys," was also part
of the res gestae.
The court again held that evidence of the notoriety of the existing
fact is admissible to prove that another had knowledge of the fact.59
It was further held in the Graves case that evidence of failure to prosecute
in 1938 was admissible in a suit to oust from a term beginning January 1,
1939, on the theory that to establish a given condition at one time, it was
competent to show the existence of similar conditions during a prior period,
particularly where the evidence tended to establish the continuity of the
condition and that there had been no change in circumstances.

IX.

CRIMINAL LAW

A.

Exhibits

In State v. Lewis,60 clothing worn by deceased at the time of the homicide was admitted in evidence. It was held to be properly admissible inasmuch as it corroborated the state's evidence that deceased was stooping
when he was shot, whereas defendant had testified that he, deceased, was
standing upright and threatening defendant with a knife.
B.

Evidence of preliminary or former trial

In the same case the state, in rebuttal, offered evidence that defendant
testified at the preliminary hearing that he had not shot the deceased. Defendant had testified that he shot in self-defense, and his attorney had
so stated in his statement to the jury, but apparently that statement was
not made until after the close of the state's case. After the state offered
59. State ex inf. of McKittrick v. Graves, 144 S. W. (2d) 91 (Mo. 1940);
State ex inf. of McKittrick v. Williams, 144 S. W. (2d) 98 (Mo. 1940).
60. 137 S. W. (2d) 465 (Mo. 1940).
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this rebuttal testimony defendant was given the opportunity to take the
stand and offer an explanation. It was held that the rebuttal evidence was
competent and that where the court in its discretion admitted rebuttal
evidence, there was no violation of defendant's rights where he was accorded full opportunity to rebut or explain.
C. Admissions and confessions
In State v. Bowdry6l the defendant was charged with selling certain
forged or counterfeit bonds. After his arrest he gave information as to
his name, age, residence and his participation in the sale of the bonds in
question, but when asked whether he knew whether the bonds were fraudulent, he replied that he did not care to answer as he did not want to
incriminate either himself or someone else. The state contended that when
he answered certain questions, the whole conversation became admissible,
but it was held that his silence was not admissible and that his statement that he did not care to answer simply amounted to silence which could
not be shown.
D. Proof of other offenses
In quo warrantoproceedings to oust an officer for failure to prosecute
or perform his duty, pleas of guilty by defendants in criminal cases were
62
proper evidence of law violation.
It is recognized that this above case is not properly a criminal case,
but in the classification of these cases heretofore followed in these articles,
this case seemed to fall most logically in this classification.
X. EXHMITS
For the first time the Supreme Court of TMissouri was called upon to
pass upon the admissibility of motion pictures in evidence. 3 The court
pointed out that pictures of localities, machinery, etc., have frequently
been admitted and that, on principle, motion pictures are also admissible,
as they are simply a series of still pictures. It was pointed out, 'however,
that there is greater danger of false perspective or even fabrication, which
of necessity requires greater caution in the admission of such pictures.
The result is to place considerable discretion in the trial court.
61. 346 Mo. 1090, 145 S. W. (2d) 127 (1940).
62. State ex inf. of McKittrick v. Williams, 144 S. W. (2d) 98 (Mo. 1940);
State ex inf. of McKittrick v. Graves, 144 S. W. (2d) 91 (Mo. 1940).
63. Morris v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 346 Mo. 126, 139 S. W. (2d)
984 (1940).
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In this case plaintiff sought to recover for injuries allegedly suffered
from premature explosion of dynamite. The only negligence alleged was
uneven mixing of the dynamite. The pictures offered showed not only the
mixing process, but also packing the same into cartridges, at which time it
was struck with a wooden plunger. It was held that the pictures as a
whole were inadmissible, since they contained more than the pictures
dealing with the issues involved, and it was held that the court was under
no duty to separate the good from the bad. The court also said that if
the pictures were revised so as to show only the mixing process, they would
be admissible. The result of the decision is to make it necessary, in offering motion pictures, to include only views which are competent, since the
court is under no duty to admit a part and exclude a part, as it would do
in the case of still pictures offered separately.
In Herrington v. Hoey" certified photostatic copies of travel orders
on file were held to be admissible under section 5140, Revised Statutes of
Missouri 1929, and were not subject to the objection that they were not
the best evidence.
In Smith v. Thompson"5 the matter of permitting the exhibition of
plaintiff's injuries to the jury was held to be somewhat within the discretion of the trial court. In that case the plaintiff, an eleven-year-old boy,
who sought to recover for paralysis alleged to have been suffered, was
brought before the jury stripped to the waist, and doctor pointed out
certain muscles and the course of certain nerves and had the boy make
certain movements of his right arm. The boy was then asked for similar
movement of the left arm, to which he replied that he could not move his
left arm in that manner. There was no expression of pain on the part
of the boy or anything of that kind. The court considered the procedure
somewhat dramatic and not particularly desirable, but said that such
exhibition was permissible where necessary and where properly safeguarded
by the trial court.
XI.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

In a will contest suit66 statements of testator that he intended to
provide for his kinsmen in his will, and that his wife embarrassed him before strangers so much that he would have divorced her if he had not

64. 345 Mo. 1108, 139 S. W. (2d) 477 (1940).
65. 346 Mo. 502, 142 S. W. (2d) 70 (1940).
66. Look v. French, 346 Mo. 972, 144 S. W. (2d) 128 (1940).
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feared it would ruin him, and that he could not do anything he wanted to
do, not even make his own will, were held to be admissible and competent,
not to prove the truth of those facts stated therein, but as verbal acts of
the testator showing his attitude. As such they were relevant on the issue
of undue influence. In response to the contention that they were inadmissible because insufficient to make a case, it was held that admissibility
and sufficiency are separate and distinct and that the admissibility of
circumstantial evidence does not depend upon its sufficiency.
XII.

METHOD OF OBJECTION

Where evidence is excluded by the trial court, if it affirmatively appears from the record that it was incompetent or irrelevant there can be
no error in the exclusion, regardless of the form of the objection. However,
where the evidence is admitted over an objection, it should appear by the
record that the specific objection was made which the court erroneously
disregardedY1

EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES
RUSH H. LIMBAUGH
I.

A.

CERTIORARI

To Review Records of Tribunals other than Courts of Appeals

During the year 1940 the Supreme Court of Missouri used the writ
of certioraritwice to review proceedings for assessing property for taxes.
In State ex ret. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Neaf,1 the writ was directed
against the assessor who made the assessment, the board of equalization of
the county where the property was located, the State Tax Commission of
Missouri, and the state board of equalization. In State ex rel. St. Louis
County v. Evans,2 the writ was used against the members of the state tax
commission and the state board of equalization. The cases are unusual, not

67.

Hart v. Skeets, 346 Mo. 1118, 145 S. W. (2d) 143 (1940).

*Attorney, Cape Girardeau.

A. B., University of Missouri, 1916.

Author

Of PLEADING, PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND FORMS IN MISSOURI (1937).

1.
2.

346 Mo. 86, 139 S. W. (2d) 958 (1940).
346 Mo. 209, 139 S. W. (2d) 967 (1940).
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because of the fact that they reaffirm the rule that certiorarilies against
inferior tribunals other than the courts of appeals,8 but because they reveal that the supreme court will use the writ to review proceedings by
officers and organizations not usually considered judicial or a part of our
judicial system. Neither of the cases discussed the question of the right
of the court or the efficacy of a proceeding by it against an officer or an
agency not considered in the strict sense as a judge or a court.
It has been held that county boards of equalization in the performance
of their duties act judicially, 4 as do the assessor and the county board of
equalization, ' and that their proceedings in the assessment of property are
subject to review on certiorariissued in the first instance by the supreme
court" or by the circuit court of the county.7 It has been held that the state
board of equalization, though not a court, acts judicially in the performance of its functions in the assessment of property for taxation." And
it would appear that the state tax commission likewise performs judicial
functions in the exercise of its powers in the assessment of omitted property for taxation,9 and in the assessment of property of public utilities for
taxation,10 since it has the power to make original assessments of such
property.
Proceeding without discussing its obvious powers to review the judicial
acts of these quasi judicial officers and agencies, the court in the case of
State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Neaf restated the nature, functions and purpose of the writ of certiorari,pointing out that under our
practice it performs the same office as at common law; that its chief purpose is to confine inferior tribunals within the limits of their respective
jurisdictions by granting relief to injured parties where an inferior tribunal had no jurisdiction, or, having jurisdiction, abused it or acted beyond its scope; that it issues not as of right, but within the discretion of
3.

That the writ is occasionally though not frequently used against

courts other than courts of appeals, see (1940) 5 Mo. L. REV. 434; (1939) 4

Mo. L. Rav. 389.
4. State ex rel. Ashby v. Three States Lumber Co., 198 Mo. 430, 95 S.
W. 333 (1906); St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Simms, 108 Mo. 222, 18 S. W. 906 (1891);
Black v. McGonigle, 103 Mo. 192, 15 S. W. 615 (1890).
5. North Missouri R. R. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 482, loc. cit. 483 (1872); St.
Louis Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Charles, 47 Mo. 462, loc. cit. 466 (1871).
6. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schramm, 269 Mo. 489, 190 S. W. 886 (1916).

7. Ward v. Board of Equalization of Gentry County, 135 Mo. 309, 36 S.

W. 648 (1896).
8. State ex rel. Gottlieb v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 165 Mo. 502,
65 S. W. 775 (1901) ; State ex rel.Wyatt v. Vaile, 122 Mo. 33, 26 S. W. 672 (1894);
9. State ex rel. Thompson v. Jones, 328 Mo. 267, 41 S. W. (2d) 393 (1931).
10. State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Evans, 346 Mo. 209, 139 S. W. (2d)

967 (1940); State ex rel. Buchanan County Power Transmission Co. v. Baker,

320 Mo. 1146, 9 S. W. (2d) 589 (1928).
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the court; that it is used to reach errors appearing on the face of the
record which cannot be reached on appeal or writ of error; that the office
of the petition for the writ is to enable the court to determine whether the
writ should be granted, and is in the nature of an assignment of errors
and is not to be viewed as a pleading in the cause; that the reviewing
court cannot hear evidence to prove the allegations of the petition, but it
can only review the record of the inferior tribunal as returned in response
to the writ; that the return to the writ is a response to the commands of
the court issuing the writ, and is not an answer to the allegations of the
petition, so that if the writ is addressed to an officer having custody of an
official record, the officer must respond by the production of the record
and nothing more, for on that record only is the proceeding to be tested;
that evidence and exhibits sent up in response to the writ, even when incorporated in the return and referred to in the records, cannot be considered by the reviewing court where they are not properly a part of the
record of the tribunal against which the writ was issued; that no evidence
or issues of fact can be considered except the facts disclosed by the records
as set out in the return; that the merits of the matter under consideration
cannot be inquired into; that certiorari does not take the place of mandamus to compel the making of a record, but it only causes to be reviewed
the record as it is already made; that the reviewing court will not consider
or construe instruments considered by the inferior tribunal but not made
a part of its record, even though by stipulation a copy of the instrument
considered by the inferior tribunal is furnished the reviewing court. Finding that the records returned in response to the writ were not complete and
were insufficient to enable the court to determine from them whether in
the actions reviewed the inferior officers had exceeded their jurisdiction, the
court quashed the writ.
But in State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Evans, the court, proceeding
according.to the same rules announced in the Neaf case, reviewed the
record made by the tax-assessing agencies as brought up in response to
the writ and held as a matter of law from the disclosures made by such
record that the taxes were improperly assessed and quashed the record of
such assessments.
The court also used the writ of certiorariagainst a judge of a circuit
court in State ex rel. Hicks v. Waltner," and, on finding the facts were

11.

142 S. W. (2d) 464 (Mo. 1940).
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identical with those in a mandamus action 12 pending before the court at
the same time, quashed the writ.
B.

To Review Records of Courts of Appeals

1. Summary of Opinions Reviewed in 1940
In 1940, the supreme court reviewed fourteen opinions by the courts of
appeals. In 1939, it reviewed twenty-six,:" in 1938, eighteen,14 and in
1937, eight.' Of the cases reviewed in 1940, one was decided by division,
two of the court, four by division one of the court, and nine by the court
en banc. Seven cases reviewed were decisions by the St. Louis Court of
Appeals, four were decisions by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, and
three were decisions by the Springfield Court of Appeals. In six of these
cases the opinions of the courts of appeals were quashed, either as a whole
or in part, and in eight of the cases the writs of certiorariwere quashed.
2. Purpose of Review
The court restated the purpose of review under a writ of certiorari
in State ex rel. Illinois Terminal R. R. v. Hughes. 6 It is to secure uniformity in opinions and harmony in the law.
3. Lack of Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals
In a certiorariproceeding the first question for the supreme court to
determine is whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to decide the
case under review. In recent years there has been much controversy concerning the jurisdiction of appeals in cases concerning real estate. In
cases involving the title to real estate the appeal from the circuit court is
to the supreme court. 7 In Brown v. Wilson, 8 the St. Louis Court of
Appeals decided a case that had been appealed from the circuit court to
the supreme court, where, pending the appeal, the parties to the case filed
a stipulation asking the supreme court to transfer the cause to the court
of appeals. The supreme court sustained the stipulation and transferred
the cause, and, following a decision by the court of appeals, the case went
to the supreme court on certiorari. And in State ex rel. Brown v. Hughes,'9
12. State ex reL Asotsky v. Hicks, 346 Mo. 640, 142 S. W. (2d) 472 (1940).
13. (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 433.
14. (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 389.
15. (1938) 3 Mo. L. REv. 383.
16. 346 Mo. 1029, 144 S.W. (2d) 142 (1940).
17.

Mo. CONsT. art. VI, § 12.

18. 131 S. W. (2d) 848 (Mo. 1939).
19. 345 Mo. 958, 137 S. W. (2d) 544 (1940).
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the supreme court held that the case involved title to real estate. That
question having been determined, it followed that jurisdiction could not
be vested in another court by stipulation of the parties. The supreme
court evidently failed to examine the question of jurisdiction when presented upon the stipulation to transfer, and when the case went back to
that court by certiorarithe judgment of the court of appeals was quashed,
the supreme court applying the rule that certiorari is the proper remedy
to use against a court of appeals which has undertaken to exercise jurisdiction it does not have. And, as recently done in another case20 reaching
the supreme court on certiorariwhere a court of appeals decided an appeal involving the title to real estate, the supreme court, after quashing
the opinion of the court of appeals, retained the case for a final decision on
its merits.
4. The Question of Conflict
If a court of appeals has jurisdiction to decide a case taken to the
supreme court by a writ of certiorari,the supreme court is then concerned
only with the question of whether the decision of the court of appeals conflicts with the latest decision of the supreme court on the subject with
respect to a general principle of law announced or a ruling under a like
or similar state of facts. This rule was reannounced by the supreme court
in 1940, in State ex rel. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States
v. Allen,2 State ex rel. Snider v. Shain,22 and in State ex rel. Terminal R.
R. v. Hughes.
If the alleged conflict is between the decision of the court of appeals
and a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, certiorari to
23
the Supreme Court of Missouri does not lie.
5. What Constitutes Conflict
A statement in a decision by a court of appeals that the requirement
that a creditor first reduce his claim to judgment at law before resorting
to equity will be dispensed with in an ordinary creditor's bill, where the
debtor is shown to be insolvent, was held in State ex ret. Brigance v.
Smith2 ' to be in conflict with a prior decision by the supreme court.25
20.
(1939).
21.

State ex rel. Pemberton v. Shain, 344 Mo. 15, 124 S. W. (2d) 1087
345 Mo. 671, 136 S. W. (2d) 309 (1940).

22. 345 Mo. 950, 137 S.W. (2d) 527 (1940).
23. State ex rel. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States v.
Allen, 345 Mo. 671, 136 S. W. (2d) 309 (1940).
24. 345 Mo. 793, 135 S. W. (2d) 355 (1940).
25. Buckley v. Maupin, 344 Mo. 193, 125 S. W. (2d) 820 (1939).
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Where a decision by a court of appeals approves an instruction similar
to one disapproved in a former opinion by the supreme court, that part
of the opinion approving the instruction will be quashed by the supreme
court, as was held in State ex rel. Snider v. Shain.
The supreme court has ruled that since a statute26 requires the trial
court to specify the grounds on which a new trial is granted, when the trial
court does specify the particular grounds, the presumption is that all the
grounds not so specified are overruled. If the trial court fails to specify
upon which ground the motion for a new trial was sustained, the presumption on appeal is that the motion was sustained on every ground
stated therein. 'Where there is some substantial evidence to support the
verdict of a jury, a trial court has a right to grant a new trial because
that court believes the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, and
the supreme court, although disagreeing with that opinion, has no right
to interfere. In State ex ret. Spears v. Hughes2 ? the supreme court
quashed an opinion of a court of appeals affirming an order granting a
new trial, for the reason that the decision of the court of appeals was in
conflict with these former rules announced by the supreme court. The
court of appeals found that the trial court erred in sustaining the motion
for a new trial on the one ground specified by the court in granting the
new trial, namely, that ok newly-discovered evidence, but it affirmed the
action of the trial court in granting the new trial because it found there
were other good and sufficient reasons why a new trial should be granted.
The supreme court held thai, under its prior decisions, the court of appeals had no right or power to pass on other assignments of error not
specified by the trial court in granting a new trial.
In an action against a railroad company and the operator of a motor
train for the death of a trailer-truck-occupant in a collision, it was held,
in State ex rel. Alton R. R. v. Shain,28 that a decision by a court of appeals that "there is a strong presumption that deceased was in the exercise
of ordinary care," where the question of his contributory negligence was
for the jury, was in conflict with prior controlling decisions by the supreme
court.

Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1169.
27. 346 Mo. 421, 142 S. W. (2d) 3 (1940).
28. 346 Mo. 681, 143 S. W. (2d) 233 (1940),
26.
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What Does Not Constitute Conflict

In State ex rel. Anderson v. Hostetter,20 it was held that courts of appeals are not required to follow mere dicta by the supreme court or expressions of opinion not necessary for the actual decision of a cause, and
in determining whether there is conflict the decision of the court of appeals
under review will be judged by the decisions and not the dicta of the
supreme court.
In State ex reZ. National Refining Co. v. Shain,30 the court reviewed a
case where it was claimed that an instruction which directed a verdict for
plaintiff if a filling station attendant negligently assisted in pushing a
truck having no rear lights and as a direct result of the absence of rear
lights a collision occurred, was in conflict with a prior decision by the
supreme court ruling that general negligence should not be submitted
when the petition alleges or evidence discloses specific negligence. But the
court held there was no conflict.
In State ex rel. Alsup v. Tatlow,3 1 it wag held that a ruling by a court
of appeals that evidence showed there was nothing in the conduct of a
person approaching a railroad crossing to indicate that she would not walk
within a few feet of the track and wait for the train to pass, and that the
fireman was authorized to assume that she would stop, and that her failure
to stop left trainmen without sufficient time to give war'ning, precluding
recovery for her death when struck by the train, was not in conflict with
decisions of the supreme court.
In State ex rel. Terminal R. R. v. Hughes, it was held that a decision
by a court of appeals that, where it was shown plaintiff desired to become
a passenger in an elevated railroad car and stopped at the platform on
the other side of railroad tracks and then crossed the tracks when the
motorman motioned for her to do so, and was struck by a car which
suddenly started up, a submissible case under the humanitarian doctrine
was made, was not in conflict with decisions of the supreme court.
In State ex rel. St. Joseph Belt Ry. v. Shain,32 a switchman sued for
breach of contract between a railroad company and an employes' organization, which provided that the right of preference of work in promotion
should be governed by seniority in service. The court of appeals held
that the question as to whether the failure of the railroad company to
29. 346 Mo.
30. 346 Mo.
31. 346 Mo.
32. 346 Mo.

249, 140 S. W. (2d) 21 (1940).
224, 139 S. W. (2d) 995 (1940).
1025, 144 S. W. (2d) 140 (1940).
1098, 145 S. W. (2d) 131 (1940).
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include a switchman's name in a list of persons to be called for work according to seniority, posted in the railroad yard, constituted a discharge of
the employe so as to preclude him from claiming damages under the
contract as an employe of the railroad company, was for the jury. The
supreme court held that this decision did not conflict with opinions of
the supreme court, and quashed the writ.
In State ex rel. First National Bank in St. Louis v. Hughes, 33 it was
held that a decision by a court of appeals that the questions as to whether
a bank was negligent and an invitee was contributorily negligent were for
the jury in an action against the bank for injuries sustained when the
invitee slipped and fell on steps within the building made wet with
rainwater tracked into the building by customers, does not conflict with any
controlling decisions of the supreme court.
7. What is Binding on Supreme Court on Certiorari
In determining the question of conflict the supreme court is bound by
the conclusion of the court of appeals as to what the facts are, but it is not
bound by the conclusion reached by the court of appeals in applying the
facts. This principle was restated in State ex ret. First National Bank in
St. Louis v. Hughes.
Where a court of appeals construes an instruction that has not been
construed by the supreme court in another similar case, the supreme court
is bound by the construction given it by the court of appeals, even though
the supreme court considers it wrong, unless the instruction is one that is
susceptible of but one meaning and the court of appeals attempts to give
it another meaning. This rule was reaffirmed in State ex rel. Powell Bros.
34
Truck Lines v. Hostetter.
8. What the Supreme Court Cannot Do on Certiorari
Unless a decision of a court of appeals conflicts with a prior controlling
decision of the same point by the supreme court, the correctness of the
decision on the merits of the case cannot be considered on certiorari,if the
court of appeals had jurisdiction to decide the cause. This rule was stated
again in State ex rel. Mulcahy v. Hostetter.5
Neither can the supreme court on review by certiorariconsider whether

33. 346 Mo. 938, 144 S. W. (2d) 84 (1940).
34. 345 Mo. 915, 137 S. W. (2d) 461 (1940).
35. 346 Mo. 65, 139 S. W. (2d) 939 (1940).
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an instruction not discussed in the opinion of the court of appeals was
erroneous. This was held in State ex rel. Alton R. R. v. Shain.
Nor can the supreme court construe an instruction independently in
a case pending on certiorari,as it can do in a case pending on appeal.30
The supreme court cannot on certiorariconsider whether an instruction was erroneous that was not discussed in the opinion reviewed1 7 Xor
can the supreme court on certioraritell the court of appeals what judgment
to render in the case reviewed.38
9. 'What the Supreme Court May Do on Certiorari
The court may on certiorariquash an opinion on grounds not mentioned by the relator, for the reason that it is the duty of the court to examine the opinion under review for all points of conflict, as was
held in
State ez rel. Brigance v. Smith, and State ex rel. Alton B. R. v. Shain.
And, although the supreme court has held that it is not its duty to edit
opinions of courts of appeals, striking out the language the supreme court
disapproves and letting that stand which it approves,"9 it may quash a
part of an opinion not in conformity with prior decisions of the supreme
court and permit the decision to stand, where the supreme court finds that
the expressions contained in the portion of the opinion quashed was not
necessary to the decision, as was held in State ex ret. Brigance v. Smith.
The supreme court may also regulate the practice in certiorari cases,
as shown by its decision in State ex rel. Alton R. B. v. Shain, where it was
held that its rules 15 and 33 apply to certiorariproceedings and that it is
improper for a relator to inject in his statement in his brief in a certiorari
proceeding facts not shown in the opinion to be reviewed, and that if extraneous matters are inserted, the supreme court will neither consider same
nor permit bill therefor to be taxed as costs.
The supreme court may also refuse to dismiss a certiorariproceeding
for relator's failure to comply with the rules of the court specifying errors
and points of conflict, where it finds, as in State ex rel. Snider v. Shaim,
that specification of errors and points of conflict were sufficiently set forth
in relator's brief.

36. State ex rel. Powell Bros. Truck Lines v. Hostetter, 345 Mo. 915, 137

S. W. (2d) 461 (1940).

37. Ibid.; State ex rel. Alton R. R. v. Shain, 346 Mo. 681, 143 S. W. (2d)
233 (1940).
38. Ibid.
39. State ex rel. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Hostetter, 342 Mo.
859, 119 S.W. (2d) 208 (1938).https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1
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10. Annotations
In its opinion in the recent certioraricase of State ex rel. Alton R. R.
v. Shain, the supreme court used footnote annotations for the citation of
authorities. To this writer this method of citing cases, now occasionally
used by some of the judges of the Supreme Court of Missouri in their opinions, and used extensively in the opinions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, is highly desirable and one which may in the future come
to be much more widely and acceptably used.

II.

HABEAS CORPUS

Herring v. Scott 40 was the only case decided by the supreme court in
1940 in which that court issued its original habeas corpus writ. The petitioner had been convicted of robbery and had served in the penitentiary a
part of the term for which he was sentenced. He was then paroled, following which he was again convicted and sentenced for a new and similar
offense. After he had served more than half the term for which he was
last sentenced, he was paroled on such sentence. The warden of the penitentiary immediately rearrested him to hold him to serve the remainder of
the term for which he was first sentenced, on the theory that the prisoner
had violated the provisions of the first parole, making it necessary that
he serve the balance of the term of the first sentence. The prisoner sued out
a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the time he served for the second
conviction added to the time he served. for the first conviction amounted to
more than the time for which he was first sentenced, and, since he was paroled on the second sentence, he was entitled to be released. Following a
statute41 which provides that if any convict shall commit any crime while
under sentence for which he shall be convicted, the sentence of such convict
"shall not commence to run until the expiration of the sentence under
which he may be held," the court held that the time served by the petitioner
following his second conviction must be counted on the first sentence and
not on the second. And, since the petitioner had served the full length
of his first term, the court held that he was entitled to his discharge subject to the terms of his second parole.

40.
41.

142 S. W. (2d) 670 (Mo. 1940).
Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 9226.
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MANDAMUS

Of the eight cases decided or finally disposed of by the supreme court
in 1940 involving the extraordinary writ of mandamus, four were appeals
from circuit courts and four originated in the supreme court. Three were
decided by division one of the court, one by division two of the court, and
four by the court en bane. A peremptory writ was denied in two cases,
a peremptory writ was granted in five cases, and one of the cases was transferred to a court of appeals.
In State ex rel. Volker v. Kirby,42 the action, originating in the supreme
court, was brought to compel the Treasurer of Jackson County to pay
warrants issued by the Kansas City Election Commissioners to persons
employed by the Commission to assist in the registration of voters. By
statutory provisions the expense was to be divided between the county and
the city. The county contended that it should not be required to pay, on
the ground that the statute directing that it pay part of the expense was
unconstitutional. A commissioner was appointed by the supreme court
to report findings of fact and conclusions of law. The commissioner recommended that a peremptory writ be granted. The court ordered the granting of a peremptory writ, saying that the constitutional question was not
properly raised, and that, since the maintenance of the election board was
a state function, the legislature had the authority to compel the city and
the county to join in providing for its maintenance. The point was raised
that mandamus was not a proper remedy. The court held that, in view of
the great expense incident to a commissionership, it would be an injustice
to rule, after the submission of the case, that mandamus was not a proper
remedy.
The similar case of State ex ret. Volker v. Carey,43 also originated in the
supreme court. The purpose of the action was to compel the Treasurer of
Kansas City to pay warrants issued by the Kansas City Election Commissioners to persons employed to assist in the registration of voters. In
the hearing and disposition of the case the court followed the same course
as in State ex rel. Volker v. Kirby, ruling also that if the provisions of the
law authorizing a division of the expense between the county and the city
were in conflict with the charter of Kansas City, the provisions of the charter must yield to the constitution and laws of the state.

42. 345 Mo. 801, 136 S. W. (2d) 319 (1940).
43.. 345 Mo. 811, 136 S. W. (2d) 324 (1940).
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In State ex rel. Stallman v. Bourke,44 a former student of a certain
medical college sought to compel the state board of health to hear evidence
that such college was a reputable medical college, the state board of health
having found that the institution was not a reputable medical college. A
peremptory writ was denied, on the ground that relator had an adequate
statutory remedy.4"
State ex rel. Rothrum v. Darby4" reached the supreme court on appeal
from a circuit court. The action was to compel the Director of Finance of
Kansas City to pay the relator salary as a driver of a motor fire truck. The
question involved was, whether or not an agreement between the city manager and fire department members for deductions from pay fixed by ordinance was valid. A city fireman undertook to recover back salary deducted
under such agreement. The court held that the agreement was void as
against public policy, and reversed the decision of the trial court denying
a peremptory writ.
Mandamus was held to be the proper remedy to compel a circuit court
to reinstate a case against a non-resident interstate railroad, where the
circuit court was of the opinion that it had no jurisdiction because of the
interstate character of the railroad, in State ex rel. Fielder v. Kirkwood. 7
The court reaffirmed the doctrine that mandamus will not issue -to an inferior court whenever there is another adequate remedy, such as appeal or
writ of error, or to review the proceedings, or to direct the entry of a
particular judgment. But when a preliminary question of jurisdiction, depending wholly upon the law and not upon the facts, arises and the trial
court misconceives its duties and refuses to proceed to a final determination
upon the merits, then an appellate court will compel the inferior tribunal
to reinstate the case and proceed to its final determination, without attempting to dictate what the result shall be.
Mandamus was used against the state auditor to compel him to register
bonds issued by a city in the case of State ex rel. City of Republic v.
Smith.4" Relator was a city of the fourth class. The validity of the proceedings for the issuance of bonds was questioned. The bonds were issued
to pay a part of the cost of a sewerage system, the larger amount of
which was contributed by WPA. Over two-thirds of the legal voters of
the city voted in favor of the issuance of the bonds, at a special election
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.

345 Mo. 837, 136 S. W. (2d) 326 (1940).
Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 9984.

345 Mo. 1002, 137 S.W. (2d) 532 (1940).
345 Mo. 1089, 138 S. W. (2d) 1009 (1940).
345 Mo. 1158, 139 S. W. (2d) 929 (1940).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941

63

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1941], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

held for the purpose. A suit by taxpayers for a permanent injunction
against the issuance, registration and sale of the bonds was pending in the
circuit court. The supreme court reviewed the proceedings and found that
they conformed with the law, and held that the fact that the injunction
suit was pending in the circuit court did not bar an original action in
mandamus in the supreme court to compel the auditor to register the bonds.
A peremptory writ was awarded.
'Where a circuit court issued a mandamus writ against the state inspector of oils and motor fuels to compel him to issue a license to a corporation distributing motor fuels, and the case was appealed to the supreme
court, that court was vested with jurisdiction to determine the appeal on
the ground that a state officer was involved. This was held in Sampson
Distributing Co. v. Cherry,49 where the supreme court held that the discretion of the trial court in granting or refusing a writ of mandamus will
not be reviewed where it appears to have been lawfully exercised and no
abuse is shown.
But jurisdiction of an appeal of a mandamus proceeding to compel
the issuance of a building permit does not vest in the supreme court, because
the action does not involve title to real estate. The supreme court transferred such an appeal to a court of appeals in State ex rel. Liteclhtefeld v.
Arnold.'0
IV.

PROHIBITION

In each of the eight cases finally determined by the supreme court in
1940 involving the extraordinary writ of prohibition, the writ was directed
against a circuit judge. All of these cases originated in the supreme court.
One of the cases was decided by division one of the court, two by division
two of the court, and five by the court en bane. In two of the cases the
preliminary rule was discharged, but in the other six cases the preliminary
rule was made absolute.
In State ex rel. Lucas v. Blair,5 1 the Superintendent of the Insurance
Department of iMfissouri obtained a writ of prohibition to prevent a circuit judge from proceeding to hear and determine a case brought against
him and certain insurance companies by plaintiffs who sought to recover
an attorney fee and impress the same as a lien on funds in the hands of
the superintendent, derived from certain litigation. The court held that
49. 346 Mo. 885, 143 S. W. (2d) 307 (1940).
50. 144 S. W. (2d) 60 (Mo. 1940).
51. 346 Mo. 1017, 144 S. W. (2d) 106 (1940).
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the plaintiffs in the action pending in the circuit court were not entitled to
a lien on the funds, and made the provisional rule of prohibition absolute.
In State ex rel. Lambert v. Padberg,5 2 prohibition was used to stop
a circuit judge from proceeding in a case before him by which a police
officer was attempting to proceed against the board of trustees of the police
retirement system of the City of St. Louis for the recovery of allowances
alleged to be due him.
In State ex rel. Clay County State Bank v. Wattner,5 3 it was held
that where a daughter seeking a declaratory judgment concerning rights in
securities given her by her father for distribution after her father's death,
pleaded facts showing that she held the securities as trustee, she was within
her statutory rights authorizing declaratory relief for specified purposes
to persons interested as trustees, and prohibition would not lie to stop.
the court from hearing that cause.
Where it appeared affirmatively from the record that plaintiffs who.
filed an action in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis against the
city and a foreign corporation for damages had no cause of action against
the corporation, which had a residence in a county in Missouri for the
purposes of venue and service in this state, it was held, in State ex ret. C. H_
Atkinson Paving Co. v. Aronson,54 that prohibition was available to such
corporation to prevent a circuit court from proceeding with the cause against
it, and, since the record showed that plaintiff could not state a cause of
action against the defendant, prohibition was the proper remedy. But if
it does not appear from the record of a case pending in the circuit court
that plaintiff cannot state a cause of action, the Court will discharge its
provisional rule, as was held in State ex ret. Massman Construction Co. v.
Buzard.55 This case also held that a judgment of the supreme court quashing an opinion of a court of appeals which affirmed a judgment for attorney fees against a judgment debtor was not tes adjudicata of the
attorney's right to a lien and right to recover from the judgment debtor.
In State ex rel. Cirese v. Ridge,56 the jurisdiction of a circuit court was
challenged in an action for injunction against a defendant operating as
a public utility. It was contended that the subject matter of the injunction action involved a question as to whether the defendant was unlawfully
operating as a utility. The court held that the subject matter of such
52.

346 Mo. 1082, 145 S. W. (2d) 123 (1940).

53.
54.
55.
56.

346
345
346
345

Mo.
Mo.
Mo.
Mo.

1138, 145 S. W. (2d) 152 (1940).
937, 138 S. W. (2d) 1 (1940).
1162, 145 S. W. (2d) 355 (1940).
1096, 138 S. W. (2d) 1012 (1940).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941

65

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1941], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

446

[Vol. 6

action was one over which the Public Service Commission had exclusive
jurisdiction, and stopped the circuit court from proceeding with the
action by making its provisional rule absolute. The same rule was applied
7
where
by the court in State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Padberg,"
it was held that a circuit court cannot enjoin the Public Service Commission from determining in the first instance a matter of fact in support of
its jurisdiction, and if it undertakes to do so it will be stopped by prohibition.
Prohibition is the proper remedy to prohibit a regular circuit judge
who has been disqualified to sit in a criminal case from calling a special
judge to hear a motion by the defendant in such criminal case to set
aside a judgment granting him a parole. This was held in State ex rel.
Wilkerson v. Kelly."'
V.

Quo WARRANTO

In a well-reasoned per curiam opinion in State ex Inf. of McKittrick
v. American Insurance Co., 0 the court positively declared that when there
has been a single flagrant, inexcusable, malicious violation of the criminal
laws of the state by a corporation, the state does not have to wait for
further violations to protect its citizens and the public welfare, but it may
by quo warranto oust such corporation, and this even though a period of
five years may elapse between the time the offense is committed and the
quo warranto proceeding is commenced. And where the offender is an
insurance company, the fact that the superintendent of insurance has
exclusive control of all matters of insurance rates does not preclude a quo
warranto proceeding based on misconduct of insurance companies in securing approval of proposed rates.
In State ex In. McKittrick v. Carolene Products Co.,60 the attorneygeneral brought an action in quo warranto to prohibit the respondent, a
Michigan corporation, from doing business in this state, on the ground that
the respondent was operating its business in Missouri in violation of certain
statutory provisions known as the "filled milk" statutes. The case involved
a construction of such statutes and the application thereof to respondent's
business. The court stated and followed the usual rules of statutory construction and held that in the enactment of such statutes the legislature
57.
58.
59.
60.

346
346
346
346

Mo.
Mo.
Mo.
Mo.

1133, 145 S. W. (2d) 150 (1940).
416, 142 S. W. (2d) 27 (1940).
269, 140 S. W. (2d) 36 (1940).
1049, 144 S. W. (2d) 153 (1940).
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did not intend to prohibit the operation of business of the character being
transacted by respondent, and denied the ouster and dismissed the proceeding.
In a proceeding on an information in the nature of quo warranto for
the forfeiture of the corporate charter and dissolution of a burial association, in State ex Inf. Williamson v. Black,6" the statutes pertaining to the
organization of burial associations were examined by the court in the
light of the facts concerning the operations of the association against
which ouster was sought, and it was held that the association was subject to
ouster from its franchise. But the supreme court remanded the cause to
the trial court where it originated, suggesting that, in order to protect
the interests of the members of the association, the court could allow the
association a reasonable time to reincorporate and to take advantage of
any new legislation that might be enacted in the ensuing session of the
general assembly, before entering a judgment of ouster.
Vigorous language was appropriately used by the court both in State
63
ex Iaf. McKittrick v. Graves,6 and State ex Inf. McKittrick v. Williams,
in ousting from offmce and fining a prosecuting attorney and a sheriff in
quo warrantoproceedings in which it was held that these officials had forfeited their offices for neglect of official duties. As in the Wymore case, 64
the court reviewed the record of these officials and stated the grounds upon
which it was the duty of the court to oust such public officials for official
misconduct and neglect of duty. In State ex Inf. McKittrick v. Williams,
the court ruled that in a quo warranto proceeding to determine the right
of a respondent to continue in office, the respondent is not entitled to a
jury trial.

THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WILmAm H. BECKER, JR.Y
The decisions of the fissouri Supreme Court during 1940 failed to
produce any radical change in the function or the interpretation of the
61.
62.

145 S. W. (2d) 406 (Mo. 1940).
346 Mo. 990, 144 S. W. (2d) 91 (1940).

63. 346 Mo. 1003, 144 S. W. (2d) 98 (1940).

64.
(1939).

State ex Inf. McKittrick v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 132 S. W. (2d) 979

*Attorney, Columbia. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.
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humanitarian doctrine. Another year passed without an answer to this
question: When two day-dreaming and oblivious automobile operators,
each of whom in the exercise of care could have discovered the other and
have prevented a collision, collide at an intersection with personal injury to
each, are both liable for damages under the humanitarian rule? No case
appears to have come before the supreme court in 1940 which permitted
an answer to this question.
Although the opportunity was presented, no authoritative answer was
given to this question: Where a person is in the path of a vehicle standing
at rest and is in peril of being struck if the vehicle is started, does the
humanitarian doctrine apply if the person is injured by the starting and
subsequent movement of the vehicle? Two of the 1940 cases involved
this situation.
An interesting development in 1940 was the approval by the court
en, bane of a form of the classic "tail" to a humanitarian instruction in a
case involving plaintiff's negligence as the sole cause of his injury. Previously division number one had condemned a form of the classic "tail" in a
case submitted under the humanitarian rule and involving sole cause, in
such a manner as to forbid the cautious from using any "tail" in submitting
a humanitarian case involving plaintiff's negligence as sole cause. Now
the trial practitioner, who has faith, may again incorporate in all principal instructions submitting cases under the humanitarian rule the form
of the "tail" approved.
I.

Tim COURT EN BANC

State ex rel. Illinois Terminal R. R. v. HMghes' involved the striking
of a pedestrian by a motor. car running on defendant's tracks. The pedestrian was walking along the tracks toward the motor car which was standing at rest, when the motor car was started forward and struck the
pedestrian. Although the pedestrian was at a point where the motorman had
a right to expect a clear track ordinarily, there were facts in the record
which were held by the court to constitute submissible evidence of notice of
the presence of the pedestrian. In holding that a submissible humanitarian
case was made, the St. Louis Court of Appeals had said that when the
motor car started forward fifteen feet from the plaintiff, the plaintiff was
then in a position of imminent peril. The supreme court refused to quash
the opinion of the court of appeals, holding only that the opinion was
1.

346 Mo. 1029, 144 S. W. (2d) 142 (1940).
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not in conflict with any doctrine announced by the supreme court itself.
The decision in this case might well have settled the question of when a
pedestrian or a plaintiff comes into a position of imminent peril where the
vehicle which strikes him starts from a position at rest. Nevertheless, the
court en bave did not voice any authoritative statement on this question.
State ex rel. Alsup v. Tatlow2 involved the killing of plaintiff's intestate, a pedestrian, at a country public crossing by a railroad train. The
case was submitted solely on the humanitarian doctrine. It was contended
by the plaintiff that a submissible case of failure to warn under the humanitarian doctrine rule was made. In applying well-settled principles the
court held as a matter of fact that there was not evidence that the plaintiff's
intestate was in discoverable imminent peril a sufficient length of time before the collision for the trainman to have prevented the accident by action under the humanitaiian doctrine. So holding, the court refused to
quash an opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals in this same case
reversing plaintiff's trial court judgment outright.
State ex rel. Alton R. R. v. Shain involved a train-truck collision at a
railroad crossing. The case applied settled principles to the familar
automobile-railroad train crossing collision. It is interesting for the effect
the assumption of imminent peril of the plaintiff has upon the plaintiff's
own contributory negligence asserted by the railroad to defeat recovery on
primary negligence.
State ex rel. Snider v. Shain involved a pedestrian-automobile collision at an intersection in Kansas City. The case was submitted by the
plaintiff under the humanitarian doctrine. Following Buehler v. Festus
Mercantile Co.,, the court condemned an instruction given by the plaintiff
which imposed upon the defendant a duty to act under the humanitarian
rule when the defendant saw or, by the exercise of ordinary care, should
have seen the plaintiff, "in or immediately coming into a position of
peril." The instruction also required a finding that at the time the plaintiff was apparently oblivious of any impending danger.
In this case the court discussed and ruled upon a "tail" to the humanitarian instruction which read as follows:
. . . and if you further find that as a direct result of
such negligence (if you find defendant was negligent), defendant's
automobile struck the plaintiff and thereby injured her (if so),
2. 346 Mo. 1025, 144 S. W. (2d) 140 (1940).
3. 346 Mo. 681, 143 S.W. (2d) 233 (1940).
4.

345 Mo. 950, 137 S. W. (2d) 527 (1940).

5. 343 Mo. 139, 119 S. W. (2d) 961 (1938).
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then you are instructed that regardless of any other fact or circumstance in evidence, your verdict must be in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant."
Apparently there was sufficient evidence upon which to submit a "sole
cause" instruction on behalf of the defendant. The defendant requested
the sole cause instruction which was refused by the trial court. In contrast to its ruling in Smithers v. Barker,6 the supreme court held that inclusion of the so-called "tail" on the humanitarian instruction was not error.
In this case the court held that the difference in language between the
instruction in the present case and the instruction in the Smithers case,
supra, was sufficient to render the present instruction proper. In the
Smithers case, the phrase used was "even though you should find and believe from the evidence that the plaintiff did not exercise due care for his
own safety and was or was not then and there drunk or negligent in
getting himself into the aforesaid position of peril, if any." Judge Clark,
writing the opinion in the principal case said that the use of the word
"negligent" in the Smithers case distinguished it from the present case
where the words, "fact or circumstance" were used. In the Smithers case,
the "tail" was not held to be technically inaccurate but was held to be
misleading. So the question is not one of technical inaccuracy but a question of confusion.
It is stressed in the principal case that the humanitarian instruction
required a finding that plaintiff was injured "as a direct result" of plaintiff's negligence. But so did the instruction in Smithers case. As a result,
this part of the Smithers case is practically overruled.
Finally, in the principal case, the court approved the refusal of the
trial court to give a "sole negligence" instruction. This refusal was
based on the fact that the instruction in the present case did not follow
precisely the formula of the case of Doherty v. St. Louis Butter Co.7
The principal case seems to lay down the rule that an instruction interposed
as a defense to the humanitarian doctrine, excusing the defendant from
liability if the injury complained of is due solely to the negligence of the
plaintiff, must use substantially this language: "and was not due to any
negligence of defendant in any of the particularsset out in other instrutctions herein."

6.

341 Mo. 1017, 111 S. W. (2d) 47 (1937), noted in (1938) 3 Mo. L. REV.

7.

339 Mo. 996, 98 S. W. (2d) 742 (1936).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1

70

et al.: Work on the Missouri Supreme Court
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1940

IL

DiwSloN ONE

Roach v. Kansas City Public Service Co.' is an action involving the
death of a passenger struck by a bus which the passenger was attempting
to enter. Plaintiff's evidence showed that the deceased was standing near
the closed door of the bus, attempting to induce the operator to open the
door. Starting from a position at rest on an icy street, the bus moved
forward and struck the plaintiff. The defendant had a verdict from
which the plaintiff appealed, charging error in the instructions. The
submissibility of the case does not seem to have been questioned by
the defendant on appeal. The case was submitted solely on the humanitarian doctrine. In the course of the opinion, the court said, in
ruling upon an instruction that no humanitarian case was presented
if the passenger stood clear of the path of the bus as it was started
even though the driver might have reasonably anticipated that because of
the icy condition of the street, the bus would slip sidewise and strike the
plaintiff. Under these circumstances the court held that the plaintiff was
not in imminent peril if the bus started to move. (Of course, the driver's
conduct under these circumstances might have amounted to primary negligence, but this point was not ruled upon). This is one of the rare cases
in which humanitarian negligence is asserted in a situation where the
defendant's vehicle moves from a position at rest and strikes the plaintiff.
The principles governing such a situation are not yet clearly established.
Doubt has been expressed as to whether the doctrine can apply in this
fact situation.9 But it is certainly thinkable, under the humanitarian rule
as presently applied, that it is applicable when the operator of a vehicle
at rest starts forward and runs over a plaintiff who is standing in its path
and oblivious or unable to extricate himself. Until the court speaks authoritatively, the question must remain in doubt.
Hilton v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis0 involved a pedestrianrailroad-motor car collision in the switchyards in St. Louis. The case
was submitted under the humanitarian doctrine. The plaintiff's principal
instruction imposed a duty upon the defendant to act to avert injury to
the plaintiff, if the defendant saw, or by the exercise of ordinary care,
could have seen the plaintiff 'approaching and in such position of imminent
peril." Judge Douglas here followed the ruling in Buehler v. Festus Mer-

8. 141 S. W. (2d) 800 (Mo. 1940), noted in (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 118.
9. (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 118.

10. 345 Mo. 987, 137 S. W. (2d) 520 (1940).
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canti7e Co.11 The minority opinions in Perkins v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 1 2
are again followed as the law. It is here held that obliviousness on the
part of the plaintiff as he approached the path of defendant's vehicle but
before the plaintiff was in imminent peril as defined in previous decisions
does not impose a duty under the humanitarian doctrine. The decision
does not indicate any change in the application of the humanitarian doctrine but rather indicates a persistent acceptance of the ruling in the
Buehler case, supra.
3
Poague v. KurnP
involves an automobile-train collision at a crossing.
The case was submitted under the humanitarian rule. The defendant was
given an instruction which stated that the defendant trainmen were entitled to assume "that the driver of such .automobile will use due care to
stop before going upon the crossing and into danger of being struck by
such train," while the automobile was still in a place of safety and at such
a distance from the crossing as to yet allow the driver a reasonable time
to stop before going on the crossing in front of the train. The instruction
concluded by directing a verdict for the defendant if the jury should find
that as soon as it could become apparent to the trainmen that the plaintiff
"was going to enter a position of imminent peril," it was too late, by
the use of care, to have stopped the train or given an effective warning
and thereby have avoided collision. The giving of this instruction was
held not to be reversible error (i. e.. it was not considered to interject the
issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence into a humanitarian case), but
the court suggested that it would affirm a judgment of the trial court granting a new trial on the basis of such instruction. In other words, because the
language of the instruction was not as precise as it might have been, the
lower court was said to have discretion to grant a new trial because of
the giving of such an instruction.' Here the trial court had denied the
new trial. The court further stated that such instructions are technically
and generally proper when they limit the assumption of the trainmen that
the car will stop until such time that it is apparent that the driver of the
automobile is oblivious.

11. 343 Mo. 139, 119 S. W. (2d) 961 (1938).
12. 340 Mo. 868, 102 S. W. (2d) 915 (1937).
13. 346 Mo. 153, 140 S. W. (2d) 13 (1940).
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Pitcher v. Schoch 4 involved an automobile-pedestrian collision occurring at night and was submitted on primary negligence and under the
humanitarian rule. In the humanitarian phase there was nothing new
about this decision.
Baker v. Wood 5 involved a collision of two automobiles meeting on the
highway in a cloud of smoke blowing across the road. All the evidence
showed that both vehicles were on their own right hand side as they entered
the cloud of smoke. The court held that no humanitarian case was made
under these circumstances. This is an application of the well-established
rule that the humanitarian doctrine does not invoke any duty upon the
operator of either vehicle meeting, when both are moving on their proper
sides of the road. The only aspect of this decision that is new is the holding
that obscured vision of both drivers by smoke does not affect application of
the established rule.
Duckworth v. Dent, 6 involved injury to a pedestrian who was struck
by a second vehicle put in motion by the defendant attempting to park the
defendant's automobile. The case was submitted solely on the humanitarian
doctrine. The supreme court held that no humanitarian case was made.
The case should have been submitted solely on primary negligence. The
ruling rested upon the fact that under the evidence the defendant could
not, because of physical obstruction, have seen the plaintiff in a position
of imminent peril as he backed into and set in motion the second vehicle
which struck and injured the plaintiff.

INSURANCE
ORRnT B.
I.

EvANS

JURISDICTION

The 'Missouri Supreme Court would have no jurisdiction of an ordinary
suit upon a thousand dollar certificate issued by a mutual benefit association unless the ruling of the lower court conflicted with a prior ruling of

230.

14. 345 Mo. 1184, 139 S. W. (2d) 463 (1940).
15. 142 S. W. (2d) 83 (Mo. 1940).
16. 346 Mo. 518, 142 S. W. (2d) 85 (1940), noted in (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B., University of

Wisconsin, 1931, LL.B., 1935; J.S.D., Yale University, 1940.
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the Missouri Supreme Court or unless the suit was certified to the supreme
court because of conflict between the several courts of appeals, or unless a
a constitutional question was involved. In Achtenberg v. Sovereign Camp,
W. 0. W.,1 the defendant's association's by-laws had been amended subsequent to the issuance of the certificate to require that holders of "combined benefit certificates" should pay increased monthly assessment, or
receive diminished benefits. Another by-law enacted in the same year declared new old age disability benefits for holders of certificates already
in force. The certificate sued upon, issued in 1897, provided that it should
be subject to by-laws subsequently enacted. The by-law increasing the
assessment was upheld as valid by the Nebraska Supreme Court, in which
state the defendant's association was organized. The Missouri court of
appeals had found for the plaintiff for the full face amount of the policy,
although the insured had not paid the increase in the assessment. The
plaintiff contended that the only issue was whether or not the instant certificate was a "combined benefit certificate," but the Missouri Supreme
Court felt that it was so clearly such a certificate that the only possible
basis for the decision below was that the increase in assessment was ultra
vires. Such a holding denied full faith and credit to the decision of the
Nebraska court, raised a constitutional question which gave the Supreme
Court of Missouri jurisdiction, and must be reversed as unconstitutional.
Robertson v. Manufacturing Lumbermen's Underwriters,2 was an application to the circuit court administering the liquidation of an insolvent
insurance exchange for attorneys' fees to compensate plaintiff for successfully opposing, at the request of the state superintendent of insurance,
attempted liquidation in bankruptcy in the federal court. Appeal was
taken from the decision of the circuit court allotting the plaintiff but
$3,500.00. Defendant contended that the jurisdiction of the circuit court
was exclusive, except as appeal was permitted under Section 5945, Missouri
Revised Statutes 1929 (as amended by Missouri laws 1933-34), which statute
did not cover this case. However, the court held that that statute was but
an affirmative grant of a right to appeal which might not otherwise be
thought to exist in the particular situation it covered, and that the instant
case should be governed by the general statute of appeals in civil causes.
The court proceeded to consider the matter de novo and increased the fee
to $15,000.00.

1. 346 Mo. 927, 144 S. W. (2d) 73 (1940).
2.

346 Mo. 1103, 145 S. W. (2d) 134 (1940).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1

74

et al.: Work on the Missouri Supreme Court
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1940
II.

CONSTRUCTION OF POLIOMS

It is of course apparent that in almost every insurance case the policy
sued upon must be construed. Because certain cases are not considered
under this heading, it should not be supposed that the decision was not
influenced by the particular terms of the contract. However, it seems more
satisfactory in a survey of this type to group under such an indefinite and
uninformative heading only the cases where no significant rule of substantive law is involved.
It seems almost impossible to draft a form of "accidental death"
provision which will avoid every possibility of litigation. Cases involving
accidental death clauses are constantly before the courts, and in many of
them the only issue is whether or not the undisputed facts show an "accident." In Cleaver v. Central States Life Insurance Co.,3 the policy
excluded death from "poison."
Insured was unintentionally killed by
carbon monoxide gas. The court held that this was an accidental death
but not caused by "poison."
Not attempting any precise definition of
"poison," the court observed that carbon monoxide gas was not generally
understood to fall in that category and observed that the insurer, who
drew up the contract, could have easily prevented the ambiguity by more
precise language. It is undoubted law, and probably just law, that ambiguities in insurance policies should be construed against the insurer, but
it is not at all sure that it is possible for an insurer to draw up a provision
which will obviate any possible misunderstandings as to all possible contingencies.
Courtney v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Co., 4 was a garnishment action
to collect a judgment rendered against the insured for the wrongful death
of a workman killed while repairing the insured's building. The policy
excluded liability for injury occurring during the "extraordinary" repair
of the building. The repairs in question were necessitated by a fire and
cost, in all, some $3,000.00. The building was valued at $40,000.00. The
court held that as a matter of law, these repairs were extraordinary.
Emphasis was put less upon the relative values of the building and the
repairs than upon the unforeseen and unpredictable contingency which
caused the loss and distinguished customary wear and tear from such uncertain hazards as fire or such unusual repair as structural alterations. In
holding this to be an "extraordinary" repair, the court observed that
3.
4.

346 Mo. 548, 142 S. W. (2d) 474 (1940).
346 Mo. 703, 142 S. W. (2d) 858 (1940).
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"fair minds could not differ" on the conclusion. This language suggests
that less certain questions should be decided by the jury, but quaere, should
not all matters of construction of a written contract be for the court,
whether clear or ambiguous, where the facts are not in dispute ?
In Walker v. The Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co.,' the insured, whose true name
was W. S. W., was the husband of the plaintiff, M. W. However, the policy
had been issued to the insured under the name of J. P. and was, by its express terms, payable to "E. P., wife of J. P." There.was in existence an
E. P., as named in the policy, but she was not the wife of the insured. The
court held the policy payable to E. P., holding that the wrong description
could not overcome the specific designation of the beneficiary by name.
III.

MISREPRESENTATION

Because insurance is a business of contracting in regard to future risks
for a consideration based upon present probabilities, it is essential that
the risks be defined as precisely as possible. While by his contract the
insured may specifically exclude certain risks, he was in addition at common
law protected in varying degrees against the insured's concealment, misrepresentation, and breach of warranty. Vance summarizes these doctrines
as follows: "In making contracts of insurance other than marine, concealment does not affect the validity unless the fact concealed was known
by the insured to be material, and such fact was concealed in bad faith
with intent to defraud the insurer. The effect of concealing a fact that
should be disclosed is to render the contract voidable at the option of the
injured party." 6 " Representations are statements made to give information
to the insurer and otherwise induce him to enter into the insurance contract.
They may be oral or written and may be made before or at the time of the
execution of the contract. If written they may be found within the contract
or without it. False representation, whether innocent or fraudulent, will
in all cases render a contract of insurance voidable, provided they are
material. . . . -7"A warranty is a statement or promise set forth in the
policy, or by reference incorporated therein, the untruth or nonfulfillment
of which in any respect, and without reference to whether the insurer was in
fact prejudiced by such untruths or nonfulfillments, renders the policy
voidable by the insurer, wholly irrespective of the materiality of such state-

5. 141 S. W. (2d) 785 (Mo. 1940).
6. VANCE, INSURANCE (2nd ed. 1930) p.
7. Id. at 359.
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ment or promise." 8 "The test of materiality is in the effect which the
knowledge of the fact in question would have on the making of the contract.
To be material, a fact need not increase the risk, or contribute 0 any loss
or damage suffered. . . . Matters made the subject of special inquiries
are deemed conclusively material.'' 9 It is believed that in these excerpts
Vance states the general understanding of the doctrines, although it is
natural that there should be some variation in application in the forty-eight
states.
The common law has been materially changed in Missouri by legislation.
By this statute 0 no misrepresentation will avoid the policy unless the
matter misrepresented actually contributed to the death of the insured,
and whether or not it so contributed is in all cases a question for the jury.
The statute applies to companies doing business upon the assessment plan"but not to fraternal benefit associations.1 2 Johnson v. Central Mut. Ins.
Ass'n,"3 was a suit upon a certificate issued by defendant association, which
incorporated the provisions of the by-laws of the association. One of the
by-laws provided that the members of the association should consist of
persons "not more than fifty years of age" at the time of making application. The alleged insured had applied for membership when he was fiftyfive years of age, stating that he was but fifty. The court held that the
misrepresentation statute did not prevent an insurance company from
excluding or excepting certain risks. The misrepresentation statutes were
said to prevent an insurer from avoiding a contract because of the alleged
misrepresentation. In the instant case no contract to insure the particular
risk was found. On re-hearings, the instant case was distinguished from
Burgess v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co.,14 on the ground that in the Burgess
case the rule of the defendant insurance company not to insure any person
over the age of sixty was not a part of the contract. The Burgess opinion
contained language very strongly in point on the instant controversy, but
such language was here designated as obiter based upon authority said to
have been overruled by Langan v. U. S. Life Ins. Co. 5

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 384.
Id. at 347.
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 5843, annotated (1941) 6 Mo. L. REV.338.
Aloe v. Fidelity Mut. Life Assoc., 164 Mo. 675, 55 S. W. 993 (1899).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 6108.
346 Mo. 818, 143 S. W. (2d) 257 (1940).
230 S. W. 315 (Mo. 1921).
344 Mo. 989, 130 S. W. (2d) 479 (1939), discussed by Evans, The Work
of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1939 (Insurance) (194G). 5 Mo. L.
REv. 451.
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It would appear that the misstatement of age by the applicant in the
instant case was, in the ordinary meaning of the word, a misrepresentation.
The stipulation in the by-laws would seem merely evidence of the company's regard of the representation of age as material in the common law
sense. Quaere, can an insurance company avoid the misrepresentation
statute by stipulating in its policies that it is based upon the risk described
in the application and excepts from the policy all risks other than those
as described in the application? The instant opinion indicates that the
rule may be restricted to cases of definite and certain matter, such as age. In
the instant case the court was very evidently influenced by the fact that the
policy was one issued by an assessment company, which contemplates equal
assessment upon all members to meet the necessary expenses of the company as they arrive. Under such a plan, it is obvious that for the plan
to operate fairly as to all members, the risks of each person must be approximately equal. Indeed, the Missouri statute which authorizes assessment companies stipulates that no company shall insure a person more than
sixty years of age. 16
The court says, "Unquestionably, as to a policy in which there was
no contract about age limit, or as to persons within the limit where there
was one, no misrepresentation as to age . . . could be grounds for
avoidance of the policy." This certainly has been the general attitude of
the Missouri courts, but it might be questioned whether every misrepresentation of age in an application for life insurance does not ultimately contribute to the death of the insured.
IV.

NON-FORFflITURE PROVISION

A short time hgo the Springfield Court of Appeals held 17 that the
automatic premium loan provision, in common use in many policies outstanding in Missouri, did not comply with the "non-forfeiture" statute 8
and that where the insured had not made special arrangement for the
payment of his premium when it fell due, the accumulated cash reserve
should be used as provided in that statute. However, in Cleaver v. Central
States Life Ins. Co.,"9 our supreme court held that where the policy contained such an automatic premium loan provision, the accumulated reserve

Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 5862.
17. Heuring v. Central States Life Ins. Co., 232 Mo. App. 731, 120 S. W. (2d)
176 (1938).
16.

18.

Mo. REv. STAT. (1939)

§§ 5852-5855.

19. 346 Mo.548, 142 S.W. (2d) 474 (1940).
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might be used to pay the premium due, preventinig any default which would
bring the case within the non-forfeiture statute. The court cited, inter alia,
a recent note in the Missouri Law Review, 19 a where the problem is fully
considered.
A good deal of litigation has centered over the problem arising when a
policy is issued bearing a premium date and stipulating subsequent premium
dates, but is not accepted and the first premium not paid until some time
after its original issuance. In Halsey v. Am. Central Life Ins. Co., 20 the
rule was laid down that the policy should date from the time of the first
premium payment, and that subsequent premiums should be due at the
proper interim from that later date. However, in Tabler v. Gen. Am. Life
Ins. Co.,2 1 the insured had become a year older, for the purposes of calculating premiums, between the time of the issuance and the time of payment
of the first premium. In that case the policy provided that in the event
that the first premium was not paid in cash when the policy was delivered,
not only that the policy should not be effective until it was paid but also "In
that event the policy shall bear the date of issue and all future premiums
shall become due on such policy date and all policy values and extended
insurance shall be computed therefrom." The court held that the date of
issue was the premium date and upon that date recurring in subsequent
years, the premiums were payable and default occurred accordingly when
they were not paid. While the court there reproduced the provision in the
policy just quoted, the entire emphasis was upon the inequity of allowing
the insured to pay the reduced premium rate according to his age at the
time of issuance of the policy and yet insist that the policy was effected and
the premium date occurred only after he had reached the greater age. In
Howard v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,2 2 we have the peculiar fact that the applicant
overstated his age when he made his application. Hence, although he had
reached another birthday when he actually accepted the policy, the premium
had been assessed at the proper age as of the time of accepting and paying
for the same. Moreover, the policy was not alleged to contain a specific
provision, as in the Tabler case, dating the premium payment from the time
of issue. Hence, on both grounds the Howard case fell within the doctrine
of Halsey v. Am. Central Life Ins. Co. The opinion here would confine the
19a. (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 331.
20. 258 Mo. 659, 167 S. W. 951 (1914).
21. 342 Mo. 726, 117 S. W. (2d) 278 (1938), discussed by Evans, The Work
of the Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 1938 (Insurance) (1939) 4 Mo. L.
REv. 416.
22. 346 Mo. 1062, 145 S. W. (2d) 113 (1940).
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Tabler case to its particular facts and to the provision in the policy there
stipulated. Future litigation on this matter may be expected, for the law
does not seem to be completely settled where there is simply the change
in age without the specific policy provision mentioned in the Tabler case,
or where there is such a specific provision without the change in age.

V. BuRIAL

SOCiETiES

In State ex rel. Williamson v. Black,2s it was held that a typical burial
association was engaged in an insurance business, and was not a benevolent,
religious, scientific, or educational society. It was conceded that a burial
society might be organized as a benevolent or charitable association, but
that this one was a business enterprise. Consequently its organization by
pro forma decree under Section 5014, Mffissouri Revised Statutes 1929, was
in contravention of Section 21, Article X of the Mfissouri Constitution, and
the statute referred to was held unconstitutional.
VI.

INSURABLE INTEREST

Where the insured takes out the policy in his own name and on his own
life, he can name any beneficiary he chooses, so long as he does not defraud
his creditors. It is not necessary that the beneficiary should have an insurable interest in his life, and there is no public policy preventing his
naming as beneficiary of an "old line" policy anyone he chooses in pref24
erence to his -wife..
VII.

LIQUIDATION OF INSURANCE COMPANY

The propriety of paying out of the estate being administered the fee
of attorneys employed by the superintendent of insurance was upheld in
Robertson v. Manufacturing Lumbermen's Underwriters,25 as well as the
right of the aggrieved attorneys to appeal to the supreme court. Attempts
to pay attorneys' fees from impounded premium in a rate litigation, 20
as well as the fees of attorneys not employed by the superintendent of
insurance in an insolvency proceeding 27 were distinguished.

23. 145 S. W. (2d) 406 (Mo. 1940).
24. Walker v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 141 S. W. (2d) 785 (Mo. 1940).
25. 346 Mo. 1103, 145 S. W. (2d) 134 (1940).
26. State ex rel. Lucas v. Blair, 346 Mo. 1017, 144 S. W. (2d) 106 (1940),
the latest in the long series of cases arising out of fire insurance rate litigation.
27. Robertson v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 136 S. W. (2d) 362 (Mo.
App. 1938).
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VIII. FORmGN LAW
There were no true conflicts of laws cases before the court in 1940. Two
decisions 28 involved the doctrine of Bolin v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. 2 9
It was held that the validity and applicability of a subsequent by-law
of a mutual benefit association was conclusively determined by the decision
of the state in which the association was organized, and the failure to
recognize the authority of such a decision was a denial of full faith and credit under the United States Constitution. The matter seems so thoroughly
settled that one can only express surprise that it should be re-litigated so
frequently.

PROPERTY
WILLARD L. ECKHARDT*
The Missouri property cases bulk so large that no attempt has been
made here to brief or discuss all of them. The cases discussed have been
selected for one of three reasons: first, because they are cases of first impression in Missouri; second, because they overrule or modify in important
respects earlier Missouri decisions; and third, because holdings or dicta
seem to be of dubious soundness.
I.

NuisACc

The question whether the operation of a funeral home in a residential
neighborhood may be enjoined as a pri ate nuisance has been before the
court several times. In Tureman v. Ketterlin1 the court affirmed the permanent enjoining of a funeral home and embalming establishment in a
neighborhood that was in a period of transition, no new homes being built
and business entering here and there. The evidence was conclusive as to the
remoteness of the probability of the communication of disease and of the
emission of noisome odors. "On the other hand there was evidence equally
conclusive that constant reminders of death, such as are furnished by the
28.

McDaniel v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 139 S. W. (2d) 993 (Mo. 1940);

29.

344 Mo. 714, 127 S. W. (2d)'718 (1939).

Achtenberg v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 346 Mo. 927, 144 S. W. (2d) 73 (1940).

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.S., University of
Illinois, 1935, .LL.B., 1937; Sterling Fellow Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202 (1924).
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presence of an undertaking establishment and its visible activities, have a
depressing effect on the mind of the average person, weakening his physical
resistance and rendering him more susceptible to contagion and disease; and
that the values of homes in a residence district, both sales and rental, immediately depreciate whenever an undertaking establishment makes its
appearance therein, because there is such a general aversion to a continuing
atmosphere of death and mourning that people will not live in it if they
can avoid it." The leading case of Street v. Marshall' presented the problem
whether the operation in a residential district of a funeral home without
any embalming establishment could be enjoined. The fact that embalming
was done elsewhere completely eliminated any possibility of the communication of disease or of the emission of noxious odors. In spite of the
defendant's expert testimony "that the living observer of a passing funeral
would, or might, be buoyed up by the thought that another, and not he,
was on the way to the cemetery," and "that a person suffering from
nervousness or depression might be benefited by being stationed at some
point of vantage where he could view passing funeral processions," the
court affirmed the issuance of an injunction because "constant reminders
of death, such as an undertaking establishment and the activities connected
with it give rise to, impair in a substantial way the comfort, repose and
enjoyment of the homes which are subjected to them."
The latest case dealing with this problem is Clutter v. Blankenship3
where the defendant proposed a funeral home and embalming establishment
in a residential neighborhood. He appeals from an order perpetually
enjoining him. The defendant relied chiefly on the argument that the
granting of an injunction would deprive him of his property in violation
of the due process clause of the Missouri Constitution. 4 The court answers
that the defendant is not deprived of any property, quoting the maxim
sic ittere tuo ut alienum non laedas,5 and observing that "when such a use
of property is enjoined by equity, the property owner is not deprived of
his property at all since the privilege of using it to commit a nuisance was
never his. "6 Furthermore, even if the defendant were deprived of property, the deprivation would be by due process of law, hence not forbidden.
2.
3.

316 Mo. 698, 291 S. W. 494 (1927).
346 Mo. 961, 144 S. W. (2d) 119 (1940).

4. Mo. CoNsT. art. II, § 30.
5. So use your own as not to injure another's property.
6. The uses of the word "property" in this passage should interest students
of semantics. For more advanced study analyze Steger v. Seabaugh, 346 Mo. 728,
142 S. W. (2d) 1001 (1940)

by Tipton, J.).

(majority opinion by Ellison, J., dissenting opinion
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It is not clear whether the defendant raised the constitutional issue for its
own merits, or whether the issue was raised as a plausible argument to give
the supreme court jurisdiction in the hope that the court would reexamine
the problem and overrule the earlier decisions.

II. ADVFRS; PossEssIoN
A, owning Blackacre in fee simple absolute, grants to B for life, remainder to C and his heirs. B, who has a life estate, goes into possession,
and then grants Blackaere to D and his heirs. D occupies the land claiming
a fee simple. After B's death, forty years later, C brings an action of
ejectment against D, and asks that title be quieted. Most jurisdictions
would hold that D had not acquired title by adverse possession because
his possession was not adverse. D was in rightful possession during B's
lifetime, and as long as B lived C had no immediate right of possession, and
could not have brought a possessory action against D. Consequently C had
no cause of action against which the statute of limitations might run.
C's only possible remedy would have been a suit to quiet title.
In Armor v. Frey7 the testator in 1872 devised Blackacre to his
children; "upon the death of my children without issue I direct that the
share of such child shall revert to my estate and be devided equally amongst
my surviving children and the children of such of my children as may be
deceases, share and share alike." In 1877 all of the children joined in a
conveyance to the defendant and his heirs [in fee simple]. One child died
in 1903 without having had issue. Within ten years children of the surviving children [grandchildren of the testator] brought a suit for partition,
claiming the deceased child's share under the limitation over in the will.
The defendant argued that more than ten years had elapsed [including
time prior to 1903] since the plaintiffs had a right to bring a suit to quiet
title, and consequently the plaintiffs not only could not bring a suit to quiet
title, but also had lost their remainder by adverse possession. The court
admitted this was the rule at least in Iowa. But in Missouri such a suit
"seeks simply an ascertainment of the status quo [nunc] of the title or titles
to the property." The remainders of the plaintiffs did not vest in possession
until 1903. "The mere failure for ten years to sue under the statute
after the right to sue [to quiet title] has accrued does not bar -the right
to so proceed thereafter, and such failure of a remainderman does not bar
his estate in remainder."
7. 253 Mo.447, 161 S. W. 829 (1913).
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Moore v. Hoffman" carries the doctrine one step further. In this case
the estate carrying with it the right of possession was not expressly limited,
but was an interest with a right of possession created by law. Hilary Moore
died intestate in 1890, survived by his widow, the plaintiff, and by two
daughters. The widow thought the land was hers absolutely and exercised
complete dominion over it for thirty-seven years, up to the time of this
suit. One daughter died several years after the death of her father, her
sole heirs being her mother and sister. The other daughter, a nominal
defendant, became insolvent, and her trustee in bankruptcy, the real defendant, claims her alleged share of this land for the benefit of her creditors.
The court held this daughter had no interest in the land, and analyzed
the case as follows: When the father died, each of his daughters inherited
an undivided one-half, subject to his widow's right of quarantine until
dower was assigned to her, in case she did not elect to take a child's share
(the dwelling house was on another tract of land, and the court doubted if
the widow had any homestead rights in the tract in question). When the
first daughter died, the mother and surviving daughter each inherited half
of her undivided half. Ten years after the father's death, the statute
of limitations barred the widow's right to have dower assigned, and with
the loss of this right the widow's right of quarantine terminated. "Up
to that time she had been rightfully in possession under her dower and
quarantine rights and her possession was not adverse to the rights of the
heirs." Thereafter, for twenty-seven years, the widow was in full possession, claiming entire ownership, but in reality having the legal title to
only a one-fourth interest which she had inherited from her deceased
daughter. This possession was adverse, set in motion the ten year statute
of limitations, and the widow acquired title by adverse possession. The
important thing in the court's analysis is that the widow's possession was
not adverse during the ten years when she was entitled to possession under
her right of quarantine, even though she claimed and thought herself entitled
to the fee simple.
Barker v. Hayes,9 decided in 1940, seems to be out of line with the
above decisions. Matthew Spears contracted a slave marriage prior to the
Civil War. The defendant, Daisy Hayes, is a granddaughter and the only
surviving descendant of that marriage. In 1872, after the War between
the States, Matthew Spear married Henrietta, but there were no children

8. 327 Mo. 852, 39 S. W. (2d) 339 (1931).
9. 147 S. W. (2d) 429 (Mo. 1940).
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as a result of this marriage. He died in 1894, devising the land which
they occupied as a homestead to his widow, Henrietta.
Henrietta lived on the land as her own until her death in 1934, and
devised the land to the plaintiff. The defendant's theory is that she was
a pretermitted descendant, and therefore took as though the testator had
died intestate; that his widow, Henrietta, had a life estate and was entitled
to possession under the homestead laws, and that the defendant was not
entitled to possession until the termination by death of this life estate
in 1934; that the defendant was entitled to possession in 1934 and her
right is not barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff's theory
is that the widow claimed a fee simple under the will in 1894; that her
possession thereafter was adverse to the defendant; that the defendant
reached legal majority in 1904; that thirty-four years elapsed before this
suit was brought in 1938; and that the widow acquired by adverse possession
a fee simple which she devised to the plaintiff. The court held the widow
had acquired title by adverse possession.
The court's opinion is too brief to indicate clearly its reasons. Moore
v. Hoffman is not distinguished; it is not even cited. Perhaps some substantial ground of distinction exists, but this writer is not aware of any.
In each case the widow claimed a fee simple. In each case the widow was
entitled to possession, in the former case under her right of quarantine,
in the latter case under her right of homestead. By electing to take a
fee under a will does a widow forfeit her homestead? If homestead is
forfeited, -why is not a right of quarantine forfeited?
III.

CONCURRENT ESTATES

In Simon v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,10 a widow claimed as a tenant

by the entirety certain certificates of time deposits issued to "George H.
Simon and Charlotte Simon" and certain notes payable to "George H.
Simon and wife." The court held that the widow was a tenant by the
entirety. While these instruments represent money originally furnished
by George H. Simon, because of their form his widow is aided under
Mlissouri decisions and statutes by a presumption that George H. Simon
intended to create an estate by the entirety. This case is distinguished
from cases where it is alleged that there is a gift of the entire interest in

10.

346 Mo. 146, 139 S. W. (2d) 1002 (1940).
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chattels. In such cases the alleged donee, unaided by any presumption,
has the burden of proving the alleged donor's intention to make a gift.'
Walker v. Deppe" considers what words are sufficient to create a joint
tenancy under the Missouri statute.'13 A grant was made in the following
terms:
"This deed, made and entered into . . . by and between
John H. Newport, . . . party of the first part, and Catherine
Marie Newport and Hazel Marie Newport, as joint tenants and
not tenants in common, . . . parties of the second part:
"Witnesseth: That the said party of the first part . . .
does by these presents, grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm,
unto the said parties of the second part, the following described
real estate . . .
"To have and to hold the same . . . unto the said
parties of the second part, and to their heirs and assigns forever
After Hazel's death the problem arose as to whether this limitation created a tenancy in common entitling her husband and two daughters to
her undivided one-half interest in the land, or whether it created a joint
tenancy entitling the survivor, Catherine, to all of the land. The words
"as joint tenants and not tenants in common" appear in the premises of
the deed but neither in the granting nor the habendum clauses. The
court held that this deed was sufficient, the intention being clear, to create
a joint tenancy. The court advanced two reasons. The statute requires
the express declaration of joint tenancy to be "in such grant" (meaning
"deed"), but does not require it to be in the granting clause. The phrase
"second parties" as used in the granting and habendum clauses incorporates by reference to the premises both the names of the grantees and the
tenancy expressed. 4
IV.

RESTRICTION ON USE OF LAND

Sense-of-Justice and Good-Conscience, those valiant knights-errant of
the Law, saved one defendant's real estate from forfeiture in Robinson v.
Cannon.15 When in 1879 Robert T. Elsberry subdivided the land which
became Elsberry, Missouri, he "had the future interest of the town and
11. In re Van Fossen, 13 S. W. (2d) 1076 (Mo. App. 1929).
12. 346 Mo. 354, 141 S. W. (2d) 783 (1940).
13. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3504. "Every interest in real estate granted
or devised to two or more persons, other than executors and trustees and husband
and wife, shall be a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared, in such grant
or devise, to be in joint tenancy."
14. See Gunn, Limitation Sufficient to Create Joint Tenancy (1940) 5 Mo.
L. REv. 114.
15. 346 Mo. 1126, 145 S. W. (2d) 146 (1940).
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its citizens at heart and desired that the evil of intoxicating liquor should
never raise its ugly head in that community." To accomplish this desire,
he placed in each deed of the lots in the business section the following
for the further consideration of the agreement bestipulation: "
tween the parties hereto for themselves, their heirs, successors and legal
representatives, that intoxicating liquors shall never be manufactured,
sold, or otherwise disposed of as a beverage in any place of public resort
in or upon the premises hereby granted, or any part thereof; and it is
herein and hereby expressly reserved by the said Party of the First Part
that in case of any of the above conditions concerning intoxicating liquors
are broken by said Parties of the Second Part, their assigns, or legal representatives, then this deed shall become null and void, and all right, title
and interest of, in and to the premises hereby conveyed shall revert to
the said Party of the First Part, his heirs and assigns." By 1900 there
were a number of "drug stores" in operation on the restricted premises.
"The routine necessary to obtain whisky in those days was about as
follows: A party desiring to purchase whisky would call on a doctor
(who was always to be found at a drug store) and inform him, the doctor,
of an ailment, whether real or fancied, from which the party suffered. The
party desiring the whisky diagnosed his own case, decided for himself how
much whisky was necessary for a cure and also decided the amount of the
dose-to be taken. The doctor would then obligingly hand either the party
or the druggist a prescription, whereupon the sale of whisky followed.
One witness, speaking of these drug stores, stated that they each had a
doctor for the purpose of writing these prescriptions."
Robert T. Elsberry knew of these conditions and lamented the fact
that he could not do much about it. Prohibition came and went, and
liquor again was sold on the premises; plaintiffs in their brief state: "It is
fair to presume that the drunken orgies engendered by the flow of intoxicating beverages from these public places inspired the significant name in one
instance of 'Hot Cat.' " The heirs of the original grantor brought this
suit to have the title declared forfeited. The defense was that the right
of forfeiture was waived by the plaintiffs and their ancestors. The trial
court gave judgment for the defendants, and that judgment was affirmed
by the supreme court. The reason? "Sense of justice and good conscience
forbid a court declaring a forfeiture in this case. The restriction placed
in the deeds by Elsberry was waived by him during his lifetime." The
purpose of the following paragraphs is to examine whether more adequate
reasons might have been assigned.
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A grantor who wishes to prevent the sale of liquor on the granted
premises may use any one of at least four techniques:
1. A grants Blackaere to B and his heirs so long as no liquor is sold
on the premises. B gets a fee simple determinable (fee simple subject to
a special limitation), and A has what is known as a possibility of reverter.
If liquor ever is sold on the premises, B's estate automatically expires or
determines, and A is entitled to possession because A now has a fee simple
absolute.'
2. A grants Blackacre to B and his heirs, on the express condition
that if liquor ever is sold on the premises, A and his heirs may reenter and
terminate the estate. B gets a fee simple defeasible (fee simple subject to
a condition subsequent), and A has a right of entry for condition broken
(power of termination). If liquor ever is sold on the premises, A by his
election has the power to terminate B's estate. If A elects to terminate and
acts accordingly, A is entitled to possession as the owner of a fee simple
absolute. A breach of a covenant may be the event giving the right of
7
entry.1
3. A grants Blackacre to B and his heirs, B promising for himself and
his heirs to A and his heirs, never to sell intoxicating liquor on the premises.
If certain technical requirements are satisfied, the most important being
that of "privity," the above transaction creates a legal covenant running
with the land. If B violates the covenant, A may recover damages for past
violations and usually may enjoin future violations.'8
4. If the above transaction fails to satisfy all of the technical requirements for a legal covenant running with the land, equity may enforce the
restriction as an equitable servitude (equitable covenant running with
the land) if all of the requirements of equity are satisfied.19
What is the effect of the limitation in the Elsberry deed 720 The word
"agreement" indicates a legal or equitable covenant. The latter part of
the limitation, however, indicates a grant of either a defeasible fee with

16.

First Universalist Society of North Adams v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171,

17.

Strong v. Shatto, 46 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1919).

29 N. E. 524 (1892); Institution for Savings in Roxbury v. Roxbury Home for
Aged Women, 244 Mass. 583, 139 N. E. 301 (1923).

18. CLARK, REAL, COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH
LAND" (1929) 73 ff.

19.

Tulk v. Moxhay,.2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848); Norcross v.

James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N. E. 946 (1885).
20. On this problem of construction, see Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 283
(Mass. 1829); Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361, 22 N. E. 145 (1889). For pleasant
diversion on a rainy afternoon, see Florence Allen's opinion in In re Matter of
Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church, 120 Ohio St. 309, 166 N. E. 218 (1929).
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a right of entry for condition broken, or a determinable fee with a possibility of reverter. The words "null and void" and "shall revert" would
seem to indicate a determinable fee with a possibility of reverter, but the
greater number of cases consider it as equivalent to an express right of reentry, hence indicating a right of entry for condition broken. 21 It is submitted that the limitation should be construed as creating a defeasible fee,
subject to a right of entry if the covenant is breached. The court does
not examine the problem critically, but at several points indicates that it
thinks the limitation creates a covenant; e. g., "Even now appellants in this
case make no demand that the restriction be enforced and thus attain the
object of the restriction."
The court reached the proper result, viz., that the present property
holders may continue undisturbed in their possession, in spite of its failure
to attempt an analysis of the limitation. The following is an attempt to
supply reasons for this result. (1) Let us assume the limitation created a
determinable fee. When liquor was sold in 1900, the grantor's possibility
of reverter automatically became a present fee simple. The possession of
the occupants of the land immediately became adverse to the grantor or
his heirs, and by the date of this suit the title of the defendants would be
perfected by adverse possession. On this theory judgment properly is
for the defendants. (2) More difficulty is encountered if the limitation
created a defeasible fee. Here possession does not become adverse until
the grantor or his heirs elect to reenter and terminate the estate and this
was not done until the commencement of this suit. Consequently the defendant does not have a good title by adverse possession. But courts generally have held that the grantor's power to forfeit should not last forever,
but that the grantor has only a reasonable time after the breach in which
to declare a forfeiture. Courts usually denominate this as "waiver," but
that ambiguous term is undesirable. 22 On this theory judgment properly
is for the defendants. (3) If this limitation creates merely a covenant
running with the land, legal or equitable, without a right to forfeit for
breach of covenant, then the remedy of the grantor is at law for damages,
or injunctive relief in equity. On these theories judgment is properly
for the defendant when the plaintiff asks for forfeiture.

21.
22.

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) § 45, comment m.
1 SIMEs, FuTURE INTERESTS (1936) ,§ 170.
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CONTINGENT REMAINDERS

The supreme court, speaking through Dalton, C., delivered one of its
best -property opinions in recent years in the case of Lewis v. Lewis.23
Hugh Lewis, Sr., died testate in 1896, survived by his widow, Adaline, and
by five children, one of whom was Addie Lee. By item four of his will, lie
devised to his "daughter, Addie Lewis, for the term of her life, and at
her death to the heirs of her body, absolutely," the real estate here involved.
By item seven he devised the residue of his estate to his widow, Adaline.
In 1899 the widow and the other four children quit-claimed to Addie Lee
all their interest in the land described in item four. Addie Lee, unmarried,
seventy-five years of age, without issue of body, petitions for a declaratory
judgment that she has a fee simple absolute, joining as defendants all
living descendants of the testator and his widow.2 4 The trial court entered
judgment declaring that the plaintiff "did become vested with the fee
simple title to the real estate described in the petition subject to be divested
upon the plaintiff, Addie Lee Lewis, having heirs of the body." Judgment
was affirmed by the supreme court. "We hold that respondent has a life
estate in the real estate described and a vested reversionary interest in
fee, which reversionary interest in fee is subject only to being divested in
the event of respondent's death, leaving surviving her, heirs of her body.
The estate which respondent has is, in effect, a fee-simple title which she
may transfer by deed or will or which will pass by descent, and which
fee-simple title will be defeated only in the event that at her death respondent is survived by heirs of her body.""
At common law the life estate of Addie Lee was the particular estate of
freehold which supported the contingent remainder in the heirs of her body.
When Addie Lee acquired the reversion, the life estate and the reversion

23.

345 Mo. 816, 136 S. W. (2d) 66 (1940).

24. The principal issue in the case arose under item eight: "If any of my
children named in this, my last will and testament, shall die without issue living
at the time of his or her death, capable of inheriting, then, and in that case, it

is my will, that my dearly beloved wife, if living, and such of my said children

as may then be living shall take in equal parts all the property by the terms
of this will given and devised to such deceased child . . ." The defendants
claimed an alternative contingent remainder but the court held that none existed,
on the theory that "die without issue living at the time of his or her death"
refers to the death of Addie Lee before the testator's death, a substitutionary

gift. Most of the opinion is concerned with this problem.

25. Compare the language of the trial court, "fee-simple title subject to be
divested," with the accurate analysis and terminblogy of Dalton, C., "life estate,
vested but defeasible reversion, contingent remainder." He then properly adds
that this is "in effect" a defeasible fee simple. The conclusion would seem
to be that the result is the same whether one calls the future interest a contingent
remainder or a shifting executory interest.
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merged, thus determining the supporting particular estate, and destroying
all contingent remainders dependent thereon. Merger was the technique
usually employed at common law to destroy contingent remainders. 2 6 Thus,
the decision in this case at common law would be that Addie Lee had a
fee simple absolute. But in Lewis v. Lewis the court held that Addie Lee's
reversion was subject to a contingent remainder in the heirs of her body.
The contingent remainder was not destroyed by merger. The case holds
that in Missouri a contingent remainder is not destructible by merger, and
overrules the common law doctrine if it ever was in force in Missouri, or
adopts a modern rule better suited to the present century if the common
law rule never was in force in Missouri. In two earlier Missouri cases,
Fountainv. Starbuck2 7 and Schee v. Boone,28 the court held on the facts of
the cases that a contingent remainder is not destructible by merger, but
in neither of these cases did the court recognize that a reversion exists after
a limitation of a contingent remainder. But in Lewis v. Lewis, the court
expressly discusses the reversion, and expressly finds that the reversion
and the life estate are in one person. 29 Thus there can be no doubt that
this is a case for destruction of a contingent remainder by merger if the
court will permit it. No holding on the facts that a contingent remainder
is indestructible could be more definitive. It is unfortunate that the court
did not mention destructibility in express terms, to remove any last iota of
doubt. A statement of the background of the destructibility problem, and
an exhaustive analysis of Missouri authorities will be found in my article
in a recent number of this Review."0

26.
27.
28.
29.

Bond v. Moore, 236 Ill. 576, 86 N. E. 386 (1908).
209 S. W. 900 (Mo. 1919).
295 Mo. 212, 243 S. W. 882 (1922).
136 S. W. (2d) at 71: "Upon the death of the testator the reversionary

interest in fee, in the real estate described, vested in the widow Adaline Lewis,
subject to the life estate and the contingent remainder devised under item 4 of
the will. . . . The reversionary interest in said- real estate, which, by reason
of item 7 of the will became vested in the widow Adaline Lewis, was the proper
subject of conveyance by deed, and it was conveyed by deed by the said Adaline
Lewis in her lifetime to respondent, in whom it is now vested. .
.
The (reversion) conveyed to respondent was a vested interest, subject to being divested
upon certain conditions, but it has not been divested, and will not be divested,
except in the event that respondent is survived by heirs of the body."
30. Eckhardt, The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in Missouri
(1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 268-296.
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PUBLIC UTILITIES
F.ANx E. ATWOOD*

The Missouri Supreme Court decisions in 1940 directly involving
public utility law grew out of original proceedings in prohibition.
In State ex rel. Cirese v. Ridge,1 decided by the court en bane, relators
challenged the jurisdiction of the circuit court to grant the injunctive
relief sought by the plaintiff. Defendants had demurred to the petition,
alleging that the circuit court was without jurisdiction of the subject
matter. The demurrer was overruled and temporary injunction granted.
The demurrer admitted that the defendants in the injunction suit
were operating a public utility. Hence, the supreme court, following
previous decisions, held that the public service commission had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the petition for injunction. Respondent,
nevertheless, contended that the circuit court had concurrent jurisdiction
with the public service commission of a complaint made by a public
utility against another public utility, and that a determination by the
commission of the facts here complained of would be an exercise of
judicial power.
In disallowing both contentions the supreme court held that the
commission has exclusive jurisdiction, in the first instance, over public
utilities, .and that "the regulation and control of public utilities by the
commission is not an exercise of judicial power". The provisional rule in
prohibition was made absolute.
State ex ret. Public Service Commission v. Padberg,2 also decided by
the court en bane, was likewise an original proceeding in prohibition,
challenging the jurisdiction of the circuit court to entertain a suit filed by
motor carriers to prevent the enforcement of the Bus and Truck Law
against them in the face of their claim of exemption under the terms of
the law. Relators contended that the circuit court was deprived of
jurisdiction under the Public Service Commission Act, which exempted
from its operation trucks of one and one-half ton capacity or less. Controversy centered over whether the commission was bound to accept the manufacturers' rating of the trucks, rather than its own determination of their
*Attorney, Jefferson City. A.B., William Jewell College, 1902, A.M., 1912,
Former member of the Supreme Court of Missouri.
1. 345 Mo. 1096, 138 S. W. (2d) 1012 (1940).
2. 346 Mo. 1133, 145 S. W. (2d) 150 (1940).

LL.D., 1930.
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actual weight carrying capacity in determining the applicability of the
act.
Citing the Cirese case, supra, and other similar cases, the court stated
and approved the rule that "matters within the jurisdiction of the commission must first be determined by it in every instance before the courts
will adjudge any phase of the controversy because otherwise different
phases might be pending before the commission and the courts at one
time, thereby leading to endless confusion".
Further discussing the particular case, the court said:
"Turning again to the exemption clause we find: 'the provision of this act shall not apply to trucks of one and one-half ton
capacity and less.' No ambiguity whatever is present in this enactment and the statement of the parties that it is ambiguous does not
make it so. What is a truck of one and one-half ton capacity is a
fact to be determined. The commission is expressly clothed with
the power to determine the capacity of trucks for the purpose of
fixing and assessing license fees. There is no force or logic to
the argument that the commission cannot determine such capacity
for the purpose of exemption from such fees. It must find a
truck has more than one and one-half ton capacity before it can
assess the lowest license fee.
"In addition to certain positive powers expressly conferred
upon the commission it is also vested with all others necessary and
proper to carry out fully and effectively the duties delegated to it.
State ex reZ. Pitcairn v. Public Service Commission, 232 Mo. App.
755, 111 S. W. (2d) 982.
"It is contended that trucks rated as one and one-half ton
capacity by the manufacturer are exempt. Assuming such contention to be correct it would directly conflict with the license fee
provision under which, as admitted here, the commission does not
accept the manufacturer's rating but by express power rates
according to actual carrying capacity. This would be the situation: A truck rated one and one-half ton capacity by the manufacturer would be exempt under respondent's contention, yet if
the commission pursuing its usual practise, found the actual carrying capacity of the same truck to be in excess of one and one-half
tons then the commission is authorized to collect a license fee on it.
Such contention on its face and under the express provisions of
the law is obviously untenable. To adopt it would do violence to
the fixed guide in statutory construction that provisions of an act
must be construed in harmony with each other so as to give force
and-effect to each.
"The determination of truck capacity is a fact to be found
in the first instance by the commission. The law gives the commission the right to relieve itself of this burdensome operation
by accepting the manufacturer's rated load capacity if the commission desires, but the commission has chosen to make its own
finding. Its choice has been forced upon it, no doubt because
there appears to be no standard, rule or guide followed by manufacturers in rating the load capacity of their trucks. As far as we
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
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know such rating is governed only by the individual considerations
of each manufacturer.
"If the circuit court should be permitted to force the commission to exempt a truck which in fact is not entitled to exemption,
and this the proceeding below attempts to do, the circuit court
would be violating the limitations of Section 5234 and would be
proceeding without jurisdiction of the subject matter."
The provisional rule in prohibition was made absolute.
State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Blair,3 decided by the
court en bane, December 3, 1940, was handed down with and portions
thereof cited with approval in the Padberg opinion, sitpra. It was also
an original proceeding in prohibition, this time to prevent a circuit court
from entering a declaratory judgment in suit filed by certain motor
carriers against the Missouri Public Service Commission, the Chief of
Police and Board of Police Commissioners of St. Louis, the City of St.
Louis, the State Highway Commission and the Acting Superintendent
of the State Highway Patrol. It was contended that the Act was not
applicable to carriers the major portion of whose business was within
the corporate limits of the City of St. Louis, or across the Illinois-Missouri state lines, and that defendants' efforts to apply the law to petitioners was causing irreparable injury.
Finding that a proper case for injunctive relief was alleged, the
supreme court distinguished the two cases just discussed. Of the Circse
case it observed that that was an effort by a private interest to enforce
the Public Service Commission Act against an alleged illegal public
utility directly through the courts instead of through the enforcement
agency given exclusive jurisdiction by the Act. The instant case was
to enjoin the action of the commission in a field in which, by the terms of
the Act, it had no jurisdiction. In the Padberg case the court held that
the statute plainly gave the commission exclusive power to determine
truck capacity by the method employed, as well as to select that method,
so that the court might not interfere with its activities. In the instant
case, the court was of the opinion that the Act clearly exempted certain of
petitioners' operations and was ambiguous as to the rest, and that it was
a judicial function to ascertain the limits of the statute.
In construing provisions of the Act found to be ambiguous, the court,
in substance, held,
1. That the underlying purposes of the Bus and Truck Act are
to provide for the preservation of the highways, for the safety and welfare
3. 146 S. W. (2d) 865 (Mo. 1941).
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of those who use them, and for reasonable compensation from those who
use them for commercial purposes.
2. That "contract haulers," exclusively engaged in intraurban or
suburban transportation, are exempt from the Act without regard to
whether they operate over regular or irregular routes.
3. That the term "regular routes" as used in the proviso includes
every portion of the municipality and suburban territory over which
the carrier usually or ordinarily provides transportation service.
4. That carriers domiciled in city, and carrying on major portion
of business or transportation within the city, whose operations are wholly
within the city, or wholly within city and suburban territory, or wholly
within city and across state line into suburban territory in another state,
are exempt from the Bus and Truck Act.
5. That the General Assembly intended to exempt operations even
in interstate commerce, provided the major part of the carrier's system
is located within a municipality in this state and the operations do not
extend beyond the limits of suburban territory as defined by the Act,
and that "suburban territory" should include territory outside the state
as well as within the state.
6. That Missouri cannot grant permission binding on another state for
operations by motor carrier outside the state, but can refuse to tax for
use of Missouri highways although carrier operates within a limited
sphere outside the state, if the carrier otherwise comes within the exemption proviso.
7. That the exemption provision contained in Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, § 5264 exempts commercial motor vehicles operating wholly
within a municipal corporation in this state, or wholly within such municipal corporation and its adjacent suburban territory (as defined), whether
such suburban territory is located within or without the state, where,
in either case, the major part of such transportation system is within the
limits of such municipal corporation.
8. That relators were not restrained from doing anything they
were authorized to do under a proper construction of the Act; that in any
circumstance where a statute is reasonably open to construction, the
Commission does have the power in the first instance, to determine administratively its own jurisdiction, but in this instance the Commission had
no hearing and made no record which could be reviewed, and the matter
of frequent arrest and irreparable injury entered in.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941

95

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1941], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

TAXATION
J. W. MCAFEE
I.

TAXATION OF INCOME OF DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS

During the year 1940 the Missouri Supreme Court decided three
cases involving the state income tax on domestic corporations. The
general problem presented in each of them was the meaning of "source of
income" as used in the tax statute.
Under the first Missouri income tax law, enacted in 1917, domestic
corporations were taxable on all their net income regardless of its source,
while foreign corporations were taxable only on net income derived from
sources in Missouri. 1 In 1927 the law was amended to tax both foreign
and domestic corporations on the same basis, that is, on income from
sources within this state.2 That amendment further provided that a
reasonable portion of net income derived from business partly within and
partly without Missouri should be allocated to Missouri, but did not set
forth any formula or method as a basis for making such an allocation.
This defect was remedied to some extent by an amendment in 1929 which
set forth a formula for the allocation of income and provided for an election by the taxpaying corporation to compute its taxable income in accordance with that formula.3 Since the legislature realized that the formula
would by no means cover every situation where income resulted from
interstate or several state activities, it was further provided that a taxpaying corporation might use some other method if it sought and obtained
the approval of the state auditor.
Thus the income tax law, applicable to the three cases decided in 1940,
was in general:
4
(1) A tax on net income derived from sources within this state.
(2) A tax on that portion of net income attributable to transactions
in this state where net income was derived from transactions partly within
4
and partly without this state.
(3) A formula by which the taxpaying corporation might elect to
compute that portion of net income. 4
*Attorney, St. Louis. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1926. Former Judge of
the St. Louis Circuit Court. The author acknowledges the valuable assistance
rendered him in the preparation of this survey by William H. Ferrell of the St.
Louis Bar.
1. Mo. Laws 1917, p. 524.
2.
3.
4.

Mo. Laws 1927, p. 475.
Mo. Laws 1929, p. 423.
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 11343(3).
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(4) A wide discretion in the state auditor in determining the method
of computing such portion of income when it was impossible or not
desirable for the taxpaying corporation to follow the formula and it did
not elect so to do.'
The statutory provisions relating to the allocation of net income were
first before the supreme court in Artophone Corporation v. Coale,6 decided in 1939. In the following year they were again before the court
7
in In re Kansas City Star Co.
The Kansas City Star Company, a Missouri corporation, had its
principal office in Kansas City, Missouri, where it published four newspapers. The widespread and many-fold activities carried on by the
company in connection with the publication and distribution of its
papers are discussed at length by the court in its opinion. However,
suffice it to say here that the company's business involved numerous
activities in states other than Missouri.
Since 1927 the company had computed its taxable income by applying
to its total net income the percentage which its newspaper circulation in
Missouri bore to its total circulation. The remainder of its net income,
the company claimed, was not taxable by Missouri since it was over and
above the portion attributable to transactions in Missouri. This method
used by the company in allocating its net income did not correspond to
the formula set forth in the statute, and the company had at no time
asked the state auditor to approve its method of allocation as required
by the statute. However, the state auditor accepted the company's tax
returns over a period of ten years without making any objection to the
method of allocation employed therein. The court held that action the
equivalent of an approval by the state auditor pursuant to his statutory
authority.
The principal contention made by the state auditor was that all of
the company's income was derived from a source in Missouri. Therefore,
it was claimed, the auditor had no authority to approve any method of
allocating income. The source of the income was in this state, the auditor
said, because the main office of the company was in Missouri, and the
source of the income is the location of the main office, the principal headquarters or directory control of the business. The court, however, held

5.
6.
comment
7.

Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 11343(7).

345 Mo. 344, 133 S. W. (2d) 343 (1939).
in (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 50-52.
346 Mo. 658, 142 S. W. (2d) 1029 (1940).

This case is discussed in a
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that the source of income must be determined "by the nature and location
of its producing cause." Thus, "if it be from labor, the place where the
labor was performed is decisive, if it be from capital, the place where the
capital was employed governs."" The court upheld the company's petition to abate the additional assessment of income taxes, since the facts
clearly showed that the company's income resulted from transactions partly
within and partly without TMissouri, and the method of allocation employed by the company had been tacitly approved by the state auditor.
Burkhart Mfg. Co. v. Coaie9 was the first case wherein the supreme
court held that certain income was derived in its entirety from sources
outside this state. The Burkhart Co., a domestic corporation, operated
factories in Missouri, Arkansas, Pennsylvania and Michigan. These outof-state factories had their own plant managers and sales forces, the head
office in 'issouri exercising merely a directory control over all the company's operations. The company claimed that the net income derived
from sales by the out-of-state factories direct to out-of-state customers
was not taxable since it arose from sources outside this state. On the
other hand, the auditor claimed that the income arose from transactions
partly within and partly without this state and should be allocated.
In a short opinion the court held that the net income was not subject
to tax since it was not derived from transactions partly within and partly
without Missouri-a negative approach to the problem.
However, that decision can hardly be considered authoritative, since
the later decision of It re Kansas City Star Co. discussed above. In that
case the court cast considerable doubt on its earlier opinion and said that
the directory control, which was located in Missouri, must be considered a
partial source of the income, if such directory control "efficiently entered
into the processes by which income was earned.'10 Therefore, if a case
involving facts similar to those in the Burkhart case were today presented
to the supreme court, it would probably hold that the income should be
allocated.
The most recent supreme court decision on the question of source of
income is Union Electric Co. v. Coale." In that case the company, a
domestic corporation, had received dividends from stock owned by it in
eight foreign corporations and one loreign stock company operated by

8.
9.
10.
11.

346
345
346
146

Mo. 658, 142 S. W. (2d) 1029, 1037 (1940).
Mo. 1131, 139 S. W. (2d) 502 (1940).
Mo. 658, 142 S. W. (2d) 1029, 1039 (1940).
S. W. (2d) 631 (Mo. 1940).
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trustees. The dividends were paid out of funds derived from capital
employed and operations carried on it the domicile states of the companies
paying the dividends. None of those companies employed any capital or
carried on any operations in Missouri.
The state auditor made two points in support of his contention that
these dividends were derived from sources in Missouri. In the first place
he claimed that Section 10117, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929,12 applies
to this case, and it defines "income" to include dividends. The court
answered this contention by pointing out that Section 10115, Missouri
Revised Statutes, 1929,13 expressly taxes only income derived from sources
in this state, and Section 10117, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, defines
"income," not "income from sources in this state." The court refused
to read out of the statute the requirement that income be received from
sources in this state.
Secondly, the auditor claimed that the shares of stock, evidenced by
the stock certificates, had a situs in this state and such situs should be
considered the source of the dividends. The court held that neither the
stock certificates nor the shares of stock could be considered the source of
the income. "Source," it said, "must be taken according to its common
usage, and that is the cause or origin of a thing." The cause or origin of
the dividends was necessarily the business which gave them birth and that
was located outside Missouri.'1 4 Therefore, the court held that no tax
could be assessed on the dividends.
II.

VALIDITY OF CITY ORDINANCES IMPOSING LICENSE TAXES

Last year the supreme court decided two cases challenging the
validity of certain license taxes imposed by the City of Cape Girardeau
and the City of St. Louis.
In City of Cape Girardeauv. Groves Motor Co. 5 the principal question involved was whether the license tax imposed by that city violated
Section 3, Article X, of the Missouri Constitution. That constitutional
provision says taxes "shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax."

12.
13.

Mo. REv.

STAT.

Mo. REv.

STAT.

(1939) § 11345.

(1939) § 11343(3).

14. This concept of source of dividends has been adhered to by the Board

of Tax Appeals in construing certain provisions of the Federal Income Tax Law.
See, In appeal of Standard Marine Ins. Co., 4 Board of Tax Appeals 853, and In
appeal of Codington, 6 Board of Tax Appeals 413.
15. 346 Mo. 762, 142 S. W. (2d) 1040 (1940).
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The license tax under question was imposed upon the privilege of
engaging in a number of occupations or businesses, including automobile dealers and auto accessory dealers. According to the ordinance imposing the tax, the amount payable by an applicant for a license for any
given year was computed with reference to the amount of business such
applicant had done during the preceding year. Thus, the amount payable
by an applicant who in the preceding year had gross receipts of $5000
or less was $11.25. For each additional $1,000 or fractional part thereof
the tax was $2.25. If the applicant had not been engaged in business
during the preceding year, the tax was computed on the estimated amount
of business the applicant would enjoy during the year the license was in
effect. At the end of that year an adjustment of the license tax was
made upon the basis of the gross receipts actually enjoyed during the
year.
The court upheld the claim of the Groves Motor Company, an automobile dealer and auto accessory dealer, that the tax violated the uniformity provision of the constitution. The discrimination arose from the
different measures of the tax which were applicable to established dealers
and to those commencing business. For example, if an established dealer
did a $500,000 business in the year preceding the tax year and a $250,000
business during the tax year, he would be required to pay $1,125, while
a new dealer who also did a $250,000 business during the tax year would
be required to pay only $562.50. Since the supreme court did not believe
there was a reasonable basis for placing new dealers and established dealers
in different classes, the tax was declared unconstitutional.
Ploch v. City of St. Louis" was a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an
ordinance of the City of St. Louis taxing cigarette merchants located in
that city. The amount of tax payable was $1.00 per thousand of cigarettes
sold, offered, or displayed for sale at retail, plus an annual registration fee
of $1.00. Although several constitutional and statutory objections were
raised and disposed of by the court in favor of the tax, only one is of
sufficient interest to be considered here, namely, the contention that the
taxing ordinance violated Sections 23 and 25 of Article IX of the Missouri
Constitution.
In brief, those sections require ordinances of the City of St. Louis to
be in harmony with state statutes. The claim of conflict was rested on
the provisions of Section 47 of the Missouri Sales Tax Act, enacted in
16. 345 Mo. 1069, 138 S. W. (2d) 1020 (1940).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1

100

et al.: Work on the Missouri Supreme Court
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1940
1937, which prohibited any city from either directly or indirectly imposing
a tax upon sales of tangible personal property which were taxed by the
State, under the provisions of that act.17 Since the sale of cigarettes was
admittedly subject to the State Sales Tax, the point at issue was whether
the tax imposed by the city ordinance constituted a direct or indirect
tax upon the sale of cigarettes. The court divided on this point, the majority holding that the ordinance did not directly or indirectly tax the
sale of cigarettes and the minority taking a contrary position,
In the absence of Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, there could be no
question but that Section 7596, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929,11 permitted the tax ordinance under question. The majority could not find in
Section 47 sufficient legislative intent to suspend the operation of that
section. They, in effect, held that the ordinance was not a tax on the
sale of cigarettes, since it was an occupation tax falling on the seller rather
than the purchaser.
In a strong opinion the minority took the position that Section 47
clearly showed an intent to limit the power of taxation previously enjoyed
by municipal authorities. A consideration of the history of the Sales
Tax Act and of provisions other than Section 47, they claimed, buttressed
their construction of that section. Then, turning to what would seem to
be the more controversial point, the minority expressed their opinion that
the ordinance was at least an indirect tax upon the sale of cigarettes.
They felt that a tax imposed on the seller was as much a tax on the sale
imposed on the purchaser. 20 However, it should be noticed that the tax
was $1.00 per thousand on cigarettes sold, offered, or displayed for sale

17.

Mo. Laws 1937, p. 568. Section 47 provided:

"No city, town or village, whether organized by general law or by special

charter, shall, either directly or indirectly, levy, impose or collect any tax upon
the sale of or charge for any tangible personal property taxed by the state under

the provisions of this act, or, upon the sale of or charge for any service or other
thing taxed by the state under the provisions of this Act."

18. The majority opinion was written by Judge Gantt, with Judges Hays,

Clark, Tipton and Douglass concurring. Chief Judge Leedy concurred in the
dissenting opinion written by Judge Ellison.
19. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 7744.
20. That position is strongly supported by authority. For example, in
Panhandle Oil Company v. Mississippi, 277 U. S.218 (1928), cited by the court,

Mississippi had imposed on dealers a privilege tax of a specified number of
cents per gallon on sales of gasoline. The question involved was whether the
tax might constitutionally be imposed on sales to certain instrumentalities of the
United States. The majority held that the tax could not be so imposed since it in
effect constituted a tax on the purchaser, the United States Government. The
minority agreed that the tax was against the United States but felt that it
should be liable like any citizen of the state. Both the majority and minority
recognized that the incidence of the tax, though purportedly on the seller, was in

fact on the purchaser, since the seller would pass it on in the sales price.
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at retail. Although neither the majority nor the minority mentions the
point, it would seem that the tax had no necessary relation to a sale of
cigarettes since it would be equally applicable if the cigarettes were displayed for sale but never sold. Nevertheless, from a practical point of
view, cigarettes displayed or offered for sale would in all probability be
sold, and the tax would be paid out of the proceeds of the sale.
III. PROPERTY TAX ON THE DISTRIBUTABLE PROPERTY OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

The complicated and obtuse provisions of the statute taxing the distributable property of public utilities were twice before the supreme
court in 1940.
In State ex rel. Halferty v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.21 the
Collector of Revenue of Clay County brought suit to recover alleged delinquent taxes from the utility company. The taxes were purportedly
based on an assessment of a part of the distributing system of the utility
to Public Water Supply District No. 1 of Clay County. The major premise
of the court was that the assessment of property and levy of taxes thereon
could not be sustained, unless clearly authorized by statute. 22 Therefore,
the court made a careful examination of the statutory provisions, relating
to the taxation of the distribution system of utilities, to determine whether
the particular assessment was authorized thereby.
According to the statute the distributable property of electric utilities
must be assessed and taxed in the same manner as the statute provides for
the taxation of railroad property.2 3 Turning to the statutory provisions
relating to taxes on railroads, we find that the president or other chief
officer of the railroad company must furnish the state auditor with a
statement containing information as to the railroad property, its value,
the mileage within the state and the mileage in each county, municipal
township, incorporated city, town or village. 24 On the basis of that
statement the State Tax Commission originally assesses the property,
subject, however, to the power of the Board of Equalization to adjust
and equalize the assessment and to allocate it among the various taxing
districts. -" The assessment must be allocated by the board to each county,
municipal township, city or incorporated town in which the railroad has
21.

346 Mo. 1069, 145 S. W. (2d) 116 (1940).

24.
25.

Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 11243, 11295.
Mo. Rzv. STAT. (1939) §§ 11027, 11247, 11248.

22. That is, of course, a well-established principle of tax law. See State
ex 'el. Union Electric L. & P. Co. v. Baker, 316 Mo. 853, 293 S. W. 399 (1927).
23. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 11295.
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That allocation is then certified to the county court which
trackage.2
levies the taxes for state, county, municipal township, city, incorporated
27
town and village purposes "and for other purposes."
The court held that those statutory provisions did not authorize an
assessment and levy of taxes for the benefit of the water district. The
water district, though admittedly a political corporation, could not, the
court held, be considered a county, city, town or village. Neither could it
be thought a municipal township. The phrase "and for other purposes,"
the court held, referred only to taxes by school districts. In so holding,
the court relied primarily on the definition of the phrase "and for other
purposes," contained in Section 11267 of the Missouri Revised Statutes,
1939.28-

The second case involving the taxation of the distributable property
of public utilities was State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Evans. 29 In that
case St. Louis County brought an original certiorari proceeding in the
supreme court to review certain orders of the State Tax Commission and
the State Board of Equalization. Those orders required the Terminal
Railroad Association and four railroad corporations in which it owned all
the stock to make separate returns of their distributable property.3° The
findings of fact made by the State Tax Commission showed that the
Terminal Railroad Association held written leases of the trackage of two
of its subsidiaries and had working agreements with the other two whereby
it used their tracks in consideration of the payment of their corporate
expenses and the maintenance of their tracks. The court held that the
working agreements, though oral, constituted leases of the trackage.

26. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 11253.
27. Mo. RLv. STAT. (1939) § 11259.
28. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 11267, provides:
"Whenever and wherever the words 'and for other purposes' occur in this
article, they shall be held to mean taxes or taxation for other purposes, and shall
be construed to include all taxes, estimates for which shall have been made
or the levy of which shall have been lawfully directed by any school meeting,
school officer or school board, other than taxes for school purposes, and taxes
for the erection of public buildings herein provided for."
29. 346 Mo. 209, 139 S. W. (2d) 967 (1940).
30. St. Louis County wanted the Terminal Railroad Association to make
a tax return for its subsidiaries, because the county would thereby receive a
larger portion of the taxes than would otherwise be the case. The rolling stock
and most of the other distributable property iised by the terminal and its subsidiaries were owned by the terminal. Since the terminal had trackage only in the
City of St. Louis, none of that distributable property would be allocated to the
county for taxation unless the terminal was required to include in its return
the trackage of subsidiaries located in the county. If such a return were required,
the county would be entitled to tax that portion of all the distributable property
of the terminal which the mileage of main tracks in the county bore to the total
mileage of main tracks.
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Since the Terminal Railroad Association held leases on the tracks of
the four subsidiaries and controlled them through stock ownership, the
court held that it should include in its tax return the trackage of all four
companies. This would seem to be in accord with the applicable statutory
provisions. 31
IV. MIscELRANEOUS
32
State v. Shell Pipe Line Corporation
was a suit to recover the corporation franchise tax imposed by Section 5113, Missouri Revised Statutes,
1939. In line with its earlier decisions, the court held that the tax was
imposed only on corporations doing an intrastate business and was to be
measured by that business.3 3 Thus the question involved was whether the
facts in the case showed that the pipe line corporation engaged in
intrastate as well as interstate business. After an extensive discussion of
those facts the court concluded that all the company's business was either
interstate or purely incidental thereto, or consisted of isolated and casual
intrastate transactions. Such transactions, the court concluded, did not
affect the ordinary interstate business carried on by the company and
could not be considered as bringing it under the taxing act.
The court further held that the pipe line company must be considered
as an entity distinct from its parent corporation in determining its
liability to tax.
State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Neaf 34 was a certiorariproceeding to review the assessment of certain trust certificates for property
taxes. Relator contended that the certificates were not taxable since they
represented merely a beneficial interest in real estate which was already
taxable at its full value. The court refused to pass on the question of
taxability on the ground that it was not presented by the record on

31.

Mo.

REv. STAT. (1939) § 11242, says:
all other property, real, personal or mixed, owned, hired or leased

by any railroad company or corporation in this state shall be subject to taxation
Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 11243, says:

"On or before the first day of January in each and every year, the president

or other chief officer of every railroad company . . . shall furnish to the
state auditor a statement . .
setting out in detail . . . all other movable
property owned, used or leased by them . . ."
Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 11253, provides:
"Said board shall apportion the aggregate value of all property hereinbefore
specified belonging to or under the control of each railroad company .

32. 345 Mo. 1222, 139 S.W. (2d) 510 (1940).
33. See, for example, State v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 339 Mo. 459, 97 S. W.
(2d) 109 (1936).
34. 346 Mo. 86, 139 S. W. (2d) 958 (1940).
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certiorari. That question, it said, could only be decided on the basis of
the evidence presented to the Board of Equalization, and evidence presented to the board was not properly a part of the certiorarirecord. The
court also refused to consider the findings made by the board on the
basis of that evidence. Even assuming that the findings of the board
35
might be considered on certiorari,
the court said, those here made cannot
be considered since they are in reality nothing but conclusions of law.

TORTS
GLENrN A. MCCLEARY*

Although the. volume of business presented from the field of Torts
each year continues to be heavy, important developments in theory occur
only occasionally. During the year under review there was no substantial
development in this area of the law except in the subject of libel. The cases
involving the humanitarian doctrine are treated at another place in this
issue so that the developments in the administration of that doctrine may
receive adequate emphasis.1 A few cases, however, do have some features
of interest, although most of them involve the application of well settled
rules to varying sets of facts.
I.
A.

NEGLIGENCE

Duties of persons in certain relations
1.

Possessors of Land

The court, on certiorarito quash an opinion bf an intermediate court
on the ground of conflict with previous decisions upon similar sets of facts,
in State ex rel. First National Bank in St. Louis v. Hughes,2 compares
the various decisions having to do with the responsibility of a proprietor
to an invitee for injuries resulting from a fall due to slippery condition
35. In State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Evans, supra, note 29, the court
considered the findings of the State Tax Commission as a part of the record on
certiorari.
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri.
A.B., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1917; J.D., University of Michigan, 1924; S.J.D.,
Harvard, 1936.
1. Infra at p. 447.
2. 346 Mo. 938, 144 S.W. (2d) 84 (1940).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941

105

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1941], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 6

of steps and floors, depending upon the state of the plaintiff's knowledge
of the condition. Here the plaintiff's fall occurred on marble steps leading
down to the first floor of the bank from a street entrance. The steps were
of cream color, smooth polished marble, with no wear apparent upon their
surface. Due to rainy weather on the particular day, other patrons had
tracked in from the outside sufficient water to make the steps slippery, a
condition which was not actually noticed by the plaintiff. The knowledge
that it was raining outside and that there would be a certain amount of
water tracked inside the bank was insufficient to charge the plaintiff with
knowing and recognizing the unsafe condition resulting from water being
upon the particular steps. Thus the court distinguished the case from
those where the slippery condition was obvious.
In Lindquist v. S. S. Kresge Co.,3 the danger alleged was the worn and
dangerous conditions of a stairway in a store accompanied by improper
lighting, so that a prospective customer could not discover the danger.
There was no dispute over the applicable rule of law, the only question being
whether the facts tended to show due care in lighting the stairway. 4 A
similar situation was presented in Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co.," where
a landlord was sought to be made liable for injuries received by a visitor
in a tenement house which were sustained when the plaintiff fell down a
stairway, on the theory that the stairway was insufficiently lighted under an
ordinance requiring a proprietor of a tenement house of two stories or more
to provide a light in the common halls and stairways of each floor. Again
the conflict was with regard to the evidence and not in relation to the
applicable principles for liability. The ordinance was construed to require
only one light on the second floor, whether the light fixture was directly in
or over the stairway or not.
The duty of an abutting property owner and his tenant to a pedestrian
as to a coal hole cover in the adjacent sidewalk was presented in Bond v.
Weiner.6 An instruction that it was negligence on the part of the owner
and tenant of the adjacent building to fail to lock the coal hole cover
placed a greater burden on the owner and tenant than the law required.
The court recognized that such structures are not unlawful or a nuisance
3. 345 Mo. 849, 136 S. W. (2d) 303 (1940).
4. In Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R., 346 Mo. 28, 142 S. W. (2d)
455 (1940), a pedestrian standing on the platform of a railroad station, where he
intended to send a telegram, was quite properly held to be an invitee.
5.
6.

144 S. W. (2d) 62 (Mo. 1940).
346 Mo. 258, 140 S. W. (2d) 25 (1940).

On the liability for sidewalk

structures placed there by the abutting owner or occupier, see note (1941) 6 Mo.
L. Ray. 122.
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per se when properly constructed, in good repair, and, when closed, providing a safe passage to pedestrians.
In Luettecke v. City of St. Louis,7 the question was whether sufficient
evidence had been shown to establish negligence on an abutting property
owner who was alleged to have caused an artificial discharge and accumulation of water on the sidewalk from the construction of a terrace adjoining
the sidewalk, resulting in a slippery condition in the walk when the water
froze. The plaintiff failed to show with reasonable certainty that she
slipped on ice that formed from drainage from the terrace, rather than
on ice which formed on the sidewalk from the freezing rain.
The court reasserted the well-established principles of liability of a
municipality for dangerous conditions resulting from the accumulation
of ice and snow on the sidewalks in Walsh v. City of St. Louis.8 While
there was a general condition of ice making the sidewalks slick and slippery
on the morning the pedestrian was injured, at the place where the pedestrian
fell the ice was rough and heavy, having accumulated and remained there
over the previous three or four weeks. The dangerous condition in the sidewalk existing at the place of the injuries was not common to the general
condition throughout the city.
2. Automobiles
No new principles of law pertaining to automobile accidents were
developed during the period under review. A question was presented
in State ex rel. Avderso v. Hostetter,9 involving the procedural problem
as to whether an instruction may be given covering a cause of action not
stated in the petition but where evidence has been introduced without
objection tending to prove such cause of action. The court distinguished
between those situations where the petition was amendable, that is, where
the omitted averment with respect to which the evidence was received
could have been incorporated in the petition, had the pleader so requested,
without having changed the cause of action attempted to be inserted therein,
and the instant case where the plaintiff's instructions which submitted
an issue outside the cause of action stated in the petition even though
evidence tending to prove such cause of action had been admitted without
objection. The petition alleged merely that the trucker negligently parked
his truck on the traveled portion of the highway and negligently failed
7. 346 Mo. 168, 140 S. W. (2d) 45 (1940).
8. 346 Mo. 571, 142 S. W. (2d) 465 (1940).
9. 346 Mo. 249, 140 S. W. (2d) 21 (1940).
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to warn travelers by flares or lights. An instruction was not justified on
negligent failure to remove the truck from the traveled portion of the
highway on the ground that the petition charged negligent parking and
that it could have been negligently parked only through a violation of a
rule of the Public Service Commission, ° and that the petition would have
to be taken as alleging a violation of such rule, in the absence of allegations
of facts constituting the violation, including facts with respect to the
possibility of removing the truck. The court also distinguished this situation where there was an attempt to allege negligence in the doing of a
particular act from those cases where there was simply a general charge of
negligence.
1
where more
The case may also be compared with Herrington v. Hoey,"
than one act of negligence of the same character and leading to the same
result are alleged and proof of one is sufficient to sustain the verdict for
the plaintiff, the defendant is not prejudiced simply because another
was submitted of which there may not have been sufficient proof. There
a motorist also collided with a stalled truck on the highway at night. The
instruction given for the plaintiff authorized a recovery if the defendants
left the truck and trailer parked north of the center line of the pavement
headed west "without any red light or other warning on the back end
thereof. . . ." The use of the italicized words in the instruction was
not error as against the contention that such phrase was broader than
the pleadings or the evidence.
The same question was raised in Oesterle v. Kroger Grocery & Baking
2
Co.,1 where in a suit for personal injuries caused by a collision
between
plaintiff's automobile and the defendant's tractor and trailer, negligence
was charged in not stopping and in turning onto the southbound lane
of the highway. The instruction contained both elements of such negligence
which were stated in the conjunctive. Assuming the truth of the appellant's
contention that the charge on failure to stop should not have been submitted
on the ground there was no evidence to support it, it was not prejudicial
error since a recovery was not based on it alone but in conjunction with
the other ground which was amply supported by the evidence.
In White v. Powell, 3 instructions that failure to exercise the "highest

10.
11.
12.
13.

Rule 56 of General Order 27 of the Missouri Public Service Commission.
345 Mo. 1108, 139 S. W. (2d) 477 (1940).
346 Mo. 321, 141 S. W. (2d) 780 (1940).
346 Mo. 1195, 145 S. W. (2d) 375 (1940).
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degree of care" and to exercise "ordinary care" constituted negligence
were in direct conflict and constituted prejudicial error.
3.

Railroads

The fact that the respondent would have been a trespasser, had it not
been for the user by several hundred men who work in the area and who
cross the appellant's tracks at the place where the respondent was struck by
the defendant's train, did not excuse the appellant from its duty to keep
a lookout in Yakubinis v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. B.'4 There the respondent sat down on the rail where the path approached the right-of-way,
awaiting the end of the lunch hour when he intended to go to the camp
office to apply for a job. Since it seemed to be conceded by the appellant
that the respondent was oblivious to his peril, the appellant having him
lying on the track instead of sitting on the rail, the facts did not sustain
the instruction offered by the appellants that the engineman had a right
to assume the respondent would exercise, while on the track, reasonable
care for his own safety. On ordering a rentittitur because of excessive
damages allowed by the trial court, the court observed the "unfortunate
practice which we recognize has arisen in some of the circuits under which
the trial judge declines to interfere with the amount of the verdict, no matter
how excessive on the ground that the appellate court will ultimately determine the matter." The court stated that "This practice should be
discontinued." To be compared on the facts with this case is Carpenterv.
Kurn,15 where there were no additional facts to take the plaintiff out of the
trespasser class while sitting on the defendant's railroad tracks. In such
case there is no duty owed to the pedestrian until his position of peril
is actually discovered.
In Carson v. Baldwin, 6 the plaintiff while riding at night as a guest
in an automobile was injured when the driver of the car, suddenly discovering that the street was blocked by a flat car on one of defendant's
trains, turned sharply to avoid a collision and the automobile upset causing
the injuries. The plaintiff based his petition both on negligence for
blocking the street without providing a warning and on the violation of
the statute making it a misdemeanor for a railroad to block any public
crossing for more than five minutes anywhere in the state, except in cities

14. 345 Mo. 943, 137 S. W. (2d) 504 (1940).
15. 345 Mo. 877, 136 S. W. (2d) 997 (1940).
homa law.
16. 346 Mo. 984, 144 S.W. (2d) 134 (1940).

The case is governed by Okla-
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and towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants. No provision is made for the
latter under the statute. The court held this statute was unconstitutional
as special legislation and unreasonable classification in exempting its
application to cities of over 10,000 inhabitants, and because the legislature
may not enact a law making the same act a crime if committed in one
locality and not punishable if committed in another. The instruction
incorrectly stating the law on this point was ground for reversal. The
other ground of negligence in blocking a street without providing a warning
under the circumstances was properly submitted to the jury. The evidence
showed that only the narrow edge of the platform of the car was visible
to persons coming along the street, the car was not in motion, the crossing
was unlighted, and a light fog or mist reduced the visibility. To be compared with this case is Dimond v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis,"
where the plaintiff was injured when the automobile in which she was
riding as a guest collided with one of defendant's trains at a public crossing.
The automobile struck a coal car near the center of a long freight car
train as the train moved slowly over a railroad crossing in a village. The
question was whether there was sufficient evidence to make a submissible
case under the exception to the general rule that a train upon a crossing
is adequate notice to all of its presence, that is whether or not additional
warnings were necessary to reasonable care under the special facts and
circumstances to the particular crossing. The court gives some guide as to
what kind of evidence is essential to prove these special conditions.
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The question as to the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
where one to whom a duty of care is owed is injured by a projection from a
car in a passing train, was presented in Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
R. R. 18 There the plaintiff was injured while standing on the platform of
the defendant's railroad station where he was struck by the open door
of a refrigerator car of a passing train. The inspection of the car and
operation of the train were in the exclusive control of the railroad company.
The evidence showed that the train was newly made up in the appellant's
yards less than a mile from the scene of the accident and a thorough
inspection completed less than thirty minutes before it pulled out. This
was about ten minutes before the accident. In holding the doctrine ap17. 346 Mo. 333, 141 S. W. (2d) 789 (1940).
346 Mo. 28, 142 S. W. (2d) 455 (1940).

law. 18.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1

The case is governed by Illinois

110

et al.: Work on the Missouri Supreme Court
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1940
plicable, the court repeats its present position on the effect of rebutting
evidence on the doctrine, on the burden of proof, the burden of evidence,
and its weight as to judge and jury.
C.

Imputed Negligence

The presumption arising from mere proof of ownership in the defendant of a commercial truck which is involved in an accident, and the
presumption arising from mere proof that the driver of the truck was in the
general employ of the defendant, were sufficiently overcome by proof that
the driver was acting outside the scope of his employment, in the case
of Sowers v. Howard.19 There a gasoline distributor, driving his own
truck which had upon it the gasoline company's tank, collided with the
plaintiff's automobile while the former was on a return trip from a town
where he had obtained a helper for himself. The fact that he had delivered
motor oil for the gasoline company on the outbound trip on the night
previous to the day of the accident did not impose liability upon the company, where the company had no information of the intention of the distributor to do anything except to get the helper. Such delivery was held
to be merely causal and incidental to the trip, and hence the company could
not be said to have consented to the combining of the distributor's own
business or pleasure with the business of the company.
Where a fellow employee deliberately and without the customary warning turned loose from his side of a heavy tie rod which four employees were
lifting together, it was held in Steeley v. Kurn0 that the act was not in
furthering the employer's business, interfering with it instead, so that the
railroad employer was not liable for negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act to another employee injured thereby. The case had
to be determined on the plaintiff's theory of the facts since the defendant
asked for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. The plaintiff's
evidence tended to show that the fellow employee did not step or stumble,
therefore showing that he intentionally dropped the rod. The plaintiff's
evidence so considered in this light made out too much to sustain a recovery.
D.

Causation

No new developments or new situations in the field of causation appeared during the year in the torts cases. However, two statements taken
19. 346 Mo. 10, 139 S. W. (2d) 897 (1940).
20. 146 S. W. (2d) 578 (Mo. 1940).
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from different cases may be compared to throw more light on two types of
problems presented in any case in determining the causal relation between
defendant's act and the plaintiff's injury essential to liability. In Rose v.
Thompson,2' the court said "there must be substantial evidence that the
negligence for which defendant was responsible caused or contributed to
plaintiff's injuries as a direct and proximate cause thereof before a case
is made for the jury."
It further elucidated its idea in stating that
"the test of whether there is a causal connection between the alleged negligence and the injury is that the facts show that, absent the negligent
act, the injury would not have occurred." In Gray v. Kurn,22 the court
said "in determining proximate cause the question is not whether a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen the particular injury which
happened, but a defendant is liable for an injury which, after the occurrence is complete, appears to be the reasonable and probable consequence of defendant's act or omission. The term "proximate cause"
in the first case would seem to be used in the sense of "cause in fact" or
"actual cause'"'-butfor the defendant's negligence the plaintiff would not
have been hurt. But "proximate cause" in the second case is used in the
sense of "cause in law" or "legal cause"-a limitation on responsibility
even though there is some causal connection in fact. Causation problems
are made difficult by virtue of the language employed such as "proximate"
23
-an ambiguous word at best.
E. Defenses in negligence cases
Deceased motorist was found guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law, in Fitzpatrickv. Kansas City Southern Ry.,2 4 whose automobile ran into the side of a freight train at a crossing, where the evidence
for the administratrix showed that the motorist drove through a dense fog
and smoke for a distance of approximately 200 feet before colliding with
the freight train, and did not slacken his speed of about 20 miles per hour
as he approached the crossing although he was aware of its existence.
A prima facie showing of contributory negligence was made in State
ex rel. Alton R. R. v. Shain,25 on the part of a guest in a trailer truck in
an action against the railroad company and the operator of a motor train

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

346
345
See
146
346

Mo. 395, 141 S. W. (2d) 824 (1940).

Mo. 1027, 137 S. W. (2d) 558 (1940).
similar criticism and observation in note (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 124.
S. W. (2d) 560 (Mo. 1940).
Mo. 681, 143 S.W. (2d) 233 (1940).
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for the death of the trailer truck occupant in the collision, where there was
a substantial showing that the deceased could have seen and did see the
train as soon as the truck driver, knew they were approaching a railroad
track, knew an oncoming train would be concealed by the shrubbery,
failed to caution the truck driver by his side of the speed of the truck,
although he could and should have known what distance was required to
stop the truck.
The well-settled rule was reasserted in Carpenter v. Ku.rn, 26 that one
who has become intoxicated voluntarily is held to the same standard of
care as that required of one sober, and if he fails to exercise such degree
of care for his own safety which the ordinary prudent sober person would
exercise under the same or similar circumstances, he is guilty of contributory negligence where such failure contributes as a legal cause to
the injury of which he complains. There it was held that a pedestrian
sitting on a railroad track when a train was about due to come, and going
to sleep or losing himself in meditation, was negligent, whether drunk
or sober.
Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-TexasR. R.217 was an action by a pedestrian
who, while standing on the platform of a railroad station where he intended
to send a telegram (invitee), received injuries when he was either struck
by an open door of a passing freight car, which projected twenty-six
inches, or by a door lever projecting eighteen and a half inches beyond
the edge of the door. Considering the slow speed of the train, the fact
that most of it had passed by, and that the respondent was rightfully
on the platform, the court concluded that he was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law, but that the question was for the jury even
though he was close enough to be within range of the open car door projecting out twenty-six inches.
Assumption of risk was raised as a defense in Barrett v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry.,28 where a brakeman on defendant's freight train was
injured while aiding in repairing a split switch. He fell from a board
with which he was attempting to pry up a bent tie rod when the engineer
struck with a sledge hammer a brindle rod which was connected to the tie
rod. The action was brought under the Federal Liability Act. It was
held that the risk incurred by a brakeman on a freight train in repairing
this split switch was not an ordinary risk of the brakeman's employment
26. 345 Mo. 877, 136 S. W. (2d) 997 (1940).
27. 346 Mo. 28, 142 S. W. (2d) 455 (1940).
28. 143 S. W. (2d) 60 (Mo. 1940).
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where it did not appear that repairing a split switch was a part of the
brakeman's regular duties or that the method employed at the time of the
accident was the usual method for doing that kind of work, neither was it
an extraordinary risk due to the negligence of a fellow employee which
was obvious or fully known and appreciated by the brakeman so as to
preclude recovery under the Act.
II. LmIEL AND SLANDER
Perhaps the most significant torts decision of the year was that of
McDonald v. R. L. Polk & Co.,29 in which the question was presented whether
or not the liability of a company conducting a mail advertising business
for mailing libelous per se circulars concerning a prominent attorney should
be governed by the same rules of libel law applicable to newspapers or
broadcasting companies, in view of the service rendered by the company, or
whether the liability should be governed by the rules applicable to a disseminator. The defendant's service consisted of the sale of names and
addresses of thousands of individuals, firms, et cetera, including the service
of addressing envelopes, enclosing the advertising material supplied to it,
and stamping and mailing the materials supplied. The court upheld instructions given for the plaintiff that, if the jury found the circular was
libelous and that the company published it, the verdict was to be for the
plaintiff, notwithstanding the jury might find that the sending and mailing
of the circulars by the company was the result of oversight or mistake, and
without any intention to injure the plaintiff. Such an instruction is an
application of the same theory of liability for libel as is applied to newspapers
and in most instances to broadcasting companies. Had the court accepted
the theory of liability applicable to disseminators, such as news vendors
and circulating libraries, instructions offered by the defendant to the effect
that there was no evidence tending to show that the company had any
knowledge of the contents of the circular supplied to it, and there was no
evidence that there was knowledge on the part of the company of any facts
or circumstances which would cause belief that the circular was likely
to contain libelous matter, would have seemed proper. Knowledge of or
negligence in failing to discover statements which are libelous per se are not
essential facts when one publishes hurtful statements concerning another,
where no other justification exists than for an advertisement or a piece of
news. As in the cases involving the liability for the publication of defama29.

346 Mo. 615, 142 S. W. (2d) 635 (1940).
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tory statements by newspapers and radio stations, emphasis was placed
upon the opportunity for widespread harm under the facts of the principal
case. Furthermore, no one should be permitted to make a profit from
such operations without assuming complete responsibility. The public
interest in sustaining reputations outweighs the public interest in commercial enterprises which see fit to publish such hurtful statements without
other justification than exists for an advertisement. A more complete
discussion of this case is found elsewhere in the Review.30

TRUSTS
W. L.

NELSON, JR.*

The application of the rule regarding the type of proof required to
establish a resulting trust occupied the attention of the Missouri Supreme
Court in the majority of the decisions in the year 1940 involving the law
of trusts.
However, one case, Rand v. McKittrick,' is of special interest since
there, for the first time, the court was called upon to determine the type of
investments which are proper in the case of charitable trusts.
I.

ExPREss TRuSTS

Investment of trust property
Rand v. McKittrick2 is a case of first impression in Missouri on the
question of the power of trustees to invest the funds of a charitable trust
in corporate stocks. The trustees of Barnes Hospital in St. Louis filed an
action to determine their power, under the will by which the trust was
created, in regard to investing the trust funds, and to secure approval
of investments already made, these including common and preferred shares
of stock. The court followed the rule laid down in the Restatement of
30. See note (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 228. Another case considered by the
court during this period involving libel and slander was Fritschle v. Kettle River
Co., 346 Mo. 196, 139 S. W. (2d) 948 (1940). There the petition was held demurrable for failure to set out the actual words used by the defendants' officer
and in not making a prima facie showing of falsity of statement.
*Attorney, Columbia. A.B., University of Missouri, 1933, LL.B., 1936.
1. 346 Mo. 466, 142 S. W. (2d) 29 (1940).
2. 346 Mo. 466, 142 S. W. (2d) 29 (1940).
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the Law on Trusts, Section 227, requiring that in the absence of limiting
provisions in the trust agreement or in the statutes a trustee will not be
restricted to any particular class of securities, but must make only such
investments "as a prudent man would make of his own property having
primarily in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and
regularity of the income to be derived."
The court discussed the rules in other jurisdictions and referred to
the two lines of authority, that known as the New York rule and that known
as the Massachusetts rule. The former does not permit trustees to invest in stocks of private business corporations, while the latter permits such
investments to be made. Both lines of authority, however, generally purport to follow the rule set forth in the Restatement.
The court stated that it has been demonstrated by the decided cases
that trust funds fare no better where the trustees are prohibited from
investing in stocks than they do where the more liberal view is followed,
and that such a fact demonstrates that the preservation of such estates
depends on the honesty and business ability of the trustees, rather than
on an arbitrary classification or limitation of the kinds of securities in
which they may invest the trust funds.
In a comment under Section 227 of the Restatement, referred to above,
the purchase of shares of stock of a company with regular earnings and
paying regular dividends is approved as a proper trust investment if prudent men, with a view to the safety of the investment, are accustomed to
invest in such stock.
II.

RESULTING TRUSTS

Sufficiency of proof
In only one case in which the court was asked to find that a resulting
trust existed did it hold that the evidence was "so clear, positive, cogent,
and convincing as to exclude every reasonable doubt from the chancellor's
mind." The proof in the other cases failed, in the opinion of the court,
to meet this established and familiar test.
In Woodard v. Cohron,3 which was a suit in ejectment, the defendant
Cohron contended that a resulting trust in certain real estate had arisen
to the extent of an undivided one-half interest. The defendant and one
Powell, who owned another tract of land, had executed accommodation
3.

345 Mo. 967, 137 S. W. (2d) 497 (1940).
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notes secured by separate deeds of trust on their properties and on default
both deeds of trust were foreclosed. They later entered into a written
agreement with the purchaser of the property under the terms of which
it was conveyed to Powell, subject to a deed of trust which he executed.
Cohron admitted the written agreement but contended that under a
prior oral agreement with Powell, Cohron was to share equally in the
property. He argued that a resulting trust arose by virtue of the payment
by him of a part of the consideration and that the parol agreement was admissible to show the character of the transaction.
The court held that the testimony was insufficient to establish a resulting trust, because it was not of the character required by the established
rule. The court further held that the oral agreement could create neither
an express nor a resulting trust, since an express trust in land must be
proved by some writing, and a resulting trust never arises by virtue of
an agreement. The court further stated that this was not the case of
a resulting trust arising where the consideration is paid by one person and
the deed is taken in the name of another, or where one person holds the
equitable interest and the property is deeded to another, for here it was
not clearly shown that Cohron paid any part of the consideration for
the conveyance to Powell.
Clubine v. Frazer4 involved an action by the heirs of a deceased woman
to establish their title to certain real estate. They alleged that the husband
of the deceased had purchased and improved the real estate in question with
the proceeds of the latter's separate property which he had appropriated
without the wife's written consent, and that he had taken title in his own
name without her knowledge or consent.
First holding that the action to establish title was barred by the statute
of limitations, the court then said that to establish a resulting trust it is
necessary to plead and prove in detail the facts relied on, and that in this
case the evidence was not sufficiently clear and convincing to show that
such a trust had arisen from the alleged use of the wife's money in the
purchase of the real estate. The court pointed out that the trust must arise
from facts existing at the time of the purchase, that it cannot be created
later by the use of a claimant's money in improving it, and further, that
it cannot arise as a result of oral declarations of the grantee.
5
a widow brought an action against the adIn Schwind v. O'Halloran

4. 346 Mo. 1, 139 S. W. (2d) 529 (1940).
5. 346 Mo. 486, 142 S. W. (2d) 55 (1940).
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ministrator of her deceased husband's estate and sought to establish her
interest and that of her transferees in certain promissory notes which were
payable to third parties and had been endorsed in blank. Plaintiff contended that the notes were purchased with the proceeds of certain real
estate which she and her husband had owned as tenants by the entirety,
and that the notes were likewise held by the entirety. A part of the
proceeds was traced to several of the notes involved in this suit and it was
further shown that the only income of the parties prior to and during
the time the notes were acquired came from this real estate.
The administrator argued that the husband took title to the real
estate in the names of himself and his wife as a matter of convenience only,
since his actions in assuming control over the proceeds from the sale of
the real estate established such an intention on his part, and that a resulting trust in the real estate existed in his favor.
The contention of the wife was upheld, the court denying that a
resulting trust arose in the husband's favor when he purchased the real
estate and took title in the names of himself and his wife. The court
stated that even if the husband had furnished the entire purchase price
of the real estate the law would presume that by naming himself and his
wife as grantees he intended it as a provision for the latter, unless the evidence to the contrary was so clear, cogent, and convincing, so definite and
positive, as to leave no room for doubt.
In Mays v. Jackson6 the court found the evidence sufficient to establish
a resulting trust in certain real estate. The plaintiff alleged that he paid
the purchase price of the property, that it was taken in defendant's name,
and that the latter agreed orally that he would convey to plaintiff on demand. He further alleged that he assumed ownership and improved the
property, but that the defendant then refused to convey to him.
The defendant contended that in this suit the plaintiff was attempting
to enforce an oral contract to create an express trust, which was invalid
under the statute, and that there could not be a resulting trust because
such a trust could never result from an agreement.
The court stated that the fact that there was an express trust, which
was invalid and unenforceable because oral, would not prevent the establishment of a resulting trust by operation of law from the acts of the
parties, that the resulting trust arose from the ultimate facts, that is, the
payment of the consideration by the plaintiff and the taking of the deed in
6. 346 Mo. 1224, 145 S. W. (2d) 392 (1940).
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the name of the defendant, and that the oral agreement was merely evidence
tending to show the relationship of the parties and the character of the
transaction.
III.

CONSTRUCTivm TRUSTS

Following trust property
In Schneider v. Schneider,7 a partner was wrongfully excluded from
a business and the remaining partners transferred the firm assets to a
corporation which they had formed and which they controlled. The
court held that when the remaining partners took over the assets of the
firm they became trustees ex maleficio as to the excluded partner, and that
on the transfer to the corporation it held the property as a constructive
trustee, since it was bound by their knowledge. The court further held
that it was proper to trace the partnership property into the hands of the
corporation and to impress it with the trust or subject it to a lien in favor
of the defrauded partner."

WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
OZBERT W. WATKINS, JR.*
During the year 1940 the Missouri Supreme Court decided numerous
cases that might be classified under the general subject of Wills and Administration, or that at least involved some related question. Many of
these have been omitted here to prevent unduly lengthening the discussion,
and for the further reason that many of them involve questions that could
be discussed to better advantage under some other subject. The fifteen
cases discussed here are those that in the opinion of the writer are more
nearly within the intended scope of this article, and are important cases.
In the discussion of some of the cases, the facts have been simplified by
omitting those necessary only to a subject not intended to be covered here,
or those concerning an unimportant or well-settled point of law.
7. 146 S. W. (2d) 584 (Mo. 1940).
8. In Kinney v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 143 S. W. (2d) 250 (Mo. 1940)
a trust was set aside on the ground that its execution had been procured by
fraud and undue influence.
*Attorney, St. Joseph. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1939.
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CONSTRUCTION

What is probably the leading case dealing with the construction of
wills decided by the court in 1940 is St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kern.
There the testator left his residuary estate in trust to pay one-half the
income to his wife for life and the other half to his daughter for life.
There was the further provision, however, that upon the death of the wife
the trust was to terminate, and after the payment of certain specific bequests, the corpus was to go to the daughter free from trust. The estate
had dwindled in value to a great extent, so that the specific bequests to
take effect on the death of the wife would consume a large portion of the
remainder. The wife renounced the will, and the question arose as to
whether or not this was equivalent to her death, so that the specific bequests
and the remainder to the daughter were accelerated to take effect as of
the time of the renunciation. The court, after reviewing the facts and
circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of making the will,
states that although there would ordinarily be an acceleration of remainders when the widow renounced, that such is dependent on the intention of
the testator, and that a contrary intent appears here. Therefore, the
trust continues until the death of the wife, although the wife has no furthei interest in the trust. The court relies quite heavily on the fact that
the dominant purpose of the testator, as shown by the will itself, was to
provide for his wife and daughter, and that, therefore, the wife should not
be permitted by her renunciation to reduce so largely the amount that the
daughter would receive.
A case of an attempted renunciation, and its effect, was presented to
the court in Sanders v. Jones.2 The will provided that the residue should
go to the wife for life, and then to testator's son "or his heirs at law." The
testator died in May, 1933. In August, 1934, the son executed a written
renunciation of the provisions in his favor. The widow died in 1936.
The court properly held that the word "or" meant "and" and that the
son took a vested remainder, and then proceeded to hold that there was
a presumption of acceptance of the bequest because it was beneficial, and
that the renunciation was too late to take effect.'
1. 346 Mo. 643, 142 S. W. (2d) 493 (1940).
2.

147 S. W.

(2d) 424

(Mo. 1940).

3. The renunciation here was apparently attempted for the reason that the
son was indebted to the Commercial Bank of Shelbina on some promissory notes.
Had the renunciation been successful, the property would have gone to the
grandson of the testator, who was the child of the beneficiary who attempted
to renounce.
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In Burnett v. McHaney,4 the will provided that the property should
go to the testator's wife for her life, thereafter "to be divided equally between the then living brothers, sisters, nieces, and nephews of myself and
wife." The wife pre-deceased the testator by a considerable period of time.
The court properly held that the living brothers and sisters, nieces and
nephews of the testator and his wife took in equal shares per capita, and
not per stirpes.
In Grundmann v. Wilde,5 the will provided for a remainder to "lawful
issue" of his children. The court held that an adopted child was not included in the term "lawful issue."
In Simon v. St. Louis Union Trust Go.,6 it was held that a presumption
of survivorship in the case of property held by husband and wife as tenants
by the entirety was not rebutted by an apparent intent in a will to dispose
of property as if it belonged solely to the testator.
II.

CONTEST OF WILLS

In the year 1940 there were three will contests in which one of the
grounds for the contest was the alleged mental incapacity of the testator.
In one of these, Look v. French7 there was admittedly insufficient evidence
of mental incapacity and the contest proceeded on other grounds.
The first of these cases was Calaway v. Blankenbaker8 It was shown
that the testatrix suffered from arterio sclerosis, high blood pressure and
heart trouble; that she was 71 years of age when the will was executed; had
fainting spells in January, prior to the execution of the will in June; that
for a few days after the fainting spell she had hallucinations as to where
she was and what was going on, which hallucinations continued for ten
or twelve days. A doctor gave an opinion based on assumed facts, such
as her failure to recognize the witness who had gone to see her, that she
was of unsound mind. The verdict of the jury was in favor of the contestant. The supreme court held that as the jury had found for the contestant, all favorable inferences should be drawn in his favor. Nevertheless,
the court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of
mental incapacity. This was true even though the doctor's opinion was
correct, for the reason that a person could be of unsound mind and still

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

148
346
346
346
346

S. W. (2d) 495 (Mo. 1940).
Mo. 327, 141 S. W. (2d) 778 (1940).
Mo. 146, 139 S. W. (2d) 1002 (1940).
Mo. 972, 144 S. W. (2d) 128 (1940).
Mo. 383, 141 S. W. (2d) 810 (1940).
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understand the ordinary affairs of life, the nature and extent of his
property, the natural objects of his bounty, and that he was giving his
property to the persons named in the will as therein set forth.0
I In the same case, there was also a charge of undue influence. The
court again held that there was insufficient evidence to support this charge
and goes on to say that undue influence may be inferred without direct
evidence, but that the facts must at least savor of some act which by reasonable construction may indicate a purpose to gain a pecuniary advantage.
This must not be natural affection but must rise to the mark of over-persuasion, coercion or deception such as breaks the will of the person influenced and puts the will of another in its stead. It was also charged that
the will was improperly executed for the reason that the testator did not
sign in the presence of the witnesses and the witnesses did not sign in the
presence of each other. The court held, citing Section 519, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929,10 that this was unnecessary to the proper execution
of a will.
The other case involving the mental capacity of the testator is Foster
v. Norman." 'Undue influence was also charged. The court, after stating
that the burden of proof on the question of mental capacity remains
throughout on the proponents of the will, then reviews the facts and reverses and remands the case because of the exclusion, on objection by the
contestants, of an opinion of a subscribing witness as to the mental soundness of the testatrix at the time of making the will.
In Look v. French," the contest, in addition to charging mental incapacity of which the evidence was admittedly insufficient, charged undue
influence. In that case the testator left all of his property to his wife
except for certain specific bequests of one dollar each to several brothers,
sisters, nieces, and nephews. The court reviewed several interesting
questions of evidence ana held that the evidence, even with what had been
excluded, was insufficient to make a case. The evidence, some of which
was by offer of proof, was to the effect that the testator was fond of the
nephews and nieces; had furnished medical aid to a sister and was unusually close to his brothers and sisters; that his wife often nagged him; that

9. Quaere: Does the court place the burden of proof on this issue on the
contestants? Some of the language used would seem to indicate that it does. In

this regard cf. Foster v. Norman, 346 Mo. 850, 143 S. W. (2d) 248 (1940), which

is considered later in this discussion.
10.

Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1939) § 520.

11. 346 Mo. 850, 143 S.W. (2d) 248 (1940).
12. 346 Mo. 972, 144 S.W. (2d) 128 (1940).
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testator and his wife sometimes quarreled; that testator had stated he
would divoice his wife except that he was afraid it would ruin him; that
two days after the making of the will he had said he had always had to
do what his wife wanted and now he couldn't even make his own will;
that the wife had stated that she was going to get the testator's will changed
to leave out one of the testator's brothers. The court in holding the evidence insufficient states that motive and opportunity are not enough to
show undue influence. There was also a charge that the will was improperly executed for the reason that testator did not request the witnesses
to sign. However, the testator and the witnesses were in the same room and
the attestation clause was read by the testator and the witness signed together in his presence. The court held it was unnecessary under these
circumstances for the testator to request the witnesses to sign the will as
such a request would be inferred.
In Thomson v. Butler, 3 the contest was on the ground that the probated will had been revoked by a later will which had been lost. The
probated will was executed by testatrix in 1933 and 1934, and the will which
was alleged to have been lost was allegedly executed in 1935. An alleged
carbon copy of the 1935 will was introduced in evidence and the contestant
testified that testatrix had given him the copy of the will; that he had seen
the original and that it was signed by the testatrix and witnessed; that she
had read it to other witnesses and declared it to be her last will. A doctor
testified that testatrix and another came to his office, in 1935; that she
took a paper from an envelope and said she wanted them to witness her
will; that she signed it in their presence and they signed in her presence.
This evidence was uncontradicted. The verdict of the jury was against
contestants and upheld the will. The contestants appealed, contending
that the verdict could not stand because it was contrary to the uncontradicted testimony. The supreme court, after noting that the contestant
did not ask for a directed verdict, went on to hold that the burden of proof
was on the contestant and even though the evidence was uncontradicted the
jury could disbelieve the witnesses. The court in so holding relies to a
great extent upon the case of In re Brown's Will."
The question of abatement and revival of a will contest was before the
15
There the
court in the case of Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.
action to
an
filed
brother
The
heir.
sole
his
testator left his brother as
13. i47 S. W. (2d) 437 (Mo. 1940).
14. 143 Iowa 649, 120 N. W. 667 (1909).
15. 346 Mo. 200, 139 S. W. (2d) 935 (1940).
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contest the will and died several years later while the action was still pending. One of the heirs of this brother here attempted to be substituted as
party plaintiff. The trial court refused to permit the substitution and an
appeal was taken. The supreme court held that a will contest is dependent upon the statute and that the interest of the contestant must be a
direct pecuniary interest in the probate of the will rather than in the
estate. The court also held that the right to contest a will as conferred by
statute is a personal right, cannot be assigned and cannot descend, citing
Braeuel v. Reuther.16 The court goes on to say that a will contest is of a
singular nature, being a proceeding in rem operating directly on the will,
and that once started it must go on to a conclusion and cannot be dismissed.
III.

ADMINISTRATION

State ex rel. Clay County State Bank v. Waltner" was an original proceeding in prohibition. The facts leading up to the prohibition proceeding
were that one Julia Lisby, here referred to as plaintiff, filed a suit in the
circuit court asking for a declaratory judgment and setting up that one
Cyrus Blakely died intestate, leaving herself and some of the defendants
in the declaratory judgment suit as heirs; that shortly before intestate's
death, intestate called her and gave her a safety deposit box and its contents with orders to divide the contents between herself and her three sisters upon his death; that in the box there were certificates of deposit in
the defendant bank and some postal savings bonds; that the bank would not
pay the certificates of deposit, and that the post-office department would
not pay the savings bonds; that the administrators were claiming an interest therein. The bank and another started the prohibition proceeding
in the supreme court contending that the circuit court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter as the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction. The
supreme court in quashing the preliminary writ said that the facts set forth
by the plaintiff's petition in the declaratory judgment action show that she
is trustee and therefore within the terms of the declaratory act.1 8 The
court overruled the defendant's contention that the fact that Cyrus Blakely
gave plaintiff the bonds must be established in probate court before the
question of the establishment of the trust could be decided in the circuit
court.
16.
17.
18.

270 Mo. 603, 193 S. W. 283 (1917).
346 Mo. 1138, 145 S. W. (2d) 152 (1940).
Mo. Laws 1935, p. 218 § 4; Mo. Ruv. STAT. (1939) § 1129; Mo. STAT.

ANN., § 1097d, p. 1388.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/1

124

et al.: Work on the Missouri Supreme Court
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1940
The case of Linville v. Ripley"9 was a suit to quiet title. It was shown
that plaintiff purchased at a sale ordered by the probate court on the
basis of the petition filed therein under Section 146, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929,20 by a bank which, it developed, had no interest in the estate.
The supreme court held that it was proper to admit the record of the
probate court in these proceedings and such record showed that the bank
was not a creditor and not interested in the estate and therefore the order
of the probate court was void and subject to collateral attack in this proceeding.
In Cook's Estate v. Brown,2 1 one Brown in Illinois had obtained a
judgment against Cook on a warrant of attorney. Brown then sued Cook
in MNissouri on the Illinois judgment but Cook died while the suit was pending-. Brown had the action revived against Cook's executor and obtained
a judgment which was certified to the probate court. The probate court
classified the judgment as a fifth-class claim. Brown appealed to the
circuit court, contending that it was a fourth-class claim. The judgment of
the probate court was affirmed and Brown appealed. The supreme court,
citing Section 184, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929,22 holds that the revival has the same effect as the filing of a demand in the probate court and
therefore is the same as though the demand had been filed in the probate
court on the Illinois judgment. After so holding, the decision rests on the
construction of the word "judgment," as used in Section 182, Missouri
Revised Statutes 1929.23 The court then follows the old cases of Harness
v. Green's Administrato, 24 and Gainey v. Sexton's Administrator,2' and
holds that the word "judgment" means domestic judgment and not a
foreign judgment and that therefore the foreign judgment falls in the
fifth class. The court in its opinion notes its disapproval of obtaining
the Illinois judgment by warrant of attorney which is not valid in Missouri,
but gives full faith and credit to the Illinois judgment.
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS

The case of Robertson v. Jones"6 presented a question of first impression in Missouri. The will left one-half of testator's property to his "be19.
20.

146 S. W. (2d) 581 (Mo. 1940).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 145.

21. 346 Mo. 281, 140 S. W. (2d) 42 (1940)..
22. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 183.
23. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 181.
24. 20 Mo. 316 (1855).
25. 29 Mo. 449 (1860).
26. 345 Mo. 828, 136 S. W. (2d) 278 (1940).
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loved wife Zuella Jones." After the execution of the will, testator and his
wife were divorced and there was a property settlement between them
including a cash payment, and the wife released all of her rights to testator's property, including dower. Thereafter, testator died, without changing or revoking the will. The court, in holding the will to be in effect,
reviews the common law under which implied revocations were recognized,
and the decisions of several other states, and concludes that the Missouri
statutes governing revocation of wills are exclusive and has abrogated the
common law doctrine. At the end of the opinion, the court seems to
recognize that this is a harsh result, but states that if the statute is to be
changed it is for the legislature to do it.
In the same case it was also contended that as the will referred to the
wife as "my beloved wife," the devise must lapse, for the reason that
she was not his wife when he died. The court held, however, that the
words "my beloved wife" were merely descriptive.
In Demattei v. Missouri,K. T. R. R., 21 the court follows the generally
accepted rule that a foreign administrator may maintain an action under
the Missouri wrongful death statute,2 for the death of a non-resident resulting from an accident that occurred in Missouri. The court reaches this
result by reasoning that the cause of action is not a local asset in that any
amount recovered goes to those named in the statute, and is not a part of
the estate. For the same reason local creditors could not be hurt, as there
is no diversion of local assets. The court points out that Section 706, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929,29 does not cover this situation, as that section
applies where the cause of action accrued under the laws of another state.

27.
28.
29.

345 Mo. 1136, 139 S. W. (2d) 504 (1940).
Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3262, Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 3652.
Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 857.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Jx mEs

A.

POTTER*

During the year 1940 the ]Missouri Supreme Court considered eight
cases in which some interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Law
was involved.' This is just half the number considered during 1939.
I.

DEFNITIONS

The determination of the status of the owner of a one-man corporation
was involved in Soars v. Soars-Lovelace, Inc. 2 The court's decision turned
on its interpretation of the meaning of the term "employee" contained in
Section 3305, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, 3 (now Section 3695, Missouri
Revised Statutes 1939). The deceased was on a salary considerably greater
than $3600.00 per year, but the company's business had been such that
he had actually received less than that amount during the year preceding
his death.
The court held that the evidence showed that, taking either the
amount credited to deceased on the company's books or the amount he actually received, his average annual earnings exceeded $3600.00 and he was
outside the Act. 4 The court went further and said:
"We, therefore, hold that the substantial owner of an incorporated business, who completely manages and directs its entire
operations, cannot bring himself under the Workmen's Compensation Act by giving back to the corporation part of his salary after
*Attorney, Jefferson City.

A.B., University of Missouri, 1902, LL.B., 1905.

1. The jurisdictional grounds in the eight cases considered were as follows:
Over $7500.00 involved ...............................

4

question involved ...................................

1

Certiorari to Court of Appeals .........................
2
Transferred by Court of Appeals on ground constitutional
Jurisdictional ground not clear .........................

1

Tokash v. Mo. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 346 Mo. 100, 139 S. W.
2d) 978 (1940).

Probably over $7500.00 involved.)

2. 346 Mo. 710, 142 S. W. (2d) 866 (1940).
3. Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1939) § 3695 defines "employee" as follows:, "(a) The
word 'employee' as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean every person

in the service of any employer, as defined in this chapter, under any contract of
hire, express or implied, oral or written, or under any appointment or election,
but shall not include persons
whose average annual earnings exceed three thousand
six hundred dollars. .
4. The ruling was based on the authority of Sayles v. K. C. Structural Steel
Co., 344 Mo. 756, 128 S. W. (2d) 1046 (1939); State ex rel. Mills v. Allen, 344
Mo. 743, 128 S. W. (2d) 1040 (1939); Morse v. Potosi Tie & Lumber Co., 130 S. W.
(2d) 477 (Mo. 1939). The view of the court in the present case appears to be

logically correct and tends to clarify the decision in the Morse case. See (1940)
5 Mo. L. REv., n. 10, p. 506.
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it has become legally obligated to pay him an amount exceeding
that which, under the exclusion clause of the Act, would also prevent him from being within it."
The definition of occupational disease was considered in State ex rel.
Fisher Body St. Louis Co. v. Shain.5 The deceased began working for relator in its paint shop in 1929. His health began to decline in the latter
part of 1933, and in May, 1934, he collapsed at work, became ill, and died
in March, 1936 from tuberculosis, having done no work after May, 1934.
The widow filed claim for compensation which was allowed. The
award was affirmed both by the circuit court and the Kansas City Court
of Appeals. The ruling of the court of appeals, which was under review
in this case, was that there was substantial evidence in the record tending
to prove that deceased continued in good health until 1933, when he became
afflicted with silicosis, an occupational disease, which caused the tuberculosis
of which he died.
Certiorariwas granted on relator's contention that the opinion was
in conflict with the decisions of the supreme court in Wolf v. ilfallinckrodt
Chemical Works" and Downey v. Kansas City Gas Co.7 The conflict seemed
to be that the court of appeals in this" case held that "occupational disease"
under the Compensation Law is not restricted to diseases peculiar or incidental to the employment. 9 The supreme court held that this view of the
court of appeals concerning occupational disease was in conflict with the
Wolf and Downey cases, and the opinion was quashed as to that part.10
On the other hand an award of the commission for the death of an
employee from pneumonia contracted as a result of an accident and not
as an occupational disease, was reversed in Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co."
In holding that there was no "accident" within the meaning of the Act,

5. 345 Mo. 962, 137 S. W. (2d) 546 (1940).
6. 336 Mo. 746, 81 S. W. (2d) 323 (1934).
7. 338 Mo. 803, 92 S. W. (2d) 580 (1936). See comment on this case in
(1937) 2 Mo. L. Rnv. 513.
8. Fitzgerald v. Fisher Body St. Louis Co., 234 Mo. App. 269, 130 S. W.
(2d) loc. cit. 977 (1939).
9. The ruling of the court of appeals was that "in the absence of any

provision (in the Compensation Law) to the effect that an occupational disease

under the Act is a disease 'incident' or 'peculiar' to the work, it is reasonable to
say that the legislature intended that an occupational disease . . . is a disease
caused by or directly resulting from working conditions."
10. The statement of the rule in the Wolf case was that occupational
disease, under the Compensation Law, includes only diseases peculiar and incidental to the employment. In the instant case the court points out that the
statement in the Wolf case was obiter, but that it was adopted in the Downey
case as the law of the case.

11. 346 Mo. 58, 139 S. W. (2d) 918 (1940).
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the court relied on two earlier decisions of the court of appeal. 12 The
distinction was drawn between those cases in which the disease resulted from
exposure in the ordinary course of the employee's work, in which cases
the disease is not compensable, 13 and those cases in which the death or
injury is the result of some abnormal and unforeseen condition in the
employment arising suddenly and which can be said to be a positive factor
in the injury or death. 14
II.

JURISDICTION

In Chubb v. Skelgas Co.'5 the Compensation Commission found that
the accident occurred in Illinois and the contract of employment whs
12. Rinehart v. F. M. Stamper Co., 227 Mo. App. 653, 55 S. W. (2d) 729
(1932); Carter v. Priebe & Sons, 77 S. W. (2d) 171 (Mo. App. 1934).
13. Carter v. Priebe & Sons, 77 S. W. (2d) 171 (Mo. App. 1934), is an
example of this type of situation. In that case the employee was a chicken
picker; his work was done in such a fashion that scalding water was splashed
upon his clothes. From time to time he had to go from the warm picking room
into the cooler, which was kept at a low temperature. Compensation was denied
for pneumonia contracted as a result of these conditions, on the ground there
was no unusual or unexpected event happening suddenly and violently to cause
the disease.
14. Rinehart v. F. M. Stamper Co., 227 Mo. App. 653, 55 S. W. (2d) 729
(1932), and Schulz v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 331 Mo. 616, 56 S. W. (2d) 126
(1932), represent this type of situation. In the Schulz case the employee worked
in a bakery where extremely high temperatures were maintained, which resulted
in death of the employee from a heat stroke. The supreme court held this a

compensable death within the Act, on the theory that an accident occurred (the
heat prostration) and that it arose out of the employment. The Rinehart case
was a common law action for damages based on negligence. The petition alleged
that the plaintiff, employee, was engaged in work that caused him to perspire
freely. On one occasion, when his clothes were wet from perspiration, he was
directed to go into and remain in the refrigeration room which was kept at an
extremely low temperature. As a result of this act he contracted pneumonia.
The petition was dismissed and the case was affirmed on appeal, on the theory
that the facts alleged included all the elements of a compensable case under
the Compensation Law.
These cases may be reconciled on the theory that in the first type there is
no definite act or event that can be pointed out as the cause of the death or
injury, while in the second type there is some occurrence that can be said to be
the cause of the injury, or at least the event out of which the injury resulted.
A statement of the court in the Rinehart case is, however, worthy of consideration; it is as follows:
"It may be said with equal propriety that plaintiff in this case, because
of his duties, was exposed to a special and peculiar danger from cold
resulting in sickness and disability. Evidently the legislature never intended

any discrimination between the ravages of heat and cold incident to employment, and never intended that disability caused by one would be included
while disability caused by the other would be excluded from ,the operation

of the Act.. One element may be as devastating as the other." (55 S. W.
(2d) loc. cit. 732).
The logic of the present case and the Carter case could be applied to the Schulz
case with some degree of plausibility. In these cold cases the courts do not
rely entirely on the exclusion clause of Section 3695, MissouRi REVsED STATUTES
1939, for in the Rinehart case the court of appeals said that the exclusion clause
"contemplates a contagion or infection which does not arise out of the employment, but which is encountered in some manner independent of an accident in
connection with the work of the employee." (55 S. W. (2d) loc. cit. 731).
15. 346 Mo. 22, 139 S. W. (2d) 904 (1940).
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entered into in that state, and that it therefore had no jurisdiction. The
supreme court affirmed the commission's decision, holding that there
was substantial evidence to support the finding as made.
In State ex rel. Mulcahy v. Hostetter,' the decision of the Compensation
Commission, denying jurisdiction because claimant was engaged in interstate commerce, and which had been affirmed by the circuit court and
the St. Louis Court of Appeals, was affirmed by the supreme court. 17
III.

MISCELLANMOUS

The case of McCoy v. Simpson' is merely an application of established
principles to the facts of that particular case' 0 The court affirmed the
award of the commission, holding that it was supported by sufficient competent evidence.
The case of Tokash v. Workmen's Compensation CommissiomN° involved a suit in equity to set aside a judgment of the circuit court reversing
an award of the commission and an order of the commission made pursuant
thereto denying compensation. The facts are interesting. Plaintiff received an award for temporary total disability of $20.00 per week for four
hundred weeks. Employer and insurer appealed. Pending the appeal
the insurer settled with employee for $3800.00 and took a release. Then
a stipulation was filed in the circuit court providing for judgment reversing
the award of the commission and directing it to enter an order denying
compensation. 21 This was accordingly done. This equity action was instituted two years later to set aside this judgment and order.
The court applied the provisions of Section 3723, Missouri Revised
Statutes 1939, which provides that settlements under the Compensation
16. 346 Mo. 65, 139 S. W. (2d) 939 (1940).
17. When employes of carriers are engaged in interstate commerce, their
Tights are governed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. 51,
et seq., which supersedes the Compensation Law. The court applied the test of
long standing established in the case of Shanks v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 239
U. S. 556 (1915), in deciding that the employee was engaged in interstate
commerce.
18.

346 Mo. 72, 139 S. W. (2d) 950 (1940).

20.

346 Mo. 100, 139 S. W. (2d) 978 (1940).

19. Three well established rules are affirmed:
a. The burden is on claimant to show that the injuries causing employee's
death arose out of and in the course of his employment.
b. The commission is the trier of the facts and its award will be sustained
is supported by competent and substantial evidence.
c. Where an employee is found injured at a place where his duties require
him to be, (as here) a presumption arises that he was injured in the
course of his employment, but such presumption is rebuttable.
21. This is contrary to the established principle that the power of the
circuit court extends only to affirming or reversing; it cannot direct the commission to enter an award.
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Act are not valid until approved by the commission. In the absence of
a showing that the settlement was approved, the stipulation, judgment
22
and award were held to be void.
It was decided in Mangiaracinov. Laclede Steel, 22 that the Illinois Com24
pensation Act abolished the common law action for negligence.

22. Under this ruling after an award is made and an appeal taken, no compromise settlement can be made without the approval of the commission prior
to settlement.
23. 145 S. W. (2d) 388 (Mo. 1940).
24. Plaintiff's theory was that the decision of the Illinois court denying
this claim for compensation was conclusive that he had a common law action.
However, our supreme court pointed out that the decision of the Illinois court
was based upon the holding that plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden of proof
that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. Although
this decision involved a construction of the Illinois Act, the decision would be
the same under the Missouri Law.
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